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INTRODUCTION

When Jean Kambanda, former prime minister of Rwanda, pled
guilty to genocide and crimes against humanity for his role in the
mass violence that engulfed his country in 1994,' he expected leniency
I Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S,Judgement and Sentence, para.
3 (Sept. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence], reprinted in 2
ANNOTATED

LEADING

CASES

OF

INrERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

TRIBUNALS:

THE

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 1994-1999, at 793, 794 (Andr6 Klip
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in return. Brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR or Rwandan Tribunal), 2 the seemingly repentant
Kambanda not only expressed his intention to plead guilty immediately, he also provided the prosecution with nearly ninety hours of recorded testimony for use in subsequent trials of senior political and
military leaders3 and promised to testify for the prosecution in those trials.4 For these efforts, Kambanda got nothing. The ICTR Trial Chamber acknowledged that guilty pleas are generally considered mitigating circumstances in the domestic courts of most countries5 but
nonetheless followed the prosecution's recommendation and sentenced Kambanda to the most severe penalty that the ICTR can impose: life imprisonment.6 Outraged, Kambanda immediately stopped
cooperating with the prosecution,7 and he sought to revoke his guilty
plea and proceed to trial." On appeal, Kambanda claimed, among
other things, that the Trial Chamber had failed to consider the general principle of law that a guilty plea warrants a sentence reduction.")
The Appeals Chamber rejected Kambanda's appeal, but it did not call

& Gbran Sluiter eds., 2001) [hereinafter 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS].
2 The United Nations established the ICTR
in order to provide:
[A]n international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States, between IJanuary 1994 and 31 December 1994.
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
3 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-I, Prosecutor's
Pre-Sentencing
Brief, 22-23 (Aug. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Kambanda, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing
Brief] (on file with author).
4 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-1, Plea Agreement
Between Jean
Kambanda and the Office of the Prosecutor, para. 42 (Apr. 29, 1998) [hereinafter
Kambanda, Plea Agreement] (on file with author); see also Lawyer for the FormerRwandan PrimeMinister Arguesfor Light Sentence, INTERNEWS (Sept. 4, 1998) (reporting prosecutors' comments that Kambanda would testify in the genocide trials of other government and military leaders), at http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTR-reports/
ICTRNewsSep98.html.
5 Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para.
61.
6 Id. at Part
IV.
7 Letter from Carla Del Ponte, to Agwu Okali, ICTR Registrar
(Apr. 25, 2000) (on
file with author); Interview with Mohamed Othman, former ICTR Chief of Prosecutions Uan. 25, 2002).
8 Kambanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, Judgement,
para. 3 (Oct. 19,
2000) [hereinafter Kambanda, Appeal], at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/
cases/Kambanda/decisions/191 000.htm.
9 Id. at para.
10(4).
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into question his assertion that guilty pleas are normally compensated,
as it were, by sentence reductions.
Indeed, Kambanda is correct: The countries that use guilty
pleas-primarily Anglo-American countries-usually secure those
pleas by means of the controversial practice of plea bargaining. Plea
bargaining can take many forms," but the term most typically refers to
the prosecutor's offer of some form of sentencing concessions in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea. 2 Although many American
scholars decry plea bargaining,' 3 the practice remains, in the 1971
to Rather, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber had not
abused its discretion in determining that the aggravating factors of the case negated
the mitigating factors, including the guilty plea. Id. at paras. 120, 122, 126.
I See HERBERT S. MILLER, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES, at xii (1978)
(observing that no single definition of plea bargaining is universally accepted);
Malcolm M. Feeley, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining,13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 199, 199-200
(1979) (noting that plea bargaining can involve "negotiation over sentence as distinct
from charge, over dropping all charges as distinct from reducing them, over facts as
distinct from the purely instrumental manipulation of charges [and that each form]
can be implicit or explicit"). Robert Weninger, for instance, states that "[t]he widest
definition of plea bargaining.., includes any inducements that are offered in exchange for a defendant's concession of criminal liability." Robert A. Weninger, The
Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV. 265,
289-90 (1987). Additionally, plea bargaining can be understood to include instances
in which the defendant does not concede his own criminal liability but testifies against
other defendants or becomes an informer. See William F. McDonald, From Plea Negotiation to CoerciveJustice: Notes on the Respecification of a Concept, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 385,
389 (1979) (discussing "[n]egotiation to obtain the state's evidence," such as one party
offering evidence to help convict another party in exchange for a favorable deal from
the state).
12E.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 21 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining that guilty pleas arise when "the prosecution offers certain concessions in return
for the defendant's entry of the plea").
13 Because the literature critical of plea bargaining
is vast, this note lists only a
sampling. See, e.g., LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OFJUSTICE 71-86 (1977) (considering
plea bargaining a "reversal" of the purported theoretical model of all criminal process); Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652
(1981) [hereinafter Alschuler, ChangingPlea BargainingDebate] (asserting that neither
sentencing nor dispute resolution functions serve as adequate justifications for plea
bargaining); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining,84 YALE
L.J. 1179 (1975) [hereinafter Alschuler, Defense Attorney's Role] (claiming that the plea
bargaining system is destructive to attorney-client relationships and that the mere
presence of defense counsel does not adequately guarantee fairness in guilty plea negotiations); Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea BargainingSystem, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983) [hereinafter Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial] (listing multiple problems
involved with plea bargaining and calling for its abolition in many circumstances); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1979)
[hereinafter Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History] (relying on the history of plea
bargaining to refute claims that it is a "necessity" in the criminal justice system); Albert
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words of the United States Supreme Court, "an essential component
of the administration ofjustice" in the United States. 4 And, as a result
of plea bargaining, American defendants who plead guilty do receive
substantially
lower sentences than do defendants who are convicted
15
after trial.
W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968)
[hereinafter Alschuler, Prosecutor'sRole] (arguing that personal and political interests
of prosecutors bias the plea bargaining system, leading to practices such as overcharging); Albert W. Alschuler, The TrialJudge's Role in Plea Bargaining,Part I, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 1059, 1151 (1976) [hereinafter Alschuler, TrialJudge's Role] (addressing the notion that "even when judicial plea bargaining is formally disapproved, it is difficult to
prevent"); Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining,75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 697-99
(2001) (criticizing some forms of plea bargaining); Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea
Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547
(1997) (proposing that plea bargaining is contributing to a legitimacy crisis in the
criminal justice system); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The
Control of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 38 (insisting that prosecutors
"substantially dictat[e] the terms of plea agreements" by making their own assessments
of criminal culpability and appropriate punishment); Kenneth Kipnis, CriminalJustice
and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 105 (1976) (suggesting that "bargains are out of
place in contexts where persons are to receive what they deserve"); Kenneth Kipnis,
Plea Bargaining: A Critic's Rooinder, 13 LAw & SoC'Y REV. 555, 555 (1979) (arguing
against those who wish to reform the plea bargaining system by maintaining that plea
bargaining as a whole sacrifices the value of just deserts and violates basic liberties);
John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining,46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978) [hereinafter
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining] (drawing parallels between the American practice of plea bargaining and the medieval European practice of torture to obtain the
necessary testimony); John H. Langbein, Understandingthe Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAw & Soc'y REV. 261, 261-62 (1979) [hereinafter Langbein, Short History] (arguing that plea bargaining has been allowed to "subvert the design of our Constitution" and eliminate the opportunity to present defenses and have guilt proved beyond
a reasonable doubt); Raymond Moley, The VanishingJury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97 (1928)
(offering data to show an increasing number of guilty pleas while denouncing the simultaneous lack of public responsibility and the unfettered prosecutorial discretion
involved in obtaining these pleas); George W. Pugh, Ruminations Re Reform of American
CriminalJustice (Especially Our Guilty Plea System): Reflections Derived from a Study of the
French System, 36 LA. L. REV. 947 (1976) (proposing that an alternative to the current
process for determining guilt should be entertained); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea
BargainingInevitable?, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1037 (1984) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Is Plea
BargainingInevitable?] (utilizing a sample urban jurisdiction to maintain that plea bargaining can be eliminated or, at the very least, contained); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea
Bargainingas Disaster,101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster] (asserting, among other things, that plea bargaining does not minimize
conviction of the innocent, optimize deterrence, or accurately assess the risk of acquittal and advocating for its abolition); Welsh S. White, A ProposalforReform of the Plea BargainingProcess, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 441 (1971) (suggesting reforms to "minimize
the undesirable consequences of plea bargaining"); Note, The Unconstitutionality ofPlea
Bargaining,83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970) (attacking the state's goal of efficiency as an
unjust reason for usurping constitutional protections).
14 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
15 See William L.F. Felstiner, Plea Contracts in West Germany, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
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As accustomed as American lawyers are to plea bargaining, many
do not realize that the extent of our reliance on the practice is exceptional. In most Continental European countries, for instance, guilty
pleas are unknown, and all cases involving serious crimes proceed to
some sort of trial. 6 The question thus arises as to whether plea bargaining should be practiced in international criminal tribunals, established to prosecute the most heinous offenses. Two ad hoc tribunals
now prosecute those accused of committing genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; similar
entities are being established in Sierra Leone 7 and East Timor,"' and a
permanent international criminal court opened its doors in July
2002. ' The ICTR and its sister tribunal, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY or Yugoslavian Tribunal),' °
309, 314 (1979) ("In the United States, defendants who plead guilty are, in the aggregate, sentenced less severely than those who insist on trial."); Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note 13, at 1993 (noting that, in general, American defendants
who plead guilty receive sentences ranging from 25% to 75% lower than similarly situated defendants who are convicted at trial).
6 See infra text accompanying notes
142-46.
7 Report of the Secretaiy-General on the Establishment
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/
sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf; see also Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra
Leone: Experiments in InternationalJustice,12 CRIM. L.F. 186, 231-41 (2001) (focusing on
the creation of the Special Court in Sierra Leone); Daryl Mundis, New Mechanisms for
the Enforcement of InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 934, 935-38 (2001)
(describing differences and similarities between various international criminal tribunals); Sierra Leone: Agreement on War Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 17, 2002, at A8 (discussing the creation of the Sierra Leone Tribunal).
18 Regulation No. 2000/11 on the Organization of Courts
in East Timor, U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (2000),
available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Regll.pdf; Regulation No.
2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/
2000/15
(2000),
available
at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/
Reg0015E.pdf; see also Linton, supra note 17, at 202-30 (explaining establishment of
UNTAET and the Administration's authority to adjudicate serious criminal offenses);
Mundis, supra note 17, at 942-45 (detailing the judicial functions of UNTAET).
Marlise Simons, Without Fanfare or Cases, InternationalCourt Sets Up, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2002, at A3. The International Criminal Court was established pursuant to the
Rome Statute adopted by 120 states in July 1999. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998),
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
20 See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/808
(1993) (determining that "an international tribunal shall be established in Yugoslavia for
the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991"); S.C. Res. 827,
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have adopted procedures blending adversarial features, prevalent in
the United States, with non-adversarial features common to the Continent. By providing for guilty pleas, both Tribunals adopted the
American approach, but if they expect any defendants to plead guilty,
they must also adopt the American practice of offering sentencing
concessions to induce those guilty pleas. At the same time, however
one views the desirability of such concessions in the domestic context,
they appear particularly unseemly in the international criminal context given the gravity of the crimes being prosecuted. Kambanda, for
instance, admitted to orchestrating and encouraging a genocide that
killed approximately 800,000 people in one hundred days. Kambanda
committed crimes vastly more serious than the ordinary fare of domestic courts and, guilty plea or no, it would be hard publicly to justify
any but the most severe sentence for him.'
These differing perspectives highlight, at the micro level, the debate surrounding the practice of plea bargaining and, at the macro
level, the difficulty inherent in transplanting domestic criminal procedures to international tribunals adjudicating in the unique and developing field of international criminal law. Whether or not it is practicable, let alone desirable, to employ plea bargaining, or any other
domestic procedure, depends on a wide variety of factors, including
the purposes for which the ICTR and ICTY were established, the way
the Tribunals are organized, the nature of the crimes over which the
Tribunals have jurisdiction, and the Tribunals' existing system of procedural and evidentiary rules. Any examination must draw upon the

U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (establishing the
ICTY).
21 This point is particularly compelling since lower-level, arguably less culpable,
Rwandans are being sentenced to death in Rwanda's domestic courts. See Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sentence (Oct. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu, Sentence] (discussing Rwandan courts' authorization to sentence similar defendants to
death), reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at 810, 812; Ruth Wedgwood, National Courts and the Prosecution of War Crimes, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS 393, 403

(Gabrielle Kirk McDonald

& Olivia

Swaak-Goldman

eds.,

2000)

[hereinafter

SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw] ("Rwan-

dan national courts can impose a death penalty and have done so after abbreviated
trials lacking defense counsel. Thus, the political leaders of the Rwanda genocide who
were surrendered to the ICTR by neighboring countries face at worst a life in jail,
rather than summary execution."); Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of ConcurrentJurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 356-57 (1997) (observing
that the Rwandan penal code provides for the death penalty while the ICTR charter
does not).
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experience of plea bargaining in domestic jurisdictions. Plea bargaining constitutes a vital feature of the American criminal justice system,
though it plays a relatively insignificant role in most Continental
criminal justice systems. The historical, functional, and ideological
reasons for the different values these two systems accord the practice
of plea bargaining must inform any assessment of the desirability of
the practice in the international tribunals.
This article will comprehensively analyze the functional and ideological role that plea bargaining plays in various domestic jurisdictions
to create a theoretical framework in which to understand and evaluate
the emergence of plea bargaining in the realm of international criminal prosecutions. Part I constructs a functional account of the role
that plea bargaining plays in various domestic jurisdictions. Section A
details the historical rise of plea bargaining in Anglo-American jurisdictions. This section shows that plea bargaining developed primarily
in response to the introduction of increasingly complex and timeconsuming criminal procedures. Building on this history, Section B
will describe the role that plea bargaining currently plays in the
United States criminal justice system. Section C will then examine
plea bargaining's lesser functional role in Continental European
criminal justice systems and in the United Kingdom and Israel, two
countries whose criminal procedures resemble, but are not as adversarial as, those of the United States. In sum, this Part establishes a
correlation between the complexity of the country's criminal procedures and the prevalence of plea bargaining: the more complex and
costly a country's criminal procedures, the more often plea bargaining
will be used to evade those procedures.
Part II moves the analysis from the functional to the theoretical
plane. The adversarial procedures of the United States and the nonadversarial procedures of Continental countries derive from various
structural and ideological features of the countries utilizing them.
Part II describes these features and explores plea bargaining's relationship to them. The Part concludes that plea bargaining is theoretically consistent with the structure and ideology of the American
criminal justice system but is not especially compatible with the structural and ideological features that underpin Continental criminal justice systems. Plea bargaining's theoretical "fit" with American adversarial procedures, then, provides an additional explanation for its
prevalence and resilience in the United States.
Parts III and IV apply this theoretical framework to international
criminal prosecutions. Section A of Part III introduces the ICTY and
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ICTR and examines the Tribunals' structural components and key
players; Section B describes the procedural and evidentiary amalgam
that the Tribunals have created. With this groundwork laid, Part IV
explores the emergence and evolution of plea bargaining in these international criminal tribunals. Applying the functional and ideological considerations relevant to domestic plea bargaining, Section A sets
forth certain hypotheses concerning the importance of plea bargaining and the role it is apt to play in international tribunals. Section B
tests those hypotheses against ICTY and ICTR practice to date. It details the cases that have been disposed of by guilty plea, drawing not
only upon information available from written sources but also upon
interviews with prosecution and defense attorneys involved in the
cases.22 Section C summarizes plea bargaining's evolution at the Tribunals-from disfavored to encouraged practice-and explains the
particular forms of plea bargaining that have emerged as products of
the Tribunals' unique structural and ideological features.
I. PLEA BARGAINING: ITS FUNCTION AND ROLE IN
DOMESTICJURISDICTIONS

Most criminal cases in Anglo-American countries are disposed of
by guilty plea. 3 Guilty pleas are particularly prevalent in the United
States, where they account for the disposition of approximately 90%
of all criminal cases. 24 The vast majority of these American guilty pleas

22 The footnotes identify some interviewees,
but many current and former Tribunal officials spoke to me on condition of anonymity. Therefore, in many footnotes, I
simply cite documentary sources and omit reference to the interviews. In cases in
which no documentary source was available, I cite the interview, identifying the interviewee only by pseudonymic initials.
23 See Malcolm M. Feeley, Legal Complexity and the Transformation
of the CriminalProcess: The Origins of Plea Bargaining,31 ISR. L. REv. 183, 183 (1997) ("The standard form
of disposition for most English and American criminal cases is the guilty plea, by
means of the plea bargain."); cf Kent W. Roach, Canada, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A
WORLDWIDE STUDY 53, 75 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999) (finding that in Canada, plea
bargaining "concerning both charges and sentences occurs openly and is encouraged"
and "[a] n early guilty plea is a significant mitigating factor in sentencing"); Alschuler,
Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 973-75 (discussing
plea bargaining in England and Canada).
24 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10
(1970) (relying on estimates
"that about 90%, and perhaps 95%, of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty");
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 21-22 (observing that no more than 15% of felony
charges and only 3% to 7% of misdemeanor charges are likely to be resolved by trial);
Alschuler, PleaBargainingand Its History, supra note 13, at I (" [R] oughly ninety percent
of the criminal defendants convicted in state and federal courts plead guilty."); George
Fisher, Plea Barganining'sTriumph, 109 YALE LJ. 857, 910 (2000) (noting that in mod-
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are obtained through plea bargaining."5 For purposes of this Article,
plea bargaining can be defined as bargaining through which a defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for sentencing or charging
reductions. Most plea bargaining is explicit; that is, the prosecution
and defense bargain openly about the concessions the defendant is to
receive. And it typically takes the form of sentence bargaining or
charge bargaining. When engaged in sentence bargaining, the prosecutor will expressly agree to recommend a specific sentence which the
court will almost certainly impose. 2' As for charge bargaining, the
prosecution will agree not to charge certain crimes or to dismiss
charges already brought.27 Plea bargaining can also be implicit:
whether or not any express bargaining takes place, in many jurisdictions it is well established that judges impose more lenient sentences
ern American courtrooms, "guilty plea rates above ninety or even ninety-five percent
are common"); Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster,supra note 13, at 1993 ("[E]ighty
to ninety percent of defendants currently plead guilty."); Douglas D. Guidorizzi,
Comment, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargaining? The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining

Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 753 (1998) (reporting on a 1992 survey of the seventy-five
most populous counties in the United States which showed that guilty pleas accounted
for 92% of all convictions in state courts).
25 See Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64
MINN. L. REV. 669, 675 (1980)
("Although a guilty plea may occasionally be the unilateral product of the defendant's
genuine remorse.., or his ignorance of the advantages to be gained by manipulating
the system, it is infinitely more likely to result from a bargaining process in which the
guilty plea is tendered in return for inducements .... "); see alsoJohn Paul Ryan &
James J. Alfini, TrialJudges'Participationin Plea Bargaining: An Empirical Perspective, 13
LAw & Soc'Y REV. 479, 479 (1979) (stating that plea bargaining "is at the core of the
criminal justice system").
23 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 956
(explaining that a prosecutor may
"promise a certain sentence upon a guilty plea" and that the possibility is slight that the
trial judge will not follow his recommendations); Alschuler, TrialJudge's Role, supra
note 13, at 1065 ("Students of the criminal courts of many American jurisdictions have
noted that judges almost automatically ratify prosecutorial charge reductions and sentence recommendations."); id. at 1063-64 (noting that five of the six felony judges in
Houston, Texas followed the prosecutor's sentence recommendation in almost every
case, while the sixth judge followed the prosecutor's recommendation in 90% of the
cases); Gifford, supra note 13, at 68 ("[R]egardless of the articulated standard, courts
rarely intervene in plea agreements."). In most jurisdictions, judges are not strictly
bound by a prosecutor's promised sentence, see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (e) (1)-(2), but
fewjudges choose to upset the bargain reached.
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 956 (explaining that an "on-the-nose"
guilty plea to one charge may be exchanged for the prosecutor's agreement to drop
other charges). In many cases, the dismissed charges carry mandatory sentences
higher than the range of sentences available for the remaining charges, so the dis27 E.g.,

missal of the more serious charges necessarily results in a reduced sentence. See id.;
Michael Bohlander, Plea BargainingBefore the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK McDONALD 151, 151 (Richard May et al.
eds., 2001).
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following a guilty plea than following a conviction at trial.2 ' The introduction of sentencing guidelines in the federal system and in some
states regulated the practice of plea bargaining to some extent but did
not curtail it to any significant degree. 29 The following sections detail
plea bargaining's rise, its current role in the United States, and its
more limited role in Continental Europe and otherjurisdictions.

28

See Alschuler, TrialJudge'sRole, supra note 13, at 1076 (describing implicit plea

bargaining in the federal courts); Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargainingin Historical
Perspective, 13 LAW& Soc'Y REV. 247, 253 (1979) (discussing the unspoken understanding between defendants and judges that results in defendants being better off following a guilty plea); McDonald, supranote 11, at 386 (explaining that defendants may be
aware that sentencing may be more harsh if they insist on proceeding to trial). In
some jurisdictions, judges also impose more lenient sentences following bench trials,
which are relatively short and informal, than following jury trials. See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 1029 (asserting that

"Philadelphia and Pittsburgh discouraged exercise of the right to jury trial in more or
less the same fashion as other cities by rewarding defendants who waived this right and
by threatening defendants who exercised it with unusually severe sentences"); Schulhofer, Is PleaBargainingInevitable?, supra note 13, at 1062 (describing Philadelphia de-

fense lawyers' belief that in thatjurisdiction "defendants convicted injury trials receive
sentences substantially more severe than those imposed in bench trials"). Jury-trial
waivers can also be the product of express bargaining. Alschuler, Implementing the
CriminalDefendant'sRight to Trial, supranote 13, at 1029.

29 See Colquitt, supra note 13, at 700 ("Th[e]
widespread use of plea bargaining
exists whether or not ajurisdiction uses guideline sentencing."); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Plea Bargainingas Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1977-78 (1992) (describing bargaining under the federal sentencing guidelines and noting that the "percentage of guilty
pleas in federal criminal cases accordingly has been stable"). The federal sentencing
guidelines provide for a decrease of two levels in the offense level when the defendant
"clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense." U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (a) (2001). Parties in the federal system can still engage
in sentence bargaining: they can enter into an agreement whereby the parties designate a specific sentence which the court may then accept or reject or the prosecutor
can agree to recommend a specific sentence, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (e) (1) (B)-(C), but the
court may impose the sentence only if it is either "within the applicable guideline
range" or "departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons," U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2(b)-(c) (2001). As for charge bargaining,
the prosecutor can move to dismiss some charges upon the defendant's plea of guilty
to one or more other charges, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (e) (1) (A), although the federal sentencing guidelines instruct judges to accept such an agreement only if they determine,
"for reasons stated on the record, that the remaining charges adequately reflect the
seriousness of the actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not
undermine the statutory purpose of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines," U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2(a) (2001). The parties can evade these restrictions to some extent by beginning their bargaining before the indictment is issued.
LAFAVE ET AL., supranote 12, at 963.
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A. The HistoricalRise of Plea Bargaining
Before the twentieth century, the vast majority of criminal cases in
Anglo-American jurisdictions were disposed of by jury trial rather than
by guilty plea. Guilty pleas were considered rather ill-advised, 30 and
empirical studies focusing on particular jurisdictions indicate that
guilty pleas and plea bargaining in both the United States and the
United Kingdom were relatively rare until the latter half of the nineteenth century.3 ' Their use increased, sometimes dramatically, during
the decades following the American Civil War and soon reached, durSee Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial,supra note 13, at
971 (explaining that, before the nineteenth century, "[wihen defendants offered to
plead guilty, judges strongly urged them to reconsider");John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CII. L. REV. 263, 278 (1978) (reporting on several
late-seventeenth-century and early-eighteenth-century cases "in which, when an accused pleads guilty on arraignment or starts to plead guilty before the jury after having
pleaded not guilty on arraignment, the court urges him to go through with the contest"). Alschuler reports that the first common law treatises do not mention any procedure resembling the guilty plea, and when guilty pleas do make their appearance, at
least by the seventeenth century, courts were hesitant to receive them. Alschuler, Plea
Bargainingand Its History, supra note 13, at 7, 9-12 (providing examples of, and explanations for,judicial reluctance to accept guilty pleas).
See Feeley, supra note 23, at 187 (observing that guilty pleas increased
dramatically while trial rates declined in the mid-nineteenth century); see also Alschuler, Plea
Bargainingand Its History, supra note 13, at 4 (contending that "plea bargaining was essentially unknown during most of the history of the common law"); id. at 10 (describing a study showing that only 11% of the defendants who came before the Boston Police Court in 1824 pled guilty); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century
Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 121 (1983) (reporting
that guilty pleas were rare in the mid-eighteenth century); Moley, supra note 13, at 108
fig.] (showing that in 1839 only 25% of New York's felony convictions were by guilty
plea); cf Fisher, supra note 24, at 966-67 (reporting that in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, guilty pleas reached a high of 71% of all adjudicated ion-liquor cases in 178990, dropped dramatically to 26% by 1834, and remained comparatively rare until the
late 1870s). For most of American history, plea bargaining was considered illegitimate.
See id. at 915 (describing judicial hostility to plea bargaining in the late nineteenth century); Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging CriminalJusticeSystems: Guilty Pleas and the Public Interest, 31 ISR. L. REv. 169, 172 (1997) (noting that for most of American history
"bargaining by the parties for the 'waiver' of such rights was virtually prohibited by the
formal legal system" because the pleas "tended to nullify the criminal law, ... seemed
inherently coercive[,]" and thus were presumptively unlawful); see also Griffin v. State,
77 S.E. 1080, 1084 (Ga. Ct. App. 1913) (noting that "the law favors a trial on the merits"
and that it "does not favor confessions, either in or out of court"); Golden v. State, 49
Ind. 424, 424 (1875) (labeling a plea arrangement between the prosecutor and defendant a "corrupt agreement" and comparing plea bargaining to "corruptly purcbas[ing]
an indulgence"); Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351, 357 (1868) (holding that it would unacceptably broaden "the generally recognized force of the obligation of contracts to hold
that a defendant charged with crime might, without a trial, enter into a binding contact
with the prosecuting attorney.., to go to the penitentiary for a certain number of years
in satisfaction for the offense .... ).
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ing the early decades of the twentieth century, the prevalence associated with contemporary times.
It is sometimes asserted that plea bargaining arose as a means of
managing increasingly burdensome caseloads.33 While crowded dockets might explain plea bargaining's current prevalence, historians
have convincingly argued that plea bargaining emerged largely as a
34
response to increasingly complex trial procedures." Indeed, to say, as
I have above, that in past centuries jury trials constituted the primary
means for the disposition of criminal cases is somewhat misleading
because the trials of old bear scant resemblance to contemporary trials. John Langbein and Malcolm Feeley, among others, have reported
seventeenth and • early3 eighteenth centuries, jury
that during the •late
35
proceedings. 5 Well into the eighteenth
summary
rapid,
were
trials
century, for instance, London's Central Criminal Court, the Old Bai-

32

See Feeley, supra note 23, at 220 (finding that guilty pleas and plea bargaining

were well-established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). For instance, during the mid-1920s, 85% of all felony convictions in Chicago were by guilty
plea; in Minneapolis, 90%; in St. Paul, 95%; in Los Angeles, 81%; and in St. Louis,
84%. Moley, supra note 13, at 105; see also Alschuler, PleaBargainingand ItsHistory, supra note 13, at 27 (noting that in 1908 approximately 50% of all convictions in federal
courts were by guilty plea; by 1916, 72%; and by 1925, 90%, the same level as in recent
years).
3
SeeFeeley, supra note 23, at 184 ("Observers... conclude that plea bargaining is
an adaptation to the pressure of heavy caseloads."); Milton Heumann, A Note on Plea
Bargainingand Case Pressure,9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 515, 516-17 (1975) ("Much of the informed thought and literature on plea bargaining assumes... that plea bargaining
can be best.., understood as a function of case pressure."). Others have contended
that plea bargaining originated in England in the seventeenth century as a means of
mitigating unduly harsh punishment. See JAMES E. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND
GUILTY PLEAS § 107[1] (1975) (describing early English plea bargaining methods by
which a defendant could "confess[] his guilt and accuse[] a certain number of other
persons" in exchange for a reduced sentence granted at the Crown's discretion (citations omitted)).
34 See Feeley, supra note 23, at 202 (arguing that as the jury trial became more
complicated, there was a rise in guilty pleas and plea bargaining); Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History, supra note 13, at 27 (noting that the number of cases in federal
courts declined in 1916 at the same time that guilty plea rates substantially increased
and concluding, therefore, that "the increase cannot be attributed to the pressures of
the caseload").
35 Langbein, supra note 31, at 115 (noting that "[n]othing distances the
trial procedure of the [1750s] from its modern counterpart so much as its dispatch" and that
Sir Dudley Ryder, a trial judge in the 1750s, "saw more felony jury trials in a day or two
than a modem English or American judge would expect to see in a year").
36 E.g., Feeley, supra note 23, at 190;John H. Langbein, ControllingProsecutorial
Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 445 (1974) ('jury trial in early modern times
was a summary proceeding."); Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 262.
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ley, would hear between twelve and twenty felony cases per day.37
Such efficiency and expediency could be obtained in large part because neither the prosecution nor the defendant were represented by
counsel in most criminal trials. 38 There was also no voir dire of prospective jurors,' and the same panel of jurors would hear evidence in
several unrelated cases before retiring to formulate verdicts in all.40
Finally, "It]he common law of evidence, which has injected such vast
complexity into modern criminal trials, was virtually nonexistent as
late as the opening decades of the eighteenth century., 4'

Because

these jury trials were so brief and simple, there was little motivation to
encourage defendants to waive their right to them.42
These early trials, while perhaps enviably efficient by modem
standards, were also notably lacking in procedures safeguarding de-

37 Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 262; see also Langbein, supra note
30, at
276 ("[A] single Old Bailey jury commonly [tried] dozens of cases at a single session[].").
38 See Feeley, supra note 23, at 188; Langbein,
Short History, supra note 13, at 263
("The most important factor that expedited jury trial was the want of counsel. Neither
prosecution nor defense was represented in ordinary criminal trials."); Langbein, supra
note 30, at 282; see also id. at 307-08 (describing the reasons justifying the prohibition
on defense counsel).
39 Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 263.
"In ordinary jury practice at the
Old Bailey," wrote Langbein, "challenges were quite rare. According to the December
1678 pamphlet, the clerk at the Old Bailey faithfully made the ritual proclamation to
the accused that they should 'look to their Challenges,' but none did." Langbein, supra note 30, at 275; see also id. at 279 ("[S]ince in practice the prosecution and defense
took the jury as they found it, no time was spent probing jurors' backgrounds and attitudes.").
40 Langbein, supra note 36, at 439 ("In
the seventeenth century a criminal trial
jury would be impaneled and hear evidence in six or seven unrelated cases before retiring to formulate verdicts in all."); Langbein, supra note 31, at 275 ("[The] practice
of a single jury hearing many cases and leaving to deliberate on all of them at once was
also routine.").
41 Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 264; see also Langbein,
supra note 30, at
300-06 (discussing the modem instrument of the law of evidence). Other factors contributing to the speed of trials included the scheduling of trials soon after the crimes
took place, prompt pre-trial evidence gathering, the recurrent use ofjurors who were
well experienced, and the guidance that the jury received from the judge, who freely
commented on the merits of the case. Id. at 273-300; see also Langbein, Torture and Plea
Bargaining,supra note 13, at 10 ("[T]he exclusionary rules of the law of criminal evidence were still primitive and uncharacteristic.").
42 Langbein, supra note 30, at 278 ("So rapid was trial procedure that
the court was
under no pressure to induce jury waivers. We cannot find a trace of plea bargaining
[in the mid-1680s to the mid-1730s]."); Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 264
("[T]here was no particular pressure... to encourage the accused to waive his right to
jury trial.").
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fendants' rights. 43 In addition, Langbein has identified a series of
practices that were used to investigate crimes and gather evidence
during the mid-eighteenth century which actually encouraged false
testimony and the condemnation of innocent defendants. 4 As the
flaws in these practices became known, procedural safeguards were
developed to remedy them. For instance, certain evidentiary rules
were introduced that were designed to screen untrustworthy evidence
45
from the jury.
Also, lawyers increasingly came first to represent
prosecuting victims and then defendants. 4 6 The introduction of defense counsel led to a series of major structural changes in the criminal trial, including the elimination of the defendant as a testimonial
resource, the prevalence of evidentiary objections, and the evolution
of the privilege against self-incrimination from an empty slogan into a
47
doctrine of consequence .
In sum, during the course of the eighteenth century, English criminal procedure underwent a transformation from a predominantly non-adversarial system to an identifiably
adversarial one. 4s The introduction of these adversarial features, while
providing necessary safeguards, at the same time greatly lengthened
and complicated the heretofore summary jury proceedings.4 9 With
more issues of law raised, more expert witnesses testifying, and more

See Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 265 ("We should also not be surprised that this summary form of jury trial perished over the last two centuries. The
level of safeguard against mistaken conviction was in several respects below what civilizedpeoples now require.").
T4See
Langbein, supra note 31, at 84-114 (describing the crown witness and reward
systems).
45 See id. at 96-105 (tracing the development of the corroboration
and the confession rules).
46 See Feeley, supra note 23, at 192; Langbein, supra note 31,
at 124 (discussing the
number of times prosecution counsel and defense counsel appeared in Old Bailey
cases); Langbein, supra note 30, at 311 ("It appears that in the decade of the 17 30s,
certainly from 1734-1735, defense counsel began to be permitted to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.").
47 See Langbein, supra note 31, at 132; Langbein, supra
note 30, at 283 ("[F]rom
the 1670s through the mid-1730s I have not noticed a single case in which an accused
refused to speak on asserted grounds of privilege, or in which he makes the least allusion to a privilege against self-incrimination.").
48 See Langbein, supra note 31, at 123 (describing the adversarial
procedures to
which English criminal procedure shifted in the eighteenth century); cf Feeley, supra
note 23, at 192 (arguing that what we now call the adversary system developed in the
eighteenth century).
49 See Feeley, supra note 23, at 202 (noting that "in the late seventeenth
century
and well into the nineteenth, a single judge and jury heard over four cases per day
[but] by 1912, the average was less than one per day").
43
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occurring, jury trials became time-consuming,

complex events dominated by professional advocates.
A second and corresponding transformation also occurred. As
trials became more complex, the lawyers who were beginning to
dominate them developed a more expedient alternative for case disposition: plea bargaining. Feeley, for instance, identifies a series of
indicators of legal complexity, aggregates them to form a "Legal
Complexity Index," which provides a single summary indicator of adversariness, and shows that as the Legal Complexity Index increased
so did the percentage of cases disposed of by guilty pleas. 0 These developments led to a de facto bifurcation of criminal case disposition:
a handful of cases were disposed of by increasingly complex trials
while the vast majority were disposed of by guilty pleas secured
through plea bargaining. Thus, as some historians have ironically
noted, the reforms to the system brought about by the introduction of
evidentiary rules and the dominance of lawyers ultimately destroyed
the system by rendering trials unworkable as the routine way of disposing of serious criminal cases."
B. The FunctionalRole of Plea Bargainingin
Contemporary United States Practice
From the eighteenth century until the present day, American
criminal proceedings have increased in complexity, length, and lawyer-domination. A brief description of the contemporary American
adversarial system provides a useful starting point and a relevant contrast to the Continental non-adversarial procedures that will be taken
up next.5
50Id. at 215-17. The Legal Complexity Index represents the sum of seven variables: (1) the presence of prosecution attorneys; (2) the presence of defense attorneys; (3) the vigor/complexity of prosecution; (4) the vigor/complexity of defense;
(5) the use of expert witnesses; (6) whether either party raised questions of law; and
(7) questions of evidence and procedure. Id. at 217.
1 E.g., Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 265.
52 No domestic system of criminal procedure contains purely
adversarial or purely
non-adversarial forms; every system is something of a blend. See Mirjan Dama~ka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A ComparativeStudy,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 577 (1973) (explaining the "basic theme either of inquiry or
contest is orchestrated in real life with heavy borrowings from the other camp, so that,
as a result, all criminal processes appear mixed"); Richard S. Frase, Comparative CriminalJustice Policy, in Theory and in Practice, in INT'L CONF. FOR THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE INT'L INST. OF HIGHER STUD. IN CRIM. SC., COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS: FROM DIVERSITY TO RAPPROCHEMENT 109, 112-13 (1998) (concluding that
"all systems in the world today are 'mixed' or hybrid systems-incorporating some
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Criminal proceedings in the American adversarial system are
structured in the form of a contest. The adversarial model gives to the
parties the responsibility for investigating the facts, researching the
law, and presenting the case in the manner most favorable to their
own position." In contemporary trials, these tasks are carried out not
by the parties themselves but by their lawyers. Thus, lawyers have
emerged from playing no role in criminal cases to now dominating
54
Proceedings in an adversarial system are
adversarial proceedings.
conducted before a factfinder who is uninformed about the case prior
55
to trial. In most cases that factfinder is a lay jury,65 and the jury too57
body
has evolved over the centuries from a somewhat experienced

features typical of the Common Law, adversary, or due-process models, along with
other features typical of the Civil Law, inquisitorial, or crime-control models"); Patrick
L. Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor
the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 569, 574 (2000) (observing that neither the
common law accusatorial system nor the civil law non-adversarial systems actually exist
in pure forms). But despite this hybridization, most systems of domestic criminal procedure are predominantly adversarial or non-adversarial, and their features vary
enough that useful contrasts may be drawn.
See MIRJAN DAMA KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 74 (1997) [hereinafter DAMA KA,
EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT] (describing the adversary system as "a system of adjudication in
which procedural action is controlled by the parties and the adjudicator remains essentially passive"); MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OFJUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 3 (1986) [hereinafter DAMA9KA,
FACES OF JUSTICE] (discussing the differences between the adversarial and the nonadversarial mode of process); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 31 (describing the parties' responsibilities under the adversary system and noting that "[e]ach party is expected to present the facts and interpret the law in a light most favorable to its side");
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 57 (1988) (stating that the
adversary system is characterized by, among other things, "assignment to the parties of
the responsibility to present their own cases and challenge their opponents"); Malcolm
Feeley, The Adversary System, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICANJUDICIAL SYSTEM 753,
753 (RobertJ.Janosik ed., 1987) (stating that, in an adversarial system, it is "the duty of
the advocate ...to present his or her side's position in the very best possible light");
Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301,
302 (1989) ("The adversary system is characterized by party control of the investigation
and presentation of evidence and argument, and by a passive decisionmaker who
merely listens to both sides and renders a decision based on what she has heard.").
54 See Gordon van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 403, 431 (1992) ("Lawyers in the United States produce, direct and
dominate the trial process."); Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice, and the "Searchfor Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1280
(1996) ("Trials have become ... places where lawyers can display their artistry.").
55 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 31; Sward, supra note
53, at 308-10 (discussing the elements of fair adjudication, including an uninformed decisionmaker).
56 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 22 ("Over the country
as a whole, roughly
70% of all felony trials are tried to ajury .....
57 Supra text accompanying note 41.
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that was strongly influenced, if not controlled, by the judge, to an inexperienced but essentially autonomous body. Because contemporary
jurors, unlike their predecessors, do have the power to decide the
cases they hear, the selection of jurors has become an important feature of contemporary American trials. Voir dire and the exercise of

peremptory challenges often comprise a significant part of the guilt
phase of a trial and, in some cases, the jury selection process lasts
longer than the trial itself.59 The law of evidence has also evolved into

a complex, technical labyrinth." ° For example, the notorious hearsay
rule, with its many exceptions and rules prohibiting the introduction

of character evidence, is difficult to apply and thus frequently gives
rise to objections. 62 In addition, the United States constitutional pro-

hibition on the admission of illegally obtained evidence6 3 results in
many motions for exclusion, which add to the length and complexity
of contemporary American criminal proceedings.
The typical contemporary American criminal trial thus features
extended voir dire, numerous evidentiary objections, complex jury instructions and argument thereon, 4 motions for exclusion, motions
58 Langbein, supra note 30, at 284-300
(describing the methods judges used to
control juries).
59 See van Kessel, supra note 54, at 460-61
(noting that "voir dire and the exercise
of peremptory challenges often compose a significant part of the trial of criminal
cases" and giving examples); see also Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's
Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 1000 (criticizing the "devotion of substantial resources
to voir dire examinations [and] to the investigation of prospective jurors outside the
courtroom"); Bradley & Hoffmann, supra note 54, at 1283 (identifying the jury selection process as "perhaps the most egregious example of the adversary system run
amok").
,0 See DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT, supra note 53, at 10
(observing that,
"[v]iewed through Continental eyes, [Anglo-American evidence law] seems a maze of
disconnected rules, embroidered by exceptions and followed by exceptions to exceptions"); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 463 (reporting that Europeans "look upon our
complex system with bewilderment"); cf Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's
Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 1021-22 (describing the unnecessary and complex evidentiary rules inherited from the common law).
"Hearsay" evidence is defined as a "statement... , other than one
made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." BLACK'S LAW DICI'IONARY 726 (7th ed. 1999).
62 See, e.g., van Kessel, supra note
54, at 463-64 ("Our rules against hearsay and
character evidence provide ample opportunity for objections to relevant evidence
which might be misused by the layjury.").
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961) (reaffirming an earlier
Court ruling
that the exclusionary rule is "of constitutional origin").
64 Cf Darryl K. Brown, RegulatingDecision Effects of Legally
Sufficient Jury Instructions,
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1108-09 (2000) (proposing rules for jury instructions which
make them easier for the jury to understand).
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designed to preserve appellate issues, and a host of tactical
maneuvers
15
made by counsel eager to advance their clients' interests. Whereas in
the Old Bailey between twelve and twenty felony cases could be heard
in a day, now one typical felony trial takes between two and three
days," and these days are preceded by considerable time (and resources) spent in preparing for trial-in investigating the facts, researching the law, and "preparing" the witnesses, 67 among other
things. The contemporary American trial provides a defendant with
every means to vigorously contest the charges against him, but in doing so has become, in the words of one commentator,
"the most exs
world."
the
in
pensive and time-consuming
Indeed, American criminal trials have become so expensive and
time-consuming that they can only be provided to a small percentage
of criminal defendants.6"' As noted above, approximately 90% of all
American criminal cases are disposed of by a guilty plea secured
through plea bargaining. ° Stated differently, "[e]very two seconds
during a typical workday, a criminal case is disposed of in an American courtroom by way of a guilty or nolo contendere plea."7 Such
high guilty plea rates are commonly believed necessary in order for
the system to function." Indeed, even the harshest critics of plea bar-

65

See Langbein, supra note 36, at 44546.

66 LAFAVE ETAL., supra note 12, at 22. In the late 1980s, the average
felony trial in

the United States federal courts lasted three days, van Kessel, supra note 54, at 473, and
some states' felony trials took longer; for example, a 1986 study conducted by the National Center for State Courts showed that trials in Oakland, California, lasted nearly
six days and capital cases took considerably longer. Id. at 471.
67 E.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
647-48 (1986) ("Lawyer
interviews with witnesses in preparation for testimony have become an accepted and
standard practice in the United States."). Lawyers in Continental countries are not
normally permitted to "prepare" witnesses for trial. See id. at 648 ("[C] ontinental jurisdictions are quite severe in their prohibition against lawyer preparation of witnesses
for hearings."); Mirjan Damaka, Presentationof Evidence and FactfindingPrecision, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 1083, 1088-89 (1975) (noting that in countries utilizing non-adversarial
procedures, "[t]he parties are not supposed to try to affect, let alone to prepare, the
witnesses' testimony at trial" because "' [cioaching' witnesses comes dangerously close
to various criminal offenses of interfering with the administration ofjustice").
M William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing
the Patient,
1987 Sup. CT. REv. 97, 155.
69 See van Kessel, supra note 54, at 408; Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Dial, supra note 13, at 971-72 ("Reluctant to reconsider our expensive
trial procedures, we press most defendants to forego even the more expeditious forms
of trial that defendants once were freely afforded as a matter of right.").
70 Supra text accompanying note
24.
7 Colquitt, supra
note 13, at 696.
7 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260
(1971) ("Properly administered
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gaining have limited their abolition proposals to cases involving the
more serious crimes and have acknowledged that reducing or eliminating plea bargaining will require the expenditure of additional resources and the simplification of procedures.
Prosecutors have shown little interest in pursuing such reforms,
however, and instead have sought to maintain high guilty plea rates,
often by offering increasingly generous concessions to defendants. A
[plea bargaining] is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a
full-scale trial, the States and Federal Government would need to multiply by many
times the number ofjudges and court facilities."); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITHJUSTICE
FOR SOME: PROTECTING VICrIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 191 (1996) ("In the
American system, plea-bargaining seems to be inevitable. If all those who now plead
guilty insisted on a jury trial, the system would collapse under the burden."); LAFAVE
ET AL., supra note 12, at 961 (noting that "[t]here is a considerable body of thought
that ...it is not possible to abolish plea bargaining" given the assumption that "the
system can function only if a high percentage of cases are disposed of by guilty plea
and that this will happen only if concessions are granted to induce pleas"); Craig M.
Bradley, The Convergence of the Continental and the Common Law Model of Criminal Procedure, 7 CRiM. L.F. 471, 474 (1996) ("Given the limited resources available to the criminal justice system and the high cost ofjury trials, the majority of cases must be resolved
without a trial."); Langbein, supra note 36, at 446 ("The system as now practiced depends on the prosecutor's exclusive authority to grant concessions in order to induce
waivers of the right to jury trial."); Nemerson, supra note 25, at 725 (noting that there
"are insufficient quantities of judicial and other necessary trial resources to provide a
trial in more than a small percentage of cases"); Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in
the Adversary System, 1I J. CONFLICT RES. 52, 55 (1967) ("Among those in the system, it
is generally believed that if the trial model were to become the routine mechanism for
settling issues of criminality, the system would conceivably break down from overusethere would be too many cases for too few courts."); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 408
("This system requires that the accused be subjected to threats of increased punishment for going to trial.").
73 For instance, Albert Alschuler contends that the United States could provide
three-day jury trials to all felony defendants who reach the trial stage by adding approximately $850 million to annual criminal justice expenditures; as for misdemeanor
prosecutions, Alschuler proposes a short-form non-trial procedure modeled on the
German penal order, Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 936, whereby the prosecutor proposes a specific penal sanction not involving imprisonment, the court approves it, and the defendant can either accept it or
go to trial, id. at 956-57; see also John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental
Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE LJ. 1549, 1565-66 (1978) (describing
penal orders). Alschuler also suggests simplifying American criminal trial procedures
by, among other things, reducing the size of juries, simplifying jury selection procedures, and simplifying evidentiary rules. Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's
Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 1016-22. Stephen Schulhofer, by contrast, has maintained plea bargaining can be eliminated by using bench trials rather than jury trials.
Schulhofer, Is Plea BargainingInevitable?, supra note 13, at 1037-38.
74 See Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its
History, supra note 13, at 235 ("The high
rates of guilty pleas in the 1920s left little room for dramatic increases. In recent years,
however, prosecutors may have found it necessary to offer greater concessions simply
to keep those rates constant."). The criminal procedure revolution of the 1960s likely
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not atypical example is provided by Bordenkircher v. Hayes,1 in which a
pled guilty but redefendant was offered a five-year sentence if 1he
6
Generally speaking,
ceived a life sentence after conviction at trial.
American defendants who plead guilty receive sentences ranging from
25% to 75%.77lower than similarly situated defendants who are convicted at trial. Critics of plea bargaining argue that such punishment
differentials are coercive and effectively penalize defendants who exercise their right to trial, while proponents maintain that these differentials are
well within the range to be expected from a bargaining
78
process.
However one characterizes the sentencing differentials,
everyone agrees that they are what motivate most defendants to plead
guilty. Defendants accused of relatively trivial infractions may plead
guilty without any promise of leniency, particularly when the time and

increased the "cost" of guilty pleas by giving defendants additional procedural rights to
use in obtaining concessions. See id. at 239 (quoting defense attorneys who stated that
"'rights are tools to work with"' and "'[a]s the defendant gains more rights, his bargaining position grows stronger"').

U.S. 357 (1978).
Id. at 359; see also People v. Dennis, 328 N.E.2d 135 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1975) (reject-

75n434
76

ing a plea bargain which would have resulted in a prison term of two-to-six years, the
defendant was instead sentenced to a forty- to eighty-year term); Alschuler, Changing
Plea BargainingDebate, supra note 13, at 656 (noting that "in a great many cases the sentence differential in America assumes shocking proportions"); Alschuler, Prosecutors
Role, supra note 13, at 62 (describing a defendant who was sentenced to thirty-five
years' imprisonment after rejecting a plea offer of five years' imprisonment and a defendant put to death after rejecting a plea to voluntary manslaughter); Frank H.
Easterbrook, CriminalProcedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 312 (1983)
("Opponents of plea bargaining point out that the [sentence] differential is quite
large. Accused murderers may plead to manslaughter and receive five years in jail instead of thirty years or life in tried murder cases. Thieves receive months instead of
years."); Nemerson, supra note 25, at 680-81 (detailing the "enormity of established
sentencing differentials"). The possibility of receiving a death sentence further motivates many American defendants to plead guilty. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 31-32 (1970) (concerning a defendant who maintained that he pled guilty to
avoid the possibility of death penalty).
77 Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster, supra note 13, at 1993;
cf Stephen J.
Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines: The
First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 231, 245 n.71 (1989) (reporting that the
United States Sentencing Commission estimated that, before the federal sentencing
guidelines, defendants who pled guilty received sentences 25% to 35% lower than defendants convicted at trial).
78 Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 311-12. Easterbrook
maintains that the "sentencing differential available from surrendering the chance to be acquitted depends on
both the likelihood of acquittal and the discount rate applied to future years in jail."
Id. at 312. He sets forth tables with equivalences between sentences after trial and by
plea for selected combinations of discount rate and conviction probability; these tables
reveal that a combination of discount rate and probability of acquittal can produce a
steep sentencing discount for pleading guilty. Id. at 313-15.
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trouble of going to trial is disproportionate to the expected penalty.'
But virtually no defendants charged with serious crimes will plead
guilty absent concessions."s
Plea bargaining thus plays an essential role in the American
criminal justice system,8 ' and its pervasiveness shows no signs of abating.82 Indeed, there is little reason to expect it to abate because it not
only provides a necessary expedient alternative to the time-consuming
procedures that have developed, it also serves the needs of those in
power: prosecutors, defense attorneys, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, judges. Plea bargaining concentrates enormous power in the
hands of prosecutors who, in order to bargain effectively, must be afforded broad discretion over virtually all prosecutorial decisions,"' and
who, by reaching agreements with defendants as to the punishment to
be imposed, largely assume the role of judge in both guilt determina-

See Malcolm Feeley, Pleading Guilty in Lower Courts, 13 LAw & Soc'Y
REv. 461,
461-62 (1979) ("The primary question for many defendants in lower courts is not
whether to got to trial but whether to show up in court at all.").
80 See Nemerson, supra note 25, at 675
(attributing guilty pleas to the bargaining
process). Indeed, defendants typically will not even waive their right to a jury trial in
favor of a bench trial without the assurance of sentencing concessions. Schulhofer, Is
Plea Bargaininglnevitable?, supra note 13, at 1062-63. The very few defendants who do
plea guilty absent concessions simply recognize that they have no viable defenses to the
charges. See Alschuler, ChangingPlea BargainingDebate, supra note 13, at 657 (acknowledging that some defendants plead guilty because they "sense no chance of victory at
trial"); Weninger, supra note 11, at 293.
81 See Colquitt, supra note 13, at 700 ("Plea
bargaining permeates the criminal justice process."); Richard S. Frase, Comparative CriminalJustice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: How Do the FrenchDo It, How Can We Find Out, and Wy Should We Care?,78 CAL.
L. REv. 539, 626 (1990) ("Plea bargaining is central to the American system .... "). But
cf Lawrence B. Mohr, Organizations,Decisions, and Courts, 10 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 621, 621
(1976) ("Alternatives to the textbook method of handling cases are not anomalies;
they are institutions in their own right.").
82 See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion,
86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 753 (1996) (assessing that "the likelihood of abandoning the plea
bargain is almost non-existent").
3 See Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 299 (describing
prosecutorial discretion);
Frase, supra note 81, at 612 ("The American prosecutor has broad discretion both over
initial decisions to decline to file charges, and over postfiling decisions to drop all
charges."); Misner, supra note 82, at 743-59 (providing a detailed description of the
sources of broad prosecutorial discretion); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 442 ("American prosecutors have broad discretion limited only by the ethical duty not to bring a
case to trial which is not supported by sufficient evidence."). Although prosecutorial
discretion was seen as key to the emergence of plea bargaining as an initial matter, see
Fisher, supra note 24, at 892-93; Langbein, Short History, supra note 13, at 266-67, plea
bargaining itself has become so essential to the American administration of criminal
justice that prosecutorial discretion must now be maintained to accommodate the
practice such discretion once helped spawn, see Langbein, supra note 36, at 446.
79
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84

tion and sentencing. Plea bargaining is additionally attractive to district attorneys, particularly elected district attorneys, s5 because it helps
them maintain high conviction rates, foster good relationships with
influential private attorneys, and avoid high-profile trial losses."6 Similarly, plea bargaining serves the interests of assistant prosecutors,
whose goals often coincide with those of their
superiors and who also
7
desire to manage their case loads efficiently.
As for defense attorneys, plea bargaining offers substantial financial advantages; some defense attorneys virtually never have to try a
case yet earn substantial fees. Retained defense attorneys typically
charge a flat fee for their representation. That fee is always sufficient,
and frequently generous, for the work involved in securing a guilty
plea, 88 but it is often woefully inadequate as compensation for taking a
case to trial.
Plea bargaining is also attractive to public defenders,

84

See Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining,supra note 13, at 18 ("The dominant

version of American plea bargaining.., requires the prosecutor to usurp the determinative and sentencing functions, hence to make himself judge in his own cause.").
Some prosecutors, however, are not entirely comfortable with the responsibility that
such power brings. See Michael L. Rubenstein & TeresaJ. White, Alaska's Ban on Plea
Bargaining,13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 367, 371 (1979) (reporting that after Alaska banned
plea bargaining, some prosecutors were "relieved at being out of the sentencing business").
85 See generally Misner, supra note 82, at 733 (noting
that the great majority of local
prosecutors are elected officials).
86 See Moley, supra note 13, at 103; Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster, supra
note 13, at 1987; see also FLETCHER, supra note 72, at 192 (arguing the "state's interest
may become equivalent to the prosecutor's personal political needs"); Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 13, at 106.
87 See Alschuler, Prosecutor'sRole, supra note 13, at 54 (quoting assistant
prosecutors
who, for instance, will "'do anything... to avoid adding to the backlog"'); Schulhofer,
PleaBargainingas Disaster, supra note 13, at 1987-88 (noting that assistant prosecutors'
motivation in plea bargaining may reflect professional interests, such as career advancement and job satisfaction, as opposed to finding the optimal strategy for controlling crime).
88 Cf Alschuler, Defense Attorneys Role, supra note 13, at 1182-84
(discussing a defense attorney practice of securing as many guilty pleas as possible in order to earn
money quickly). Indeed, most defense attorneys structure their fee systems on the expectation that the vast majority of cases will be disposed of quickly, through plea bargaining.
89See id. at 1181-1206 (describing the defense attorneys'
incentive, once retained,
to convince their clients to plead guilty); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as
Confidence Game: OrganizationalCooptation of a Profession, 1 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 15, 28
(1967) (explaining the criminal defense lawyer's incentive to limit the scope of litigation rather than to battle); Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster, supra note 13, at
1988 (observing that defense attorneys often render services at trial free of charge if
plea negotiations fail); Skolnick, supra note 72, at 61 (noting the economic advantage
that can accrue to the private attorney who pleads his client guilty); van Kessel, supra
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who, although not laboring under intense financial conflicts, often labor under heavy caseloads which give them an institutional interest in
resolving their cases expeditiously.!' ° Plea bargaining also serves the
interests ofjudges, though perhaps to a lesser extent. Judges, like the
other professionals in the criminal justice arena, are concerned about
backlogs; 9' thus, many happily acquiesce in plea bargaining as a means
of efficient case disposition. 9 Plea bargaining also relieves judges of
the sole responsibility for sentencing, a responsibility that some find
burdensome. 9 Finally, by eliminating the trial, plea bargaining elimi-

note 54, at 502 (finding that retained attorneys "make more money disposing of cases
by plea bargain than by trial" and that some lawyers "complain of 'losing money by going to trial"'); see also Note, The Elimination of Plea Bargainingin Black Hawk County: A
Case Study, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1053, 1059 (1975) (detailing other benefits that plea bargaining provides to defense attorneys).
90 See Alschuler, Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 13, at 124849; Fisher,
supra note
24, at 1063 (noting that public defenders have limited power to adjust their heavy
caseloads and therefore have an incentive to plea bargain and more efficiently handle
their caseloads); Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster,supra note 13, at 1989-90 (observing that public defenders do not face financial incentives to avoid trial but do face
institutional pressure to move cases). Fisher reports that those who advocated the establishment of public defenders' offices in the early decades of the twentieth century
did so with the claim that public defenders would be able to secure more guilty pleas.
Fisher, supra note 24, at 1057. Early public defenders seemed to dojust that-in 19131914, Los Angeles public defenders resolved 70% of their cases by guilty plea as opposed to 62% for private counsel assigned to represent indigent defendants and 49%
for retained lawyers. Id. at 1062. But see Skolnick, supra note 72, at 60-61 (finding that
in a California county studied in the early 1960s, five of the six leading private defense
attorneys reported settling a greater percentage of their cases by guilty plea than did
the public defender). Plea bargaining can also afford public defenders occasional
power to influence systemic decisions. A public defender's office may periodically refuse to plea bargain certain types of cases when it believes that prosecutors are not making reasonable offers. The threat that all such cases will proceed to trial often forces
prosecutorial concessions. See Alschuler, Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 13, at 124952 (describing public defenders' ability to encourage a "general strike" in which all
clients choose to exercise their rights to trial rather than plea bargain); Skolnick, supra
note 72, at 63 (describing the public defenders' ability to frustrate the prosecutor's office).
91 See Skolnick, supra note 72, at 55 (noting that judges observed
and interviewed
exhibited a "potent interest" in calendar movement).
92 Fisher reports, for instance, that judges
in nineteenth-century Massachusetts
initially viewed plea bargaining as an unwarranted incursion into their sentencing
power but increasing caseload pressures, particularly involving civil cases, led them to
embrace plea bargaining as a necessary means of moving their dockets. Fisher, supra
note 24, at 988-89.
93 Cf Rubenstein & White, supra note 84, at 372 (reporting
that a plea bargaining
ban in Alaska resulted in "a heavier burden on sentencing judges, some of whom have
objected that they would like more guidance from the district attorney" and that
"[s]omejudges believe that a district attorney abdicates his responsibilities by not making specific recommendations").
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nates the possibility of errors in the trial and thereby protects trial
judges' reputations by shielding them from appellate reversals.4
In sum, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges each have their
own good reasons for favoring plea bargaining. Indeed, although
they have largely divergent formal interests and role obligations, their
mutual interest in processing cases efficiently exerts a potent pressure
to cooperate and thus to subvert the conflict norms on which the adversary system is based.95 Organizational theorists and social scientists
have pointed to these factors, as well as to group dynamics and the
human desire to minimize conflict and uncertainty, as additional reasons to consider plea bargaining an inevitable feature of the American
criminal justice system.96

In keeping with its pervasive role in the American criminal justice
system, plea bargaining influences virtually all significant decisions
made in that system. A prosecutor's initial charging decisions depend
not only on what crime the defendant is suspected of committing but
on a host of other factors relevant to the bargaining that is expected
to occur. Prosecutors commonly over charge defendants, expecting
to eventually withdraw some charges as part of a plea bargain.!" The
See Fisher, supra note 24, at 867; Moley, supra note 13, at 103.
See Skolnick, supra note 72, at 53; see also Malcolm M. Feeley, Two Models of the
CriminalJustice System: An OrganizationalPerspective, 7 LAw & Soc'v REv. 407, 415-19
(1973) (reviewing scholarship on the subversion of conflict norms in the plea bargaining process). Lawrence Mohr notes the goal compatibility among these actors:
Judges wish to save time, keep things simple, avoid certain undesirable images, and maintain political favor. Prosecutors wish to maximize production,
maximize convictions and guilty pleas, avoid over-leniency in the more serious
cases, and earn favorable recommendations from superiors. Defense lawyers
wish primarily to earn a fee quickly (since it cannot be large) and keep clients
satisfied. The public defender wishes to relieve the time pressure of his
caseload, maintain a good reputation for the office, and obtain certain resources (e.g., confidence, prosecutorial information) ....
Basically, the
prosecutors andjudges need a certain level of convictions and guilty pleas, but
most often it does not matter crucially to what charges, with what sentences,
and with what arrangements for bail, probation, etc. Defenders and lawyers
need to do well for their clients, but this is measured much more in terms of
penalties than in terms of formal outcomes of guilty or not guilty. Compatibility is to be found, therefore, in a plea of guilty to some charge ....
Mohr, supra note 81, at 637-38.
96 See Ryan & Alfini, supra note 25, at 480-81 (reviewing recent social science
scholarship on the importance of relationships and social groups to plea bargaining);
Schulhofer, Is Plea BargainingInevitable?, supra note 13, at 1041-43 (discussing "two ...
theoretical perspectives-organizational analysis and socialization (or adaption) analysis," that have guided a substantial amount of social science research on plea bargaining).
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 670 (describing how prosecutors will charge
94
95
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concessions that prosecutors offer defendants during plea bargaining
often depend less on penologically relevant factors, such as the gravity
of the crime or the defendant's prior criminal record, than on factors
related to bargaining. For instance, prosecutors typically offer the
greatest concessions in the weakest cases.:" In other words, the more
likely it is that a defendant will be acquitted, the more attractive the
plea offer that he will receive. Thus, for example, defendants with
colorable claims for evidentiary exclusions will be offered greater concessions than similarly situated defendants without such claims. 99

defendants with a higher charge than normally appropriate in order to encourage
pleas to lesser crimes); Alschuler, Prosecutor'sRole, supra note 13, at 85-105 (providing
an extensive discussion of the "problem of overcharging"); Felstiner, supra note 15, at
316 (characterizing overcharging as a troublesome aspect of American prosecution,
particularly because defendants are normally charged before sufficient investigation
may be completed and prosecutors are thereby given more leverage to encourage
guilty pleas); Frase, supra note 81, at 621 (noting that American prosecutors "have an
incentive to exaggerate initial charges so as to leave more room for later plea bargaining concessions"). In particular, many prosecutors charge defendants with crimes
bearing high mandatory-minimum sentences, even though the prosecutors do not expect to be able to prove those crimes at trial. The mandatory-minimums provide a useful bargaining position for the prosecutor, who may then obtain a guilty plea for a
lesser crime that, in fact, more accurately represents the defendant's conduct. See
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE LJ. 1909,
1963-66 (1992) (describing this practice and examining particular cases).
98 Felstiner, supra note 15, at 319. Albert Alschuler's
interviews with prosecutors
across the United States revealed that:
An overwhelming majority of prosecutors endorse the view that "half a loaf is
better than none," and they respond to the prospect of defeat at trial by increasing the concessions available in exchange for a plea of guilty. The
weaker the prosecutor's case, the more substantial the "break" that a defendant can secure by pleading guilty ....
Alschuler, TrialJudge's Role, supra note 13, at 1126; see also Alschuler, Prosecutor'sRole,

supra note 13, at 58 ("The overwhelming majority of prosecutors view the strength or
weakness of the state's case as the most important factor in the task of bargaining.");
id. at 59 (quoting a Chicago prosecutor as saying, "[w] hen we have a weak case for any
reason, we'll reduce to almost anything rather than lose"); Scott & Stuntz, supra note
97, at 1941-42 (noting that a prosecutor "must offer different prices to defendants who
are fairly likely to win at trial than to defendants who are sure to lose").
.99Knowing this, some defense attorneys "advance every procedural
claim that
their ingenuity can devise-even claims that lack any chance for success, but which
threaten to occupy the court's and the prosecutor's time." Alschuler, Prosecutor'sRole,
supra note 13, at 80; see also Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to 7ial,

supra note 13, at 939 ("[P]lea bargaining has led defense attorneys to file absurd pretrial motions simply because 'it takes time to refute even a bad contention' and 'every
motion added to the pile helps secure a better plea."'). At the same time, Alschuler
notes that "[p] rosecutors are usually as anxious to threaten the defense attorneys' time
as defense attorneys are to threaten theirs," and do so, among other ways, by filing
multiple charges when the law of double jeopardy or the canons of statutory construction preclude multiple convictions. Alschuler, Prosecutor'sRole, supra note 13, at 99.
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Similarly, because factually innocent defendants tend to have stronger
cases than those who are guilty, innocent defendants typically receive
especially attractive plea offers.' °° Other bargaining decisions are
driven by workload and political pressures. For instance, many prosecutors are particularly keen to plea bargain labor-intensive cases'0° but
may be unwilling to bargain with high-profile defendants... or even
with well-known defense attorneys, against whom prosecutors may
wish the opportunity to try a case.103
In sum, plea bargaining sustains the American criminal justice system, and the American criminal justice system sustains plea bargaining. Although plea• •bargaining
has been the subject of widespread
• 104
and trenchant criticism -among other things, for encouraging inno100

See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 97, at 1943. Critics thus claim that plea bargain-

ing coerces a significant percentage of innocent defendants to convict themselves in
exchange for a certain, reduced penalty. See U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON
CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, COURTS 48 (1973) (noting that "the plea negotiation system creates a significant danger to the innocent"); Alschuler, Prosecutor's
Role, supra note 13, at 60 (explaining that a serious criticism of plea bargaining, that
"the greatest pressures to plead guilty are brought to bear on defendants who may be
innocent"); John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea Bargainingand Plea Negotiation in
England, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 287, 298 (1979) (describing research suggesting that
some innocent defendants plead guilty and concluding that "innocent persons are frequently placed at risk and that, on occasion, the weaker and less knowledgeable are
wrongly persuaded to plead guilty"); Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of "BargainJustice", 13 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 509, 510 (1979) (noting critics' contention that plea bargaining "operates to encourage, if not coerce, even innocent defendants to waive their
right to trial by jury"); Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, supra note 13, at 2000
(reasoning that the innocent defendant may rationally choose to accept conviction
and a small penalty rather than risk conviction on a more serious charge); Note, supra
note 89, at 1059 (describing the pressures on innocent defendants to plead guilty).
101 See Alschuler, Prosecutor'sRole, supra note 13, at 55-56.
102 See WEINREB, supra note 13, at 77 (observing that, in a highly publicized case,
"the prosecutor may feel pressure to display a particularly firm or, more rarely, gentle
hand"); Alschuler, Prosecutor'sRole, supra note 13, at 107 (describing the political importance of publicized cases, and the corresponding difficulty in arranging plea
agreements). AsJerome Skolnick put it, the prosecutor is:
[I]nterested in making a favorable impression on a diffuse public-including
courts, political authorities, and the man in the street. His specific task is to
strike a balance between those cases which, for a variety of reasons-usually related to the public interest-he cannot deal out; and those which, in deference
to his administrative responsibilities, he needs to settle before trial. In brief,
he is required to keep the calendar moving, at the same time not appear to be
"giving anything away" to the defense.
Skolnick, supra note 72, at 55.
103 Alschuler, Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 13, at
1187 (observing that "an attorney's reputation as a trial advocate could grow to the point that, paradoxically, it
might diminish his ability to bargain successfully").
104 See supra note 13 (canvassing scholarship critical of plea bargaining,
both in
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cent defendants to self-convict, for undermining other legal doctrines
that society wishes to further, for resulting in sentences that cannot be
justified by any legitimate penological rationale, and for contributing
to widespread cynicism about the criminal justice system'°5 -ithas persevered and in recent decades has won the approval of the courts,
which consider it a necessary feature of the American criminal justice
system.10°

principle and as practiced in contemporary criminal justice systems).
See, e.g.,
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining,supra note 13, at 10, 16
("When
people who have murdered are said to be convicted of wounding, or when those
caught stealing are nominally convicted of attempt or possession, cynicism about the
processes of criminal justice is inevitably reinforced."). Alschuler, one of plea bargaining's harshest critics, summarizes the "evils" the practice has wrought thus:
Plea bargaining makes a substantial part of an offender's sentence depend,
not upon what he did or his personal characteristics, but upon a tactical decision irrelevant to any proper objective of criminal proceedings. In contested
cases, it substitutes a regime of split-the-difference for ajudicial determination
of guilt or innocence and elevates a concept of partial guilt above the requirement that criminal responsibility be established beyond a reasonable
doubt. This practice also deprecates the value of human liberty and the purposes of the criminal sanction by treating these things as commodities to be
traded for economic savings....
Plea bargaining leads lawyers to view themselves as judges and administrators rather than as advocates; it subjects them to serious financial and other
temptations to disregard their clients' interests; and it diminishes the confidence in attorney-client relationships that can give dignity and purpose to the
legal profession and that is essential to the defendant's sense of fair treatment.
In addition, this practice makes figureheads of court officials who typically
prepare elaborate presentence reports only after the effective determination
of sentence through prosecutorial negotiations. Indeed, it tends to make figureheads of judges, whose power over the administration of criminal justice
has largely been transferred to people of less experience .... Moreover, plea
bargaining perverts both the initial prosecutorial formulation of criminal
charges and, as defendants plead guilty to crimes less serious than those that
they apparently committed, the final judicial labeling of offenses.
The negotiation process encourages defendants to believe that they have
"sold a commodity and that [they have], in a sense, gotten away with something." It sometimes promotes perceptions of corruption.... The practice of
plea bargaining is inconsistent with the principle that a decent society should
want to hear what an accused person might say in his defense-and with constitutional guarantees that embody this principle and other professed ideals
for the resolution of criminal disputes. Moreover, plea bargaining has undercut the goals of legal doctrines as diverse as the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, the insanity defense, the right of confrontation, the defendant's
right to attend criminal proceedings, and the recently announced right of the
press and public to observe the administration of criminal justice.
Alschuler, Inplementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 932-34
(citations omitted) (alteration in original).
106See, e.g.,
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) ("Disposition of
charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the [criminal] process but
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C. The FunctionalRole of Bargainingin ContinentalEurope,
the United Kingdom, and Israel
Having established the vital functional role that plea bargaining
plays in the American adversarial system in Section B, this Section examines the incidence of bargaining in countries that utilize less adversarial trial procedures. Subsection 1 describes criminal procedures in
Continental European countries,' °7 and is followed in Subsection 2
with a discussion of bargaining and non-trial dispositions in those

a highly desirable part for many reasons."). Efforts to restrict or eliminate plea bargaining have been few and ill-fated. Arguably, the most comprehensive effort occurred
in Alaska, where, in 1975, the state's Attorney General prohibited his prosecutors from
plea bargaining. Rubenstein & White, supra note 84, at 367. Initial reports indicated
that prosecutors largely complied with the ban. Teresa White Carns & John A. Kruse,
Alaska's Ban on Plea BargainingReevaluated, 75 JUDICATURE 310, 311 (1992); see Rubenstein & White, supra note 84, at 369-71 (finding that four years into the ban, sentence
bargaining had been virtually eliminated and charge bargaining had been reduced).
At the same time, defendants convicted at trial received longer sentences than defendants who pled guilty, Carns & Kruse, supra, at 311-12, so implicit plea bargaining remained. Further, although the ban remained in effect as an official policy, by 1985
widespread and explicit charge bargaining had returned to most of the state. See id. at
317.
For a discussion of unsuccessful efforts to eliminate plea bargaining in El Paso
County, Texas, see Sam W. Callan, An Experience inJustice Without Plea Negotiation, 13
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 327 (1979); Weninger, supra note 11. Both courts and commentators have discussed more limited methods of restricting certain kinds of plea bargaining. See People v. Brown, 223 Cal. Rptr. 66, 72 & n.l (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (describing
a California statute prohibiting plea bargaining in certain classes of cases, and noting
that "[d]espite the recent enactment of laws designed to limit 'plea bargaining,' the
practice not only continues, but has apparently increased"); Joseph P. Busch, Guidelines
Concerning Plea Bargaining,CAL. ATT'YS FOR CRIM. JUST. FORUM, May-June 1975, supp.
(banning sentencing bargaining but not charge bargaining); Milton Heumann &
Colin Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing and the Abolition of Plea Bargaining: The Michigan Felony FirearmStatute, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 393, 395-98 (1979) (reporting that the Wayne
County, Michigan, Prosecutor's office chose not to engage in plea bargaining with defendants accused of violating a state firearms law that imposed a mandatory sentence);
Richard H. Kuh, Plea Bargaining: Guidelinesfor the ManhattanDistrict Attorney's Office, 11
CRIM. L. BULL. 48 (1975) (banning sentencing bargaining but not charge bargaining);
Raymond I. Parnas & RileyJ. Atkins, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: A Proposal, 14 CRIM. L.
BULL. 101, 109-10 (1978) (observing that while the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of California prohibited sentence bargaining, charge bargaining may
have continued); Note, supra note 89, at 1069-70 (summarizing the positive costbenefit effects of eliminating plea bargaining in one Iowa county).
107 Any attempt to summarize the criminal procedures of Continental countries is
a perilous enterprise because Continental systems of criminal procedure are diverse
and constantly changing, primarily as a result of international law developments. See,
e.g., Gordon van Kessel, European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 799, 801-02 (1998) (recognizing the diversity of Continental
procedures and the changes that have followed the development of international law).
My summary will address features common to most Continental countries.

30

UNIVERSrY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 151: 1

countries. Subsection 3 examines the criminal procedures and bargaining practices of some "intermediate countries," countries whose
criminal procedures are more adversarial (and consequently more
complex and time-consuming) than those of Continental countries
but less adversarial than those of the United States. The Section as a
whole confirms the relationship between trial practices and plea bargaining discussed above: complex adversarial criminal procedures
create a need for bargaining to avoid them.
1. Continental Criminal Procedures
Continental criminal procedures are typically described as inquisitorial" 8 or non-adversarial. Whereas proceedings in an adversary system are structured in the form of a contest, featuring two opposing
litigants who present their best evidence and arguments to a neutral
and largely passive factfinder,"°° proceedings in a non-adversarial system are structured more in the form of an inquiry,"0 directed by a
judge on the basis of a dossier, a collection of written materials compiled by government officials who have investigated the case." ' The
dossier is made available in its entirety to the defendant or his counsel
and is supposed to contain all the evidence relevant to the case, ex-

The term "inquisitorial" has, particularly in the past, "conjure[d] up the excesses of the Star Chamber or the haunting memories of the Spanish Inquisition."
G.E.P. Brouwer, Inquisitorial and Adversary Procedures-A Comparative Analysis, 55
AUSTRALIAN L.J. 207, 208 (1981) (noting further that, while the term does not conjure
such images today, it is still "viewed with suspicion by many common lawyers"); see also
LUBAN, supra note 53, at 93-94 (remarking that the label "inquisitorial" "evokes images
of the auto-da-f6 and the Iron Maiden, the Pit and the Pendulum"); Dama~ka, supra
note 52, at 556-58 (acknowledging the "aura of dread and mistrust" surrounding the
term, and describing the inquisitorial type of criminal procedure). Consequently, I
will use the term "non-adversarial."
I09 See supra text accompanying
notes 53-55.
110See DAMA8KA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra note 53, at 3 ("The non-adversarial mode
is structured as an official inquiry.").
See Mary C. Daly, Some Thoughts on the Differences in Criminal Trials in the Civil and
Common Law Legal Systems, 2J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 65, 67-68 (1999); van Kessel,
supra note 54, at 431 (contrasting thejudge's role at trial in each type of system).
2 See Daly, supra note 111, at 67-68 ("All the findings from [the pre-trial]
investigation are recorded in detail and kept in a file, the dossier."); NicoJ6rg et al., Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging?, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 41, 47 (Phil Fennell et al. eds., 1995) (stating that in The Netherlands, the dossier"reports every step in the procedure" and "not only forms the basis for
the trial, but also a coherent system of supervision and control"); Bron McKillop, Anatomy of a French Murder Case, 45 Am. J. COMP. L. 527, 544-46 (providing a detailed description of the dossier in a French murder case).
108
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culpatory as well as inculpatory. 1 3 The role of defense counsel in
many Continental countries is far more limited than in the United
States, 1 4 and Continental proceedings are in general more geared toward establishing truth than their American counterparts. 1 5 For that
reason and others, Continental procedures are also considerably more
efficient and less time-consuming than their American counterparts.
Whereas adversarial procedures are lawyer-dominated, nonadversarial procedures are judge-dominated"' and, as a consequence,

113

See, e.g., Damaika, supra note 52, at 533-34 (observing that, even in those Con-

tinental countries most restrictive regarding disclosure, "the defendant and his counsel
acquire, before the case comes up for trial, an unlimited right to inspect the whole investigative [dossier]"); Frase, supra note 81, at 672 ("In France, counsel for the defendant has an absolute right to inspect the full dossier of the case prior to trial and at certain stages of pretrial procedure."); Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German
CriminalJustice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 317, 341 (1995) (noting that in Germany, the defense
counsel has "the right to inspect the entire prosecution file, including both favorable
and unfavorable evidence"); Joachim Herrmann, BargainingJustice-ABargain for German CriminalJustice?, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 755, 764 (1992) ("German defense counsel
has a right prior to the trial to inspect and copy the official file."); J6rg et al., supra
note 112, at 47 (stating that in The Netherlands the dossier is "equally at the disposal of
the prosecution and the defence").
l14 See, e.g., AJ.H. Swart, The Netherlands, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SYSTEMS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 279, 291 (Christine Van den Wyngaert et al. eds., 1993) (explaining that in The Netherlands, defense counsel does not have the right to be present when his client is interrogated by the police and that other restrictions can be imposed on a defense lawyer's access to his client during the pre-trial stage when "serious
suspicion has arisen that contacts between accused and counsel are being used in an
attempt to hinder the investigation"); Christine Van den Wyngaert, Belgium, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,

supra, at 1, 16 (noting

that in Belgium "[d]uring the pre-trial stage, defence counsel has no right to be present when investigations are made [and] may not be present during the interrogation
of his client, or when witnesses are examined, nor may he attend searches and seizure
[sic] at his client's house or premises").
115 See Dama~ka, supra note 52, at 579, 581-89;J6rg
et al., supra note 112, at 42-43
(concluding that, in the inquisitorial system used on the Continent, "priority is given
to truth-finding"). For instance, the German Code of Criminal Procedure imposes an
express legal duty on judges to find the truth. Richard S. Frase, The Searchfor the Whole
Truth About American and European CriminalJustice, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 785, 820

(2000).

116 Philippe Bruno, The Common Law from a Civil Lawyer's
Perspective, in
INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS 1, 5 (Richard A. Danner & Marie-Louise
H. Bernal eds., 1994) ('Judges are at the center of the civil law system."); Daly, supra
note 111, at 67-68 ("In the civil law system, the judges-not the parties-drive the
criminal process."); Mirjan Dama~ka, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-Amrican and ContinentalExperiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 841 (1997) (finding
that "while the continental criminal judge takes the lion's share of factfinding activity,
in Anglo-American lands procedural action is to a much greater extent in the hands of
the lawyers for the prosecution and the defense"); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 431 ("A
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are more streamlined. Criminal cases in Continental countries are either tried to a panel of judges"7 or to a "mixed court," composed of
both lay jurors and professional judges. " 8 Even where layjurors are
used, the professional judges, and in particular the presiding judge,
dominate.":' Prior to trial, the prosecutor presents the dossier to the

central difference between the adversary and nonadversary systems is that in the latter
the judge controls the process rather than the lawyers.").
Alphonse Spielmann & Dean Spielmann, Luxembourg, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 114, at 261, 265 (noting that the
use of lay jurors in criminal trials in Luxembourg was eliminated in 1987); Swart, supra
note 114, at 288 (finding that the use of lay juries in criminal trials in The Netherlands
was abolished in 1813).
118German mixed courts have been extensively described in the academic
literature. For a survey of these courts, see GERHARD ROBBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
GERMAN LAW 182-84 (1998); Dubber, supra note 13, at 561-67; John H. Langbein,
Mixed Court andJury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195. For a discussion of mixed courts in France, see Richard S.
Frase, France, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 23, at 143,
172-73. For a general discussion of Continental mixed courts, see van Kessel, supra
note 54, at 422, explaining that: "The Continental court usually consists of a single
professional judge in minor cases and a mixed bench, usually one professional and two
lay judges or, in more serious cases, three professional and two to nine lay judges."
Discontent with the jury system in some countries has resulted in reduced use of mixed
panels.
See, e.g.,
Jean Pradel, France, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 114, at 105, 105-14 (finding the French 'Jury system is currently the target of criticism" and "in considerable demise"); Vagn Greve,
Denmark, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note
114, at 51, 57 ("For some time there has been rather widespread discontent with the
jury system, and the applicable area has been reduced markedly."); Van den Wyngaert,
supra note 114, at 11-12 (discussing the limited role of the jury in Belgian criminal
proceedings). At the same time, Spain and Russia recently reintroduced jury trials; for
a general discussion of this development, see Steven C. Thaman, The Jury Returns to
ContinentalEurope: Russia and Spain Return to the ClassicJury as a Catalyst in a Move to a
More Adversary Form of Criminal Trial, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS:
FROM DIVERSITY TO RAPPROCHEMENT, supra note 52, at 343.
119See Brouwer, supra note 108, at 217 (describing the French
presiding judge's
extensive authority and noting, by contrast, that "[t] he role of the associate judges during the trial is a rather passive one"); Dubber, supra note 13, at 561-67 (describing the
very limited influence of lay jurors); Frase, supra note 118, at 169 (finding that in
France, "[t]he conduct of the trial itself is controlled and directed almost entirely by
the presiding judge"); Frase, supra note 115, at 825 (" [S] tudies of the German mixed
courts indicate that the lay judges have very little impact on guilt determinations
....
"). While the presiding judge does dominate in the adjudicative function, especially in relation to the lay jurors, the role of the Continental judge itself has undergone something of a transformation in recent decades as the investigative functions
previously carried out by the judge have largely been transferred to the police and
prosecutor. See Serge Lasvignes & Marcel Lemonde, The CriminalProcess in France, in
THE CRIMINAL PROCESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARD A EUROPEAN CONSCIOUSNESS
23, 25 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & Mark A. Summers eds., 1995) ("In 1808 the role of a
juge dinstruction was 90% that of an investigator; by 1958, it had become 80% that of a
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presiding judge, but not the layjurors.12 0 Having read the dossier, the
presiding judge typically carries out the bulk of the questioning, and
only after she is finished do the lawyers have the opportunity to suggest additional questions. 21 The presiding judge is also authorized to
raise all issues relevant to the charge22 and can even hear evidence not
formally put forward by the parties.1
Continental evidentiary rules 23 are extremely relaxed and simple
judge. This evolution continued thereafter and particularly since 1970. Today, we can
assert that the role of a juge dinstructionis 90% that of a judge."); Francoise Tulkens,
Criminal Procedure: Main Comparable Features of the National Systems, in THE CRIMINAL
PROCESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARD A EUROPEAN CONSCIOUSNESS, supra, at 11-12
(surveying recent reforms in European criminal justice systems in such countries as
Italy, Portugal, Germany, Spain, and the former Soviet bloc countries and noting that
the dominant reform trends have been demarcating the roles of police, prosecutor,
and.judge, and streamlining the criminal process).
2 van Kessel, supra note 54, at 423; see also Gerhard Dannecker &Julian
Roberts,
The Law of CriminalProcedure, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 413, 420 (Werner F.
Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996) (explaining that, in Germany, lay jurors are not
permitted to see the files).
121 See LUBAN, supra note 53, at 94-95 (noting that in Germany
lawyers rarely ask
more than a couple of questions, both because the judge has typically asked all of the
relevant questions and because intruding further might be taken as criticism of the
judge's work); ROBBERS, supra note 118, at 189 ("The examination of the accused is
carried out primarily by the presiding judge."); Daly, supra note 111, at 70 ("The
judges almost exclusively conduct the examination of witnesses, although the lawyers
are free to suggest additional questions for the judges' consideration; and on occasion,
they may even question a witness directly."); Damalka, supra note 52, at 525 ("The bulk
of the questioning comes typically from the bench and it is the presiding judge who
begins the examination of witnesses."); Langbein, supra note 36, at 447 ("[T]he procedure is fundamentally nonadversarial. It is the presiding judge who interrogates the
witness and the accused."); Edward A. Tomlinson, NonadversarialJustice: The French Experience, 42 MD. L. REV. 131, 143 (1983) (observing that in French trials in the assize
courts, the "number of questions proposed by the other participants is usually quite
limited, however, and the president plainly dominates the courtroom proceeding").
122See Dama~ka, supra note 52, at 559 (describing the active role played
by the
judge in gathering evidence). AsJoachim Herrmann states: "At the German trial, it is
the judge who calls and interrogates the witnesses. On his own motion, he must take
all evidence he considers necessary to determine the defendant's guilt and to set the
appropriate punishment." Herrmann, supra note 113, at 760.
7
There is a great deal of variation in the evidentiary rules of Continental countries. See DAMA KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT, supra note 53, at 7 ("[Slince the collapse of
the Roman-canon proof Continental European nations no longer share a common
evidentiary regime: the range of internal differences is in modern times quite considerable."); Miijan Damaika, Atomistic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence: A Comparative
View, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OFJOHN
HENRY MERRYMAN ON HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY 91, 94-98 (David S. Clark ed., 1990)
[hereinafter Damaka, Atomisitic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence]. Yet the central
tendencies of Continental evidence law are still shared, see DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW
ADRIFT, supra note 53, at 7-8, and my summary will not become so detailed as to implicate national differences.
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by American standards. Because Continental criminal cases are heard
either by professional judges or by a mixed panel in which the professional judges guide their lay colleagues, the complex evidentiary rules
used. 1 4
so prevalent in American proceedings are less frequently
Consequently, Continental trials admit most hearsay1' and character
evidence, among other categories of evidence typically excluded from
American trials, and most Continental countries do not automatically exclude illegally obtained evidence.'2 7 As a result of their liberal

124

See Bradley & Hoffmann, supra note 54, at 1287-89 (comparing restrictive

American evidentiary rules with the European rules); Langbein, supra note 118, at 214
("[T]he device of integrating lay and professional judges spares the mixed court the
need for evidentiary exclusions or other attempts at jury control."); cf Dama~ka, Atomistic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence, supra note 123, at 95 ("Even when a party is
successful in alleging a violation of an evidence rule, the exclusion of information obtained in judge-driven examination is an infrequent sanction in Continental courts.").
125 See DAMAgKA, EVIDENCE LAw ADRIFT, supra note 53, at 15-16
(finding that,
"[a]lthough countries outside of the common law's compass are not unaware of hearsay dangers, their reaction to them seldom assumes the form of exclusionary rules");
J6rg et al., supra note 112, at 50 (stating that, in Continental systems, "[h]earsay evidence, being not regarded as fundamentally unreliable, is generally accepted"); Langbein, supra note 36, at 447 (observing that in Germany, where judgments are rendered
by professional judges working together with laymen, "[m]ost of the common law exclusionary rules, such as the prohibition of hearsay, are unknown"); Bert Swart &
James Young, The European Convention on Human Rights and CriminalJustice in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in CRIMINALJUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY,
supra note 112, at 57, 71 (noting that "Dutch case law is characterized by a rather generous acceptance of hearsay evidence").
126 Cf DAMA KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT, supra note 53,
at 16 ("One also scans the
legal map of Europe in vain for analogues to common law provisions that prohibit
character evidence, evidence of collateral misdeeds, or similar information about a
person's past life."); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 464 (finding that, in Continental
countries, "[t]here are no hearsay, character evidence, or other rules designed to protect the lay jury"). See generally Mirjan R. Dama~ka, PropensityEvidence in ContinentalLegal Systems, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 64 (1994) (concluding that "Continental judges
are exposed to propensity evidence much more so than common lawjurors").
12 See DAMA KA, EVIDENCE LAWADRIFT, supra note 53, at 14
& n.19 (observing that
although many countries have adopted provisions prohibiting the use of illegally obtained evidence, "a vigorous exclusionary policy in all these countries is highly unlikely"); Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging International Consensus as to Criminal Procedure
Rules, 14 MICH.J. INT'L L. 171, 205 (1993) (describing lenient French rules governing
searches and interrogations and concluding that "[e]ven these lenient rules are often
ignored because ... they are not generally backed up with an exclusionary sanction");
id. at 214 (finding that, while some commentators claim that the trend in Germany is
to expand the use of exclusionary rules, "exclusionary decisions are still too rare to
have a consistent impact on police behavior"); Stewart Field et al., Prosecutors, Examining Judges, and Control of Police Investigations, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 112, at 227, 228 (reporting that in The Netherlands,
"[i]n general, cases go forward with damaging statements from the accused on file,
with little concrete evidence of how they were obtained"); Frase & Weigend, supra note
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evidentiary rules, Continental proceedings can also rely more heavily
on the documentary evidence contained in the dossier instead of requiring the more time-consuming presentation of oral testimony.
Other features of Continental trials enhance their efficiency further still. There is no voir dire in the selection of the layjurors, and a
panel of lay jurors might be called upon to hear more than one
case.1 8 The questioning at trial is quite informal by American standards, with few, if any, objections by counsel; 129 witnesses are usually
permitted to testify in narrative form, 30 so the "questioning" largely
takes the form of an informal conversation between the presiding
judge and the witness or defendant. 13 Continental countries make far
more use of the defendant as a testimonial resource, and, as Langbein
has noted, the defendant is "almost always the most efficient testimonial resource.', 132 The defendant has the right to remain silent 3 3 but
virtually always agrees to speak 3 4 since it is expected that adverse in-

113, at 336 ("[I]n many [German] cases, exclusion is not an inevitable consequence of
prior breaches of the law."); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 451 (noting that illegally obtained evidence is usually admitted in Continental countries); Thomas Weigend, Germany, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 23, at 187, 195 (stating that in Germany "[t]here is no general exclusionary rule which would make
illegally obtained evidence inadmissible").
128 See van Kessel, supra note 54, at 460 (contrasting the Continental
and American
Right to
Criminal
Defendant's
the
Implementing
also
Alschuler,
see
ofjury
selection);
systems
Trial, supra note 13, at 991 (stating that voir dire did not exist in the former West German ).
See Dama~ka, Atomisitic and Holistic Evaluation of Evidence, supra note 123, at 95
(observing that the Continental "manner of examining evidence is relatively informal,
and avoids many of the complexities associated with a bilateral, lawyer-driven technique for eliciting information"); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 424 ("In contrast to the
formal, highly structured examinations which occur in American courtrooms, the typical Continental examination takes on the character of an informal discussion between
the residingjudge and the accused or the witness.").
van Kessel, supra note 54, at 433.
131 See van Kessel, supra note 107, at 834 (contrasting our
"formal direct and crossexamination procedure" with the "informality of the proceedings and the discussion
format of [the Continental] trial").
132John Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 204, 208 (1979).
133 van Kessel, supra note 54, at 423; see also van Kessel, supra note
107, at 804 ("All
countries recognize some form of the right to silence and privilege against selfincrimination, which applies to both the pretrial and trial stages of a criminal case.").
The defendant's right to remain silent is not identical to the American defendant's
right not to take the stand, however. Questions can always be asked of the Continental
defendant, but he has the right to refuse to answer at all or to refuse to answer specific
questions. Dama~ka, supra note 52, at 527 (describing the Continental interrogation
process).
134 See Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13,
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ferences will be drawn from silence.135 As noted above, the dossier is
made available to the defendant, who thus becomes aware of all the
evidence previously collected. Because all the participants are familiar
with the evidence, the proceedings can expeditiously focus on the
relevant issues. Indeed, to American observers, the Continental trial
looks less like a trial than like a summary administrative hearing
whose goal is to review the dossier.'"
Given these efficient features, it is not surprising that Continental
trials are, on average, much shorter than American trials. Whereas
the O.J. Simpson case lasted 372 days, 37 the most complicated French
trial rarely exceeds two weeks,"" and many French jury trials last only a
day. 139 A study of German trials indicated that, on average, the guilt

at 1006 (finding that a defendant in a Continental trial "rarely remains silent"); van
Kessel, supra note 54, at 423; van Kessel, supra note 107, at 833 (stating that "very few
Continental defendants remain silent at trial").
1.5 See Daly, supra note 111, at 71 ("Since
silence does not make a good impression
in France, the accused very rarely declines to respond."); Dama~ka, supra note 52, at
534 ("The pressure to speak is, I believe, somewhat stronger than the parallel pressure
in the common law trial on the defendant to take the stand, as more immediate inferences can be drawn from refusal to answer specific questions than from the general
refusal to submit to the questioning process."); McKillop, supra note 112, at 575
("[T]he accused was expected, both during the investigation and at the hearing, to
divulge what he knew about the relevant events to complement the version otherwise
established."); van Kessel, supra note 107, at 833 (noting that "[]udges and other participants expect the accused to speak," and that in France, for instance, a "defendant's
complete silence will lead to adverse inferences by the judges"). Further, because the
defendant testifies first, "the prosecutor may sit back and expect that leads or evidence
damaging to the defendant will come out of his interrogation." Dama~ka, supra note
52, at 529-30.
136 See Daly, supra note 111, at 71 (arguing
that "the trial is essentially a review of
the dossie?'); Mirjan Damalka, Models of Criminal Procedure, 51 ZBORNIK PRAVNOG
FAKULLETA U ZAGREBU 477, 491 (2001) (observing that "to lawyers expecting trials to
proceed without an official file, a trial conducted against the background of a dossier as
an organizing device can easily seem to represent not much more than a review in
open court of previously performed factfinding activities"); J6rg et al., supra note 112,
at 50 (explaining that "[b]ecause of the crucial importance of the dossier the public
hearing is often much more a verification of its contents, the results of the pre-trial investigation, than the culmination of a contest"); McKillop, supra note 112, at 565 ("The
hearing thus became essentially a public review and confirmation of the contents of
the [dossier], and hence of the conclusions that were reached in the investigation.").
137 Simpson
Tials by the Numbers, USA Today, Jan. 28, 1997, at http://
www.usatoday.com/news/index/nns] 79.htm.
3H8 Daly, supra note 111, at 69-70.
39 See Frase, supra note 118, at 172
(stating that assize court trials "generally last
from one to three days," in part because once commenced, trials "may only be recessed
to allow the court to eat and sleep"); Tomlinson, supra note 121, at 133 (noting that, in
France, "the only trials likely to last longer than a day or two are those involving either
multiple defendants or a crime victim's claim for substantial civil damages").
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phase of cases in which the defendant contests guilt lasts approximately three-quarters of a day for the ordinary felony and about one
day for the gravest offense. 140 American felony trials, which on average
141
last two to three days, thus often consume double or triple the time
of a typical French or German trial.
2. Non-Trial Dispositions of Continental Cases
Because Continental trials are generally much quicker and more
efficient than American trials, Continental countries traditionally have
42
had much less need to resort to non-trial alternative dispositions.
Guilty pleas do not exist in most Continental countries; consequently,
143
a trial is held even where a defendant has made a full confession.

140

See van Kessel, supra note 54, at 474-75 (summarizing the results of a 1972 study

by Casper and Zeisel on the German criminal courts); JOHN LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 77 (1977) (reporting that, according to the 1972
Casper and Zeisel study, half of all German criminal trials lastjust two hours).
141 See supra text accompanying
note 66.
142 See Bradley, supra note 72, at 472 (asserting that because the Continental system
"works quite efficiently, plea bargaining is not necessary to reduce the caseload, and in
[C]ontinental countries this practice is circumscribed"); Frase, supra note 81, at 627
("French trials are simpler and quicker [than American trials], thus reducing the need
to minimize trial adjudication."); Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 73, at 1562 ("German trial procedure is relatively rapid, so the prosecutor has no particular incentive to
try to avoid trial even if he could.").
143 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A,
Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Cassese, para. 7 (Oct. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Erdemovi6, Cassese Dissent] (noting that the guilty plea does "not have a direct counterpart in the civil-law
tradition, where an admission of guilt is simply part of the evidence to be considered
and evaluated by the court"), available at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/
judgement/erd-adojcas971007e.htm; Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's
Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 977 ("In most of Continental Europe, even the institution of the guilty plea is unknown, except in minor cases."); Bohlander, supra note 27,
at 151 ("Often the mere fact that the accused has made a confession does not relieve
the court of the task of finding out whether this confession is credible and supported
by corroborating material."); Frase, supra note 118, at 169 (explaining that since "there
are no defendant pleas in French criminal courts.., and no bargaining of charge or
sentence leniency in return for such a plea; in principle, all cases are tried, and the
accused's confession or admission of the charges has no formal effect on the method
of adjudication"); Weigend, supra note 127, at 208 ("Even if the defendant admits his
guilt, the court remains obliged to find the facts necessary for conviction.").
At the same time, trials featuring confessions may be summary, even by Continental standards. See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra
note 13, at 982 (discussing empirical studies reporting on the trial-time saved in European countries by a defendant's confession); Frase, supra note 118, at 169 (finding that
"trials in [the French] Correctional Court can be substantially shortened if the defendant, before or during the trial, admits most of the alleged facts"); Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth ofJudicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"Systems:
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Further, Continental prosecutors are accorded far less discretion than
their American counterparts, 44 and in some countries, "prosecutors
are legally bound to prosecute all serious crimes that come to their attention. '
For these reasons, during the 1970s some commentators
maintained that there 4was no bargaining over serious crime in some
,
Continental countries.

France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 264-69 (1977) (describing summary
uncontested trials); Herrmann, supra note 113, at 763 (noting that in Germany,
"[u]nlike a guilty plea, a confession does not replace a trial but rather causes a shorter
trial" and that in the ordinary case "trials in which the accused fully confesses take
about half as long as trials without such a confession"); Langbein & Weinreb, supra
note 73, at 1566 ("Of course a trial is likely to be shorter if the accused has confessed.").
144 Frase, supra note 81, at 629; see id. at 611-13
(explaining that "prosecutorial
charging discretion is significantly more restrained in France than in the United States"
and that French prosecutors have limited discretion after charges have been filed);
Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the ProsecutingAttorney in West Germany, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 508, 508 (1970) ("The prosecuting attorney in the Federal
Republic of Germany has by no means the same degree of freedom in the exercise of
his discretion as belongs to his American counterpart."); Thomas Lundmark, Book
Review, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 677, 686 (1999) ("Prosecutorial discretion as such is not
recognized in Germany.").
i4, Mirjan Damagka, The Reality of ProsecutorialDiscretion: Comments on a German
Monograph,29 AM.J. COMP. L. 119, 119 (1981); see also ROBBERS, supra note 118, at 184
("As a general rule [the state prosecution service] does not have a discretion [sic] to
decide whether to prosecute or not."); Frase, supra note 52, at 117 (noting that the
"'[c]ompulsory prosecution' rule.., is a common feature of Civil Law and inquisitorial systems"); Frase & Weigend, supra note 113, at 337 ("Germany, unlike the United
States, does not give the prosecutor complete discretion to decline to file charges. In
Germany, felony (Verbrechen) charges must be filed if there is an adequate evidentiary
basis."); Weigend, supra note 127, at 205 ("The [German] prosecutor is obliged by law
to file charges whenever there is 'sufficient' suspicion that the suspect has committed a
crime."). See generally Langbein, supra note 36, at 448-80 (describing the German principle of compulsory prosecution).
See Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 143, at 269 (arguing that Continental
jurists
"deny the possibility of plea bargaining by simply noting that guilty pleas are legally
impermissible"); Langbein, supra note 132, at 205 (noting that the former West Germany had "avoided any form or analogueof plea bargainingin its proceduresfor cases of serious
crime"); Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 73, at 1562-67. As the German scholar HansHeinrichJescheck stated in 1970:
The restriction on his discretion prohibits the prosecuting attorney from entering into discussions with the accused and his counsel, whether perhaps
only a portion of the alleged offenses might be charged, or whether the
charges themselves might be reduced in severity in order to obtain in exchange a confession which would relieve the prosecutor of his obligation of
producing proof. "Plea bargaining" of this sort is fundamentally prohibited in
German law, and it would not make much sense anyway to insist upon a confession at all costs, since objective proof must still be presented to the court in
the case of a confession, even if perhaps within narrower limits.
Jescheck, supra note 144, at 511.
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Whether that claim was slightly exaggerated even at the time, 141 it
is clear now that the use of non-trial alternative procedures has increased on the Continent in the last thirty years, particularly in cases
involving petty crimes, and that many of those alternative procedures
bear at least surface resemblance to American plea bargaining. The
clearest example comes from Italy, which radically revised its criminal
procedures in 1989 to include more adversarial features. 14" Because
these adversarial elements greatly increased the length and cost of
Italian trials, the new Italian Code also provided for "special forms of
procedure" aimed at avoiding the ordinary, time-consuming procedures. 149 Most similar to American plea bargaining is the Italian patteggiamento sulla pena, or simply patteggiamento, in which the defendant
and the prosecution agree on a sentence which they request the judge
to apply.'5 0 This mechanism is available only to less serious crimes,
and a prison sentence imposed pursuant to this procedure cannot exceed two years.
The procedure additionally differs from American
5
plea bargaining in that the defendant is not required to admit guilt.1 1
Other Continental criminal justice systems have remained predominantly non-adversarial but have also seen the limited emergence
of efficient non-trial alternatives. In The Netherlands, for instance,

147 See Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 143, at 264-79
(describing certain Continental practices as analogues of plea bargaining and the guilty plea).
148

See Ennio Amodio & Eugenio Selvaggi, An Accusatorial System in a Civil Law

Country: The 1988 Italian Code of CriminalProcedure, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 1211, 1211 (1989)

(asserting that the new code of Italian criminal procedure "brought into existence the
first instance of an accusatorial system ever known in a country in whose tradition and
culture the [non-adversarial] approach to criminal justice had always been the rule");
Rachel VanCleave, Italy, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note
23, at 245, 245 (describing Italy's process of transforming its non-adversarial system
into one using a combination of non-adversarial and adversarial procedures).
149

Piermaria Corso, Italy, in

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY, supra note 114, at 223, 251 (noting that Italy has shortened criminal trials

by instituting procedures to bypass committal proceedings, waive trial, or waive preliminary proceedings); VanCleave, supra note 148, at 245 (discussing procedural reforms set out in Book VI of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: judgment without
trial, abbreviated trial, direct trial, immediate trial, and penal decree).
150Corso, supra note 149, at 252-53 (describing the elements of the patteggiamento
process and noting its acceptance among practitioners).
151 Id. at 252; VanCleave, supra note
148, at 272.
152 VanCleave, supra note 148, at 272.
The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure
also provides for summary trials, in which the case is judged on the basis of the prosecution's dossier instead of proceeding to a full trial. Sentences imposed following
summary trials are reduced by one-third. Id. at 273. For a discussion of other full trial
alternatives, including direct trials, immediate trials, and penal orders, see Corso, supra
note 149, at 253-54; VanCleave, supra note 148, at 274-75.
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prosecutors will engage in "conditional dismissals" and "transactions,"
wherein they will drop the charges if the defendant agrees to certain
conditions, such as to compensate the victim or to undergo psychiatric
treatment. 153 These practices do not result in the defendant's conviction, and the conditions imposed do not include imprisonment; thus,
their resemblance to American plea bargaining is limited. Indeed,
American prosecutors utilize practices similar to Dutch "conditional
dismissals" and "transactions" under the rubric "diversion,"'154 yet still
must plea bargain the vast majority of cases that are not diverted. An
arguably closer Dutch analogue to plea bargaining is the practice of
"taking offenses into consideration," wherein the prosecutor does not
file additional charges that could be proved, but rather leaves them to
the court to take into account in sentencing. By failing to file the additional charges, the prosecutor saves time and paper work, and the
defendant is widely believed to receive milder punishment
than he
55
filed.1'
formally
been
had
charges
the
if
received
have
would
In France, several procedures have developed, particularly in the
courts hearing less serious crimes,' 5 6 that are intended to save time
and minimize litigation.'5 7 For instance, American commentators
have analogized the French practice of "correctionalization" to
American charge bargaining. In France, criminal offenses are classified as crimes, dlits, or contraventions,with crimes the most serious and
contraventions the least serious." 5 "Correctionalization" refers to the
French practice of charging an offense as a dlit when it could have

153 Bert Swart, Settling Criminal Cases
Without a Tria 31 ISR. L. REV. 223, 225-27
(1997); see alsoJ6rg et al., supra note 112, at 48 (finding that in The Netherlands,
"modern tendencies have resulted in various ways of settling cases out of court with or

without conditions like the payment of a legally fixed or negotiated sum of money").
14 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12,
at 670 ("Diversion is the disposition of a
criminal complaint without a conviction, the noncriminal disposition being conditioned on either the performance of specified obligations by the defendant, or his participation in counseling or treatment.").
'5 Swart, supra note 153, at 229-30.
Interestingly, Bron McKillop conducted an empirical study of a French murder
case involving a defendant accused of murdering his estranged wife's boyfriend.
McKillop, supra note 112, at 529-30. The forensic and witness evidence against the defendant was overwhelming, id. at 534-44, so it came as no surprise when the defendant
was convicted, id. at 560. The trial took two days, id. at 548-60, and, given the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, would likely have been seen by American
lawyers as a waste of time and resources.
157 See Frase, supra note 81, at 626-47 (describing French
analogues to plea bargaining); Frase, supra note 118, at 416-17; Pradel, supra note 118, at 131-32 (describing
French "transactions").
15
Frase, supra note 118, at 144; Tomlinson, supra note 121, at 141-42.
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been charged as a crime. Crimes are heard in an assize court, which
utilizes comparatively elaborate procedures and mixed panels of
judges and lay jurors, while dMlits are heard in a correctional court,
which features less formal procedural rules and panels consisting only
of professional judges."' The more formal procedures of the assize
courts have proven sufficiently cumbersome that prosecutors often
circumvent them by correctionalization.
Although French correctionalization does bear some resemblance to American charge bargaining, the differences between the two are also manifest. Unlike an
American defendant who pleads guilty, a French defendant charged
with a dilit still receives a trial, albeit one with fewer safeguards, and
French prosecutors do not explicitly bargain over the charging decision. ""
In Germany, most misdemeanors and petty infractions are disposed of by means of penal orders-written orders describing the defendant's wrongful conduct and specifying a penalty that cannot include imprisonment. If the defendant does not object to the order
within a certain period of time, the order becomes effective."' It used

159

Tomlinson, supra note 121, at 143-44; see also Brouwer, supra note 108, at 216-19

(describing proceedings in assize court). Further, before a prosecutor can bring a defendant to trial for a crime, he must initiate ajudicial investigation in which an examining magistrate investigates the facts alleged by the prosecutor and hears the defense.
For the prosecution of delits and contraventions, a judicial investigation is optional, not
mandatory. Tomlinson, supra note 121, at 150-53.
10 See Frase, supra note 81, at 622-23 (stating that prosecutors use correctionalization because "It]he case is then sent directly to correction court, thereby avoiding judicial investigation"); Tomlinson, supra note 121, at 153-54 (describing situations in
which French prosecutors "avoid[] the necessity of a judicial investigation and ...
bri
the defendant to trial before a tribunalcorrectionnet').
Frase, supra note 81, at 630. Further, French prosecutors who engage
in correctionalization may be motivated by a number of reasons that bear no relation to the
defendant's cooperation: the prosecutor might believe a felony sentence would be
excessive in light of the defendant's prior record, or he might fear that the assize court
would view felony penalties as excessive and either acquit the defendant or impose no
more than a dilit sentence. Id. at 622-23.
162 See Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right
to Trial, supra note 13,
at 956-57 (providing details of German penal procedure); Dannecker & Roberts, supra
note 120, at 445-46 (discussing German penal order procedure and noting that defendants are not required to object); Felstiner, supra note 15, at 310 (explaining the German penal order and its accompanying procedure); Hans-Heiner Kihne, Germany, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 114, at 137,
158 (describing penal orders and noting that they are of greatest value in helping the
criminal justice system cope with traffic cases). France's use of penal orders in criminal sentencing has also been the subject of scholarly attention. See Frase, supra note
81, at 645-47 ("Another form of tacit sentence bargaining in France is the use of penal
orders."); Tomlinson, supra note 121, at 145 ("The overwhelming majority of cases in
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to be thought that the execution of a penal order was an administrative task that involved no bargaining, but in recent years the defense
and prosecution have begun bargaining over the fine to be imposed.
According to most commentators, however, a defendant's
rejection of a penal
S 164order will not result in a higher penalty following
conviction at trial.
Bargaining over confessions has also emerged
recently in Germany to relieve the burden imposed by large-scale,
complicated financial and drug cases.
As in most Continental countries, in Germany an admission of guilt does not obviate the need for a
trial; the court must still find the facts necessary to convict. However,
if the defendant makes a credible and detailed confession, and neither the prosecutor nor defense offers further evidence, the court will
usually be satisfied that the defendant's confession provides a sufficient basis for the judgment and will not call additional witnesses.6
Because complex economic crimes can "take months or even years to
try if the defense makes use of all its procedural options, especially its

the tribunaux de police ... are disposed of through the simplified procedure of the ordonnance pinale.").
163 See Dubber, supra note 13, at 559-60 ("In
penal order bargains, the prosecutor
may offer to initiate a penal order proceeding instead of filing the case in the single
judge court, thereby limiting the defendant's maximum exposure to a suspended one
year prison sentence .... ); Herrmann, supra note 113, at 761-62 ("A higher sentence
at trial, however, is not an automatic rejection of a penal order.").
164 See Alschuler, implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right
to Trial, supra note 13,
at 956-57; Felstiner, supra note 15, at 314 ("West German defendants are, I believe, not
penalized for rejecting a penal order and insisting upon a trial."); Herrmann, supra
note 113, at 762 (explaining that "the accused ordinarily is not induced to accept a
penal order by the prospect of a higher sentence should he elect to have a trial");
Langbein, supra note 132, at 214-15 ("[1]t would violate German law for prosecutors or
judges to attempt to institute such sentencing differentials [in rejected penal order
cases.]"); Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 73, at 1565 (maintaining that, "if the accused rejects disposition by a penal order in favor of a trial, the prosecutor virtually
never recommends, nor does the court impose, a penalty higher than that contained
in the penal order"). Some commentators question that view, however. See Abraham
S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 87 YALE L.J.
1570, 1574-75 & n.18 (1978).
115 See Frase & Weigend, supra note 113, at 345
(noting the increase in complex
economic offenses). Joachim Herrmann has observed:
Previously unknown problems in criminal justice administration are today
posed by new kinds of cases involving white-collar crimes, which require the
court to consider a great number of witnesses, thousands of pages of business
records, expert testimony about fraudulent bookkeeping, and often involve
the juggling of assets between different business enterprises. The same applies to drug cases involving international conspiracies, where witnesses tend
either not to testify at all or not to tell the truth, or to keep disappearing.
Herrmann, supra note 113, at 763.
166Weigend, supra note 127, at 208.
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right to request further proof-taking,' ' 167 a confession in these cases
Therefore, prior to
proves an especially welcome time-saving device.'
formal charging, the defense and prosecution might negotiate over
the charges that will be brought following the defendant's confession;
alternatively, after charging but before or during trial, the judge and
defendant might engage in discussions regarding the sentence that
will be imposed following the defendant's confession.9 Joachim
Herrmann estimated that in 1992, bargaining occurred in at least 20%
to 30% of German cases, though he emphasized that it was largely reserved to petty crimes and large, complex crimes, and was thus rarely
used in cases involving violent or other very serious crimes."' Further,
in 1997 the Federal Court of Justice set strict guidelines as to when
plea bargaining should be allowed171 so bargaining may now be less
prevalent as a result.
The increased use of these and other non-trial and summary-trial
alternatives on the Continent has resulted from a rise in crime, par-

17

168

Frase & Weigend, supra note 113, at 345.
Indeed, confessions are generally thought to halve the trial time necessary for

an ordinary case, and they offer far greater time savings in large-scale, complex cases.
See Herrmann, supra note 113, at 763. Herrmann goes on to note that, unlike in the
United States, bargaining over confessions does not "serve to process a great number
of ordinary cases[,]" but rather "is a specific device reserved for handling big and difficult cases." Id.
169 Id. at 756, 764-65; see also Kfihne, supra note 162, at 157 (noting that,
although
"[u]nder the principles of instruction and legality, there is no room for plea bargaining in the strict sense of German criminal procedure," in complicated cases, counsel
may "promise a confession by his client on some points of the indictment, and in return the court will pronounce a sentence not exceeding a certain limit"); Weigend,
supra note 127, at 208 ("[I]n complex cases the defense sometimes intimates to the
court that the defendant would be ready to make a statement and refrain demanding
the taking of further evidence in exoneration if he could be certain that his sentence
would not exceed a certain maximum.").
170 Herrmann, supra note 113, at 763; see also Bohlander, supra
note 27, at 159
("German law finds the idea of bargaining for lesser charges unacceptable and allows
sentencing bargain [sic] only in very limited circumstances."); Heike Jung, The Criminal Process in the FederalRepublic of Germany-An Overview, in THE CRIMINAL PROCESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARD A EUROPEAN CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 119, at 59, 61-62
(describing the 1975 reforms which "introduced 'bargaining' elements into the phase
of preliminary investigations").
171 The Federal Court of Justice held, among other things, that (1) plea negotiations must take place in an open session of the court in the presence of all the judges
and parties; (2) the court is not permitted to indicate a certain sentence but can only
state an upper limit in case of a confession; and (3) it is not permissible to negotiate a
waiver of appeal before sentencing. See Bohlander, supra note 27, at 159-60 (summarizing the court's holdings).
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ticularly petty crime and complex financial crime, 7 ' and from an increasing convergence between adversarial and non-adversarial procedural systems. 7 ' The convergence itself stems in part from increasingly burdensome caseloads. As Abraham Goldstein put it: "There
are simply too many offenses, too many offenders, and too few resources to deal with them all. One result of this overload has been a
steady movement towards a convergence of legal systems-towards
borrowing from others those institutions and practices that offer some
hope of relief."'7 4 Liberal reforms, some undertaken voluntarily'75 and
others imposed by decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights,76 have provided a second factor inspiring a convergence of systems and, in particular, have resulted in the importation of some adversarial features into non-adversarial systems.'77 The European Court
172

See Dama~ka, supra note 136, at 485 ("Everywhere, swelling dockets favored the

replacement of methodically conducted official activities by flexible arrangements with
the defense."); Frase & Weigend, supra note 113, at 345 ("One reason for the growth of
plea bargaining is the increase of complicated cases of economic crime.").
'.1 See Daly, supra note 111, at 72-73. See generally
Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic
Convergence? ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure in an InternationalContext, 75 IND. L.J. 809
(2000); Bradley, supra note 127 (detailing the emerging international consensus on
international criminal procedure);J6rg et al., supra note 112, at 45, 53-56 (describing
the qradual convergence between the adversarial and non-adversarial systems).
Goldstein, supra note 31, at 159.
175 See DAMA KA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra note 53,
at 190-91 ("Sooner or later, liberal reforms were inaugurated in all Continental countries.").
176 SeeJoachim Herrmann, CriminalJusticePolicy and Comparativism:
A EuropeanPerspective, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS:
FROM DIVERSITY TO
RAPPROCHEMENT, supra note 52, at 129, 134-36 ("Published opinions.., of the European Court of Human Rights have demonstrated.. . that there is a visible trend towards humanizing the protection of individual rights in European countries."); Swart
& Young, supra note 125, at 83-84 (describing the implementation of case law promulgated by the European Court of Human Rights).
See DAMASKA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra note 53, at 190 (discussing importation
of
adversarial features as a result of liberal reforms); Lasvignes & Lemonde, supra note
119, at 29 (describing reforms in France that have "accentuate[d] the adversarial nature of the proceedings"); Swart & Young, supra note 125, at 84-86 (explaining importation of adversarial procedures as a result of the European Court of Human Rights's
judgments); Christine Van den Wyngaert, Foreword to CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 114, at i, ii (noting that "many of the 'continental' countries have recently imported features of the Anglo-American 'adversarial
system'); see also Bradley, supra note 72, at 474-75 (observing that "inquisitorial systems
have become more adversarial"). Bradley goes on to maintain that the adversarial
model "is the wave of the future" and contends that:
As societies become more diverse (i.e., more like the United States), the notion that government can be trusted to do right by minority groups seems
anachronistic. The more informal approach of the continental system may be
well suited to a society in which everyone is of the same or similar background. But it is not suitable where minority groups are mistrusted by, and
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of Human Rights has, among other things, required Continental
countries to permit defendants greater opportunity to question witnesses appearing against them... and required Continental judges to
limit the roles they play in criminal cases in order to preserve the appearance of impartialty. 9 The importation of these and other safeguards that tend to lengthen trials and reduce the efficiency of trial
procedures give additional impetus for the use and development of
non-trial alternative dispositions.
For the above reasons, Continental and Anglo-American criminal
procedures differ less than they used to, but they still differ considerably. Although the use of bargaining and non-trial dispositions has
increased on the Continent in recent years, it remains quite limited by
American standards. In many countries, such procedures are restricted to petty crime and what bargaining occurs is often implicit or
if express, more carefully regulated than in the United States. Plea
bargaining thus does not play the essential role in Continental criminal justice systems that it does in the American criminal justice system.
Continental trials, even those not featuring confessions, are still sufficiently simple and efficient that they can be viably used to dispose of a
large percentage of cases. At the same time, it is clear that growing
caseloads and the introduction of more complex procedures result,
both on the Continent and elsewhere, in the development and use of
non-trial alternatives. 8 ° The following section will briefly detail the
procedures of England and Israel to confirm the functional correla-

mistrust, the majority and its police forces. In the absence of shared norms,
formal delineation of rules by courts or legislatures, and their enforcement by
counsel, are essential.
Id. at 482.
178 See Kostovski v. The Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 21 (1989) (holding
that applicant has a right to challenge and question witnesses appearing against him).
See generally Annemarieke Beijer et al., Witness Evidence, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Principleof Open Justice, in CRIMINALJUSTICE IN EUROPE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 112, at 283, 288-89.
179 See, e.g., Oberschlick v. Austria, 204 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1991) (finding a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights because the trial judge had participated in a decision on a pre-trial request to order the prosecution of the defendant); Hauschildt v. Denmark, 154 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (finding a violation of
the European Convention on Human Rights because the trial judge had decided requests for pre-trial detention); DeCubber v. Belgium, 86 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984)
(finding a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights because the trial
judge had previously acted as the examiningjudge).
180 See Herrmann, supra note 113, at 755 (arguing that German plea bargaining
is
"mainly a consequence of the over-burdened criminal justice system").
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tion between complicated, adversarial procedures and plea bargaining.
3. Criminal Procedures and Non-Trial Dispositions in the
United Kingdom and Israel
Although the adversary system originated in England, English
procedures are now considerably less adversarial than American procedures; that is, English procedures are simpler and more efficient.""
England abolished the grand jury, voir dire is strictly limited, peremptory challenges were eliminated in 1998, and the grounds on
which a challenge for cause can be based are quite restricted.
English procedures also provide more information to the parties and to
the court. Disclosure requirements are not as broad as on the Continent, but unlike most American jurisdictions, English law does require
defendants to disclose before trial the nature of their defenses and the
matters on which the defense intends to join issue with the prosecution. England also follows the Continental approach of using rules
181

In July 2002, Britain announced sweeping changes to its criminal justice system,

among other things, abolishing the double jeopardy rule and allowing for the admission of hearsay evidence. Warren Hoge, British Change Rules to Cut Crime, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., July 18, 2002, at 3. It will remain to be seen how these reforms will affect the
prevalence of plea bargaining.
182 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 402-03 ("During
the 1820s, Jeremy Bentham
vigorously criticized the English grand jury, claiming that it was both unrepresentative
and inefficient.... England... finally heeded Bentham's advice and abolished the
grand jury."); Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note
13, at 976 ("Although English trial and pretrial procedures are substantially more burdensome than those of many nations that sense no need to engage in plea bargaining,
these procedures are also less elaborate than our own. The grand jury in England has
been discarded .... ). In the United States, by comparison, eighteen states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government grant defendants the right not to answer a felony charge unless the charge has been issued by a grand jury through an indictment or presentment. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 733. Four states require
prosecution by an indictment screened by the grand jury only with respect to the most
severely punished felonies, id. at 735, and the remaining states allow the prosecution to
proceed either by an indictment screened by the grand jury or by an "information," id.
at 737. If felony charges have not first been screened by a grand jury, most states require that a judicial officer approve the charges at a preliminary hearing, unless the
defendant waives that protection. Id. at 669.
183 Grounds for challenge have been effectively restricted
to "(a) ineligibility or
disqualification and (b) reasonable suspicion of bias." David J. Feldman, England and
Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 23, at 91, 123. See
also A.T.H. Smith, England and Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 114, at 73, 78-79 (describing English jury selection
procedures following recent reforms).
184 Feldman, supra note 183, at 121.
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of procedure and evidence that encourage the defendant to testify9.
Further, in England, as in most countries, the products of unlawful
searches and seizures are not automatically excluded from evidence.""
Turning to English judges, they do not exercise the same degree of
control over the trial process as their Continental counterparts, but
they do command more authority than an American trial judge. For
instance, at the end of a trial, English judges are required to sum up
the case; the judge will summarize the evidence and arguments on
both sides and present the inferences that the jurors may draw from
their conclusions about primary facts.' s7
Because English trial procedures are more efficient than American procedures, it should come as no surprise that there is less plea
bargaining in England than in the United States. Indeed, less than
three decades ago it was widely (but erroneously) believed that plea
bargaining was not practiced at all in England.
Since then, plea
bargaining, and in particular, implicit plea bargaining, has come to
light; English defendants are now understood to routinely receive a
sentence reduction upon a plea of guilty.' 9 Still, plea bargaining in
England is more limited than in the United States: only 50% or so of
the defendants charged with a serious crime plead guilty.9
185 van Kessel, supra note 54, at 481. By testifying,
the defendant is not automatically subject to impeachment with prior felony convictions; further, if a defendant does
not testify, the judge may comment on that fact to the jury. Id.; see also Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 976 (arguing that the
privilege against self-incrimination, as interpreted and applied in England, encourages
defendants to testify).
186 See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's
Right to Trial supra note 13,
at 976 ("[T]he products of unlawful searches and seizures are admitted into evidence
in most cases."); Bradley, supra note 127, at 186-91 (describing the limited categories of
evidence that are excluded); Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 73, at 1549, 1554-55 ("In
England, where criminal procedure more closely resembles ours, the automatic application of an exclusionary rule has consistently been rejected.").
van Kessel, supra note 54, at 433. van Kessel goes on: "Though the principal
actors of the English trial are the lawyers, the fact that the English judge wields more
authority than her American counterpart means that the English lawyers possess less
authority, thereby rendering the powers of the lawyers and the judge more balanced
than in our system." Id. at 481.
188 See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's
Right to Trial, supra note 13,
at 973 ("The frequent denial that plea bargaining occurs in England is apparently
based largely on semantics."); Baldwin & McConville, supra note 100, at 288 (noting
the belief that plea bargaining does not exist in England).
189 Baldwin & McConville, supra note 100,
at 299.
190John Spencer, CriminalProcedure in England-A
Summary of its Merits and DefectsThe Outlines of the System, in THE CRIMINAL PROCESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARD A
EUROPEAN CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 119, at 67, 69. According to Spencer, virtually
all defendants charged with petty crimes plead guilty. Id. Baldwin and McConville es-
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Israeli criminal proceedings, like American criminal proceedings,
are adversarial in character,' 9' but they have remained more faithful to
their English roots;' 9 in addition, they have incorporated many Continental nonadversarial features ' that make Israeli trials less complicated and more efficient. For instance, Israeli trials are bench trials,' 94
and Israeli judges, like Continental judges, play a substantial role in
examining
witnesses and can summon witnesses on their own initiaS 195
tive.
Further, resembling their Continental counterparts, Israeli
prosecutors are under broad disclosure obligations and cannot introduce any evidence that was not subject to discovery.' 96 Moreover, Israel, like England and Continental countries, has no exclusionary
rule' 97 and makes more use of the defendant as a testimonial resource.
Defendants are not required to testify but failing to do is often considered circumstantial evidence of guilt.' 9' Owing in part to these and

timated that in 1976, approximately two-thirds of defendants charged with serious
crimes pled guilty, while about 90% of defendants charged with less serious crimes
pled guilty. Baldwin & McConville, supra note 100, at 287 n.1. These guilty plea rates
were estimated to be less than those in America. Id. at 287; see also Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 973 (arguing that Eng-

landI among other nations, is not "as dependent on plea bargaining as we are").

See Eliahu Harnon, Plea Bargainingin Israel-The ProperFunctions of the Prosecution
and the Court and the Role of the Victim, 31 ISR. L. REV. 245, 247 (1997); Eliahu Harnon &
Alex Stein, Israel, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 23, at

217, 240.

Abraham Abramovsky, PartnersAgainst Crime: Joint Prosecutionsof
Israeli Organized Crime Figures by U.S. and Israeli Authorities, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1903, 1912
192

(1996).

Kenneth Mann, Criminal Procedure, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL
267, 267, 293 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995).
194 Harnon, supra note 191, at 247; Harnon
& Stein, supra note 191, at 239.
195 Cf Mann, supra note 193, at 286-87 (explaining
that the absence of a jury and
widespread absence of representation of defendants in criminal trials forces judges to
protect the defendant's interests).
196 Harnon & Stein, supra note 191, at 238; see also Eliahu Harnon,
Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 24 1SR. L. REV. 592, 594-98 (1990) (describing the accused's right to
inspection and discovery of evidence); Mann, supra note 193, at 285 (explaining that
the prosecution must disclose all "investigatory material," including "all factual materials collected by or known to the police relevant in any way to the offence charged"
immediately after issuing the indictment).
197 Mann, supra note 193, at 274.
198 See Abramovsky, supra note 192, at 1913-14 (observing that a defendant's "fail193

ure to take the stand may be commented upon by the prosecution and will 'add to the
weight' of the prosecution's case in an Israeli court"); Harnon, supra note 196, at 599
("A defendant's silence in court may strengthen the primafacie evidence and add to its
probative weight."); Harnon & Stein, supra note 191, at 242; Mann, supra note 193, at
287-88 (stating that "in many situations a suspect's refusal to make a statement at the
police station may constitute circumstantial evidence of guilt" and that "if the suspect is
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other, more efficient procedures, Israeli court calendars are not
nearly as congested as their American counterparts. '99 Consequently,
while plea bargaining is practiced in Israel, it is not nearly so widespread as in the United States. At least 30% to 35% of criminal cases
go to trial, and a significant proportion of the 65% to 70% of the defendants who
plead guilty do so without prior negotiations or plea
20 0
agreements.
D. Summary
This Part has examined the functional role of plea bargaining in a
variety ofjurisdictions, and has shown a correlation between the complexity and inefficiency of a country's trial procedures and its use of
plea bargaining. Simply put, it has shown that the more complex and
time-consuming the country's trial procedures, the more those procedures will be avoided in favor of non-trial alternatives. Thus, American criminal trials, with their many safeguards and intensely adversarial character, are among the least utilized in the world. As Lloyd
Weinreb has noted: "No country relies so much as we on the defendant's formal acknowledgement of his guilt. ' 201 Plea bargaining and
non-trial alternatives play a correspondingly lesser role in countries
such as England and Israel that utilize more moderate adversarial
procedures, and they play a lesser role still in Continental countries
that utilize relatively quick and efficient non-adversarial procedures.

presented with a document that incriminates him, his silence ... may be used as evidence against him").
199 SeeAbramovsky, supra note 192, at
1913.
200 Mann, supra note 193, at 284. About twenty years
ago, Albert Alschuler interviewed David Libai, a former Israeli prosecutor and defense attorney, who opined that
guilty plea rates in Israel were substantially lower than those in the United States. He
described plea bargaining in Israel as "neither very widespread nor very unusual," because Israeli trials are not to ajury:
[T]here is no feeling that the great mass of defendants must be induced to
plead guilty. Two or three ordinary trials, involving neither terribly simple
nor terribly complex cases, can usually be conducted in a single morning. It is
a rare case that cannot be proven with two or three witnesses, and prosecutors
know that they may very well spend more time bargaining a case than they
would spend at trial. Accordingly they do not regard plea bargaining as a
great administrative boon.
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial, supra note 13, at 973
n.207.
201 LLOYD WEINREB, DENIAL OFJUSTICE 148 (1977).
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THE IDEOLOGICAL AND STRUCTURAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
PLEA BARGAINING

Part I described plea bargaining's functional role in various
criminal justice systems. This part examines plea bargaining as a
theoretical construct. It explores certain ideological and structural
features of Anglo-American and Continental jurisdictions, and it
shows how these features can facilitate or impede the use of plea bargaining. In particular, it shows that the non-hierarchical structure
and laissez-faire ideology of the American criminal justice system provides a perfect setting for plea bargaining to flourish, whereas the
more hierarchical structure and managerial tendencies of most Continental criminal justice systems inhibit the development and use of
plea bargaining.
Mirjan Damaika, arguably the foremost comparative law scholar in
the United States, has linked many of the features commonly associated with Anglo-American and Continental procedural systems to the
structures of authority' ° and political ideologies of the states utilizing
203
those systems.
Using the structure of procedural authority and the
purposes of adjudication as classificatory principles, Dama~ka developed four models: two types of officialdom-the hierarchical and the
paritary-and two types of procedural purpose-the policyimplementing, characteristic of interventionist states, and the conflictsolving, characteristic of laissez-faire states.2 04 All four models were
conceived as ideal types; no actual procedural system bears all of their
traits yet, as a general matter, Continental criminal justice systems are
more hierarchical in structure 20 and manifest a greater disposition to

202

"Structures of authority" refers to the organization of governmental authority,

in particular, into hierarchical or non-hierarchical models. Mirjan Damalka, Structures
of Authority and ComparativeCriminalProcedure,84 YALE L.J. 480, 481 (1975).
203Damaika, supra note 136, at 495-97; see DAMASKA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra
note
53, at 9 (asserting that "even such intangibles" as the tone of proceedings, attitudes
toward documents and deadlines, and the division of the tribunal into judge and jury
"may be influenced by a particular character of authority").
204 Dama~ka, supra note 136, at 495-96.
205The hierarchical nature of the judiciary and the prosecuting
authority in most
Continental countries has been discussed frequently in comparative law scholarship.
See, e.g., Dannecker & Roberts, supra note 120, at 422 ("The state attorney's offices [in
Germany] are hierarchically structured and subordinated to the ministry of justice.");

Frase, supra note 81, at 559-61, 564-66 (depicting the hierarchical authority of the
French prosecuting authority and judiciary);J6rg et al., supra note 112, at 44 ("[The]
criminal justice system in the Netherlands conforms closely to th[e] model of hierarchical/pyramidal organization, the underlying assumption being that the state . ..
[can] be trusted to 'police' itself as long as authority is organized in a way that will al-
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pursue governmental ends than their Anglo-American counterparts. 6
These structural and ideological features find ready expression in
the adversarial and non-adversarial criminal procedures discussed
above . 0 7 Legal proceedings in a hierarchical setting tend to be held
in a methodical succession of stages that need a mechanism to integrate their segments into a meaningful whole, and that function is
performed by the dossier.2081 Officials in a hierarchy are professionalized, organized into strict echelons, and inclined to jealously guard
their bailiwick against outsiders.20 9 Legal proceedings in Continental
countries, then, are not controlled by the parties but are largely
driven by hierarchically ordered bureaucrats. 20' As for ideology, the
greater disposition to manage society results in a legal process organized around a central idea of an official inquiry,211 which places great
emphasis on reaching accurate, or "correct," substantive results.2
The managerial disposition also combines with the hierarchical structure to result in substantial official control over the process and, in
particular, a significant substantive role21for
the decisionmaker,2 0 thus
4
involvement.
lawyer
reducing party and
low it to do so."); Kfihne, supra note 162, at 140-41 (describing the hierarchical nature
of the German police and prosecutorial authority); Langbein & Weinreb, supra note
73, at 1555-56 (describing the hierarchical nature of French police); id. at 1560-64
(noting the hierarchical nature of German police forces and prosecutors' offices);
Pradel, supra note 118, at 111 ("The public prosecutor [in France] forms part of a
body known as the ministbre public (or parquet)[,] the dominant characteristic of which
is its hierarchical nature."); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 114, at 7-8 (explaining the
hierarchical nature of the Belgian prosecuting authority).
206See Dama~ka, supra note 136, at 499; Tulkens, supra note 119,
at 8 ("An inquisitory system is mostly directed towards maintaining public order.").
2
See DAMA KA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 47-66, 77-80, 189-93 (investigating procedural implications and conflict resolution approaches of various justice
systems);J6rg
et al., supra note 112, at 43-44.
208
See DAMASKA, FACES OFJUSTICE supra note 53, at 47-48, 51-53.
209See id. at 18-19 (observing that permanently placed officials
develop a view of
the world as divided between "insiders" and "outsiders"); see also Damagka, supra note
136, at 495 ("[01 fficials are professionals, organized in a hierarchy, who base their decisions on abstract, technical norms.").
210 See DAMAKA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra
note 53, at 56.
21
See id. at 147; see also Dama~ka, supra note 52, at 525, 564; Tomlinson, supra
note 121, at 134.
22 See DAMA KA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra note 53, at
160 (asserting that the activist
state attempts to get "the facts right" as a pre-condition to realizing the goal of the legal process).
21. See id. at 154, 168.
214 See id. at 172-78 (describing the diminished role
of the bar); Bruno, supra note
116, at 5 ("The civil lawyer looks very frail and weak compared to his almighty and
powerful common law colleague.").
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By contrast, Anglo-American jurisdictions generally, and the
United States specifically, are less hierarchical in structure and less interventionist in disposition. In a non-hierarchical setting, power is
widely distributed among roughly equal non-bureaucratic officials
who each command broad discretion over the realm in which they
operate."' The laissez-faire disposition of these states means that they
envision the task of government primarily as providing a supporting
framework within which citizens can pursue their autonomous goals.21 6
Because the state is considered to have no interests apart from private
interests, adjudication is conceived of primarily as a means of conflict
resolution 217' rather than as a means of reaching "correct" outcomes. 218
Instead of structuring criminal proceedings in the form of an official
inquiry, then, Anglo-American states structure them in the form of a
contest. " Because the state is not considered hierarchically superior
to the individual, 220 adjudication, even criminal adjudication, can be

215

See DAMAKA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra note 53, at 25-26 (calling this phenome-

non a "horizontal distribution of authority"); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at
675 ("The prosecution function [in the United States] has traditionally been decentralized, so that state attorneys-general exercise no effective control over local prosecutors.").
2
See DAMA KA, FACES OFJUsTICE, supra note 53, at 73;Jorg et al., supra note
112,
at 45 ("Common law ways of thinking about accountability and state derive initially
from a negative image of the state and a minimalist view of its functions.").
217 See DAMA8KA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 53,
at 73 ("[G]enuine extremes of
reactive ideology tend to collapse the protection of order into dispute resolution.");
Damagka, supra note 123, at 103 ("On the Anglo-American side, the absence of an official investigating apparatus combined with forms of private prosecution to impart even
to the criminal justice system a pronounced conflict-solving flavor."); Dama~ka, supra
note 52, at 563 (explaining that in the adversary model the "procedural aim is to settle
the conflict"); id. at 581 ("It is openly stated by some common law lawyers that the aim
of criminal procedure is not so much the ascertainment of the real truth as the just
settlement of a dispute.").
218That is not to say that the American criminal justice system
is unconcerned
with truth-seeking. Indeed, many commentators argue that an adversarial presentation of facts and arguments is most likely to reveal truth. See, e.g.,
United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) ("Truth... is best discovered by powerful statements
on both sides of a question."(citation omitted)); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9 (1975) ("[T]he adversary system assumes that the
most efficient and fair way of determining the truth is by presenting the strongest possible case for each side of the controversy before an impartial judge or jury."); Frase,
supra note 115, at 818 (presenting the arguments that adversarial presentation is most
effective at determining truth).
219 See DAMASKA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra note 53, at 88 (linking
American process
with "the key image of contest"); Swart & Young, supra note 125, at 71 ("[I]n common
law countries a trial is seen as a legal contest between two parties ....).
220 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 33 ("Consistent
with the premise that the individual is the source of the government's sovereignty, the adversary system treats the
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conceived of as a contest between two formally equal parties without
violating any perceived sense of order. 22 The non-hierarchical nature
of state authority also affords prosecutors the broad discretion to conduct the case as they see fit: to determine, among other things, who
to prosecute, .what
charges
•
•
222 to bring, and the manner in which to conduct the investigation.
The non-bureaucratic officials of a nonhierarchical state draw no rigid lines between official and private domains, so many functions that are the exclusive province of bureaucrats in a hierarchical system can be entrusted to private lawyers. The
preparation of the case and the presentation of evidence, for instance,
is not the responsibility of state officials but of the parties them223
selves.
The laissez-faire political ideology accords a high value to individual autonomy and participation and thereby reinforces some of these
procedural arrangements. For instance, the substantial control that
the parties exert over the preparation and presentation of the case reflects not only the willingness of non-bureaucratic officials to relinquish control but the state's disinclination to intervene and the affirmative value that the system places on autonomy and party
participation. 4 The parties do not search for truth to be presented in

defendant as an equal to the prosecution.").
221 See DAMA KA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra
note 53, at 184, 223-24; Tomlinson, supra
note 121, at 134 ("The common-law trial is the main act of a dispute between two theoretically equal parties who enjoy considerable leeway to determine themselves, through
pleadings and stipulations, the limits and outcome of their dispute."); see also Church,
supra note 100, at 523 (noting that the American judicial system "is based on the
proposition that just resolution of disputes will flow from the clash of interests of litigants whose legal fates are committed almost entirely to the hands of professional
counsel").
222 See DAMA.KA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra
note 53, at 65 ("[The trial's] preparation
is not the responsibility of a specialized branch of the judiciary or of other specialized
state officials, but is relegated to the parties involved in the case."); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 670 ("The notion that the prosecuting attorney is vested with a broad
range of discretion in deciding when to prosecute and when not to is firmly entrenched in American law."); id. at 669 (noting that "discretionary enforcement of the
criminal law has traditionally been an important part of the American prosecutor's
function").
223 DAMASKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note
53, at 63, 65; see Tulkens, supra note
119, at 8 (explaining "the accusatory system is litigant-driven; the state's intervention is
relatively limited").
224 See Sward, supra note 53, at 318 (observing
that party control is understood to
preserve individual autonomy and dignity because it gives litigants the "fullest voice
possible" in their cases). Lon Fuller believed, for instance, that "[t]he essence of the
adversary system is that each side is accorded a participation in the decision that is
reached, a participation that takes the form of presenting proofs and arguments." Lon
Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAw 30, 41 (H. Berman ed., 1961).
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a neutral, unbiased way; they search for favorable evidence and present it in the manner most advantageous to their position. In a criminal case, even though the prosecutor is a representative of the state,
he is not considered a neutral official, as in some Continental coun225
tries, but rather a partisan who operates under some constraints but
whose primary aim is to convict those brought to trial.22 6 A further reflection of the high value accorded individual autonomy is that
American defendants are provided numerous rights applicable at
various stages of the proceedings, including the right to silence, the

Enhancing litigant autonomy does not necessarily mean advancing the best interests of the litigant, however. For instance, in the United States, a criminal defendant
has the right to defend himself, even if his interests would clearly be better served by
the assistance of appointed counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975)
(deciding that it is unconstitutional for a state to "hale a person into its criminal courts
and then force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct his
own defense"). By contrast, many Continental countries appoint counsel for defendants regardless of the defendants' desires in order to serve the interests of the defendants and the criminal justice system. See ROBBERS, supra note 118, at 190 ("In some
cases, legal representation is mandatory."); Corso, supra note 149, at 231 ("[In Italy,
the] presence of defence counsel is compulsory."); Jorge de Figueiredo Dias & Maria
Joao Antunes, Portuga4 in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, supra note 114, at 317, 321 (noting that in Portugal, defense counsel "can
be nominated to be present at certain acts without or even against the wishes of the
accused"); Frase, supra note 118, at 177 (finding that defendants must be represented
in French assize court); Greve, supra note 118, at 59 (reporting that in Denmark "it is
not within the free discretion of the accused whether he wants legal assistance or not"
because it is mandatory "in any case where the court regards defence counsel as desirable").
225 See ROBBERS, supra note 118, at 184 (arguing that "in contrast
to some other
legal systems, the German state prosecution service is not a party to the case in a
criminal trial," but "[i]nstead it is a strictly neutral institution"); Jescheck, supra note
144, at 510 (observing that, while the American prosecutor is "one of two 'suitors' in
the trial," the German prosecutor "is supposed to be an objective 'guardian of the
law"').
226 See Damalka, supra note 52, at 563 (noting that "the prosecutor's
role is to obtain a conviction"); van Kessel, supra note 54, at 439 (contending that prosecutorial
zeal to convict is sometimes excessive). Although prosecutors in most Anglo-American
jurisdictions are under certain ethical constraints, see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2001) (requiring prosecutors to "refrain from prosecuting a charge
that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause"); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (2002) (obliging prosecutors "to seek justice [and] not merely
to convict"), the ethical obligations are subjective and amorphous and are not apt to
be enforced, see Roland Acevedo, Note, Is a Ban on Plea Bargainingan Ethical Abuse of
Discretion? A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 987, 1006 (1995)

(observing that no New York prosecutor has ever received a disciplinary sanction for
violating the ethical obligation to "seekjustice").
227 In the United States, for example, the right to silence is guaranteed in the
Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, and it has been interpreted as prohibiting a court
from making an adverse inference from the defendant's silence. E.g., Mitchell v.
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right to confront witnesses, 228 the right to exclude evidence from unreasonable searches,2 2 9 and the right to refuse counsel. 2 0 To Continental observers, the broad scope of some of these rights may seem
almost perverse in their ability to impede the government in its legitimate goal of investigating and prosecuting crime. But in the
rhetoric of the adversary system, these rights protect individual autonomy and dignity and prevent governmental overreaching into private
spheres.
The same structural and philosophical features that underlie
American adversarial procedures and Continental non-adversarial
procedures make plea bargaining the fitting alternative method of
case disposition in the former but an uncomfortable anomaly in the
latter. As a structural matter, plea bargaining can more readily flourish in non-hierarchical criminal justice systems: while it would violate
the proper sense of order in a hierarchical environment to place a
prosecutor-the representative of the state-in a bargaining position
parallel to that of a criminal defendant," ' a non-hierarchical system
can accommodate plea bargaining's assumption of two formally equal
parties capable of reaching a mutually beneficial outcome. Further, a
non-hierarchical system can afford the prosecutor the wide discretion
necessary to bargain effectively, discretion not typically bestowed on

United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) ("The rule against adverse inferences is a vital
instrument for teaching that the question in a criminal case is not whether the defendant committed the acts of which he is accused. The question is whether the Government has carried its burden [of proof] while respecting the individual's rights.").
Most, if not all, Continental countries also guarantee the right to silence, but courts
may draw adverse inferences from such silence, thus motivating defendants to testify.
See supra text accompanying note 135.
228 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that "[iln all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him").
229 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting "against unreasonable searches and seizures" and forming the basis of the American exclusionary rule). Continental countries also prohibit certain searches and seizures but may enforce those prohibitions
without excluding the evidence gained from them. See supra text accompanying note
127.
230 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (holding
that it is unconstitutional for a state to "hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer
upon him").
2 1 See DAMASKA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra note 53, at 184. Damagka
notes further
that "notions of negotiation and bargaining between the state prosecutor and the tiefendant are out of place. Where an official close to the center of government begins
to negotiate state interests with a private individual, in the perspective of hierarchical
authority this practice approximates an abdication of state sovereignty." Id.; see also
Jorg et al., supra note 112, at 50 ("An inquisitorial trial is a procedure between two essentially unequal parties.").
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Continental prosecutors, who are hierarchically ordered and strictly
accountable to their superiors. 2 Indeed, by allowing prosecutors to
settle cases for agreed-upon sentences, plea bargaining sharply enhances the power of prosecutors at the expense of judges. Even in a
lawyer-dominated criminal justice system like that of the United
States, this transfer of judicial power to prosecutors can be controversial;2 _1 in judge-dominated Continental systems, it is apt to prove untenable. Finally, a non-hierarchical structure allows the actors in an
adversarial criminal justice system to step outside their roles, which
are based on norms of conflict, to pursue their individual interests in
2344
cooperation.
As an ideological matter, plea bargaining advances the goal of
conflict resolution that underlies the non-interventionist governmental disposition.3 Indeed, by allowing the parties to resolve a criminal
prosecution in a way that best meets their needs, plea bargaining exemplifies the American commitment to conflict resolution over the
Continental emphasis on reaching accurate outcomes. Dama~ka has
noted that in the United States, "the criminal justice system often
seems satisfied with establishing merely a rough basis for punishmentsometimes a mere torso of actual wrongdoing-leaving the more pre23
cise delineation of factual parameters to the initiative of the parties." 1
Consequently, as a result of plea bargaining, the defendant might
See DAMASKA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra note 53, at 223.
See Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Tria supra note
13,
at 933 (lamenting the way in which plea bargaining makes "figureheads ofjudges").
234 As Feeley describes
it:
What emerges from the analysis of the operations of the criminal justice system is a clear picture of an organization which has highly specified rules and
goals, but has virtually no instruments by which to enforce them. Rather than
the highly rationalized, rule-bound and bureaucratically structured system
that Weber depicted the process to be, one finds a highly decentralized and
decidedly non-hierarchical system of exchange in which there are virtually no
instruments to supervise practices and secure compliance to the formal goals
of the organization.
Feeley, supra note 95, at 422.
,.,5
Interestingly, one of the most ardent defenders of plea bargaining as an inherent feature of the adversarial system is Judge Mazza of Israel's Supreme Court. Judge
Mazza has maintained that plea bargaining "satisfies the methodological and conceptual justifications that underpin the adversarial system" because that system does not
just dictate a contest between two parties but also encourages dialogue to reduce the
controversy. Harnon, supra note 191, at 259.
2,16 See Alschuler, Changing Plea BargainingDebate,
supra note 13, at 684 (arguing
that certain approaches to plea bargaining envisage "the process primarily as a form of
dispute resolution rather than as a sentencing device").
237 DAMASKA, FACES OFJUSTICE, supra
note 53, at 112.
232
233
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plead guilty to a lesser crime that he clearly did not commit, 38 or even
plead guilty to a hypothetical crime that does not exist.239 Such resolutions would be impossible in legal systems more fully committed to
reaching accurate outcomes.
Turning to party autonomy and participation, plea bargaining not
only reflects those values but can be understood to enhance them.240
By allowing defendants to opt for certain but less severe punishment,
plea bargaining is said to expand a defendant's choices and to afford
241
him a measure of control over his fate.
Indeed, while critics cite the
tendency of innocent defendants to self-convict as one of plea bargaining's gravest flaws, defenders of the practice trumpet this choice
as one of plea bargaining's greatest advantages. Proponents of plea
bargaining note that under any system of criminal justice, innocent
defendants run the risk of conviction at trial.242 Plea bargaining allows

238 See

Alschuler, Trial Judge's Role, supra note 13, at 1141 (observing that charge
bargaining frequently mislabels the conduct that it punishes so that "[g]uns are 'swallowed' as armed robberies become unarmed robberies; burglaries committed at night
are transformed through prosecutorial wizardry to burglaries during the day; and defendants solemnly affirm that they have driven the wrong way on one-way streets in
towns without one-way streets"); Colquitt, supra note 13, at 740-41 (discussing People v.
West, 477 P.2d 409, 410 (Cal. 1970), in which no facts stated in the appellate opinion
support the charge to which the defendant was allowed to plead); Langbein, Torture
and Plea Bargaining,supra note 13, at 16 ("In the plea bargaining that takes the form of
charge bargaining (as opposed to sentence bargaining), the culprit is convicted not for
what he did, but for something less opprobrious.").
239 See Alschuler, Trial Judge's Role, supra note
13, at 1142 (noting that "[s]ome
courts permit defendants to plead guilty even to offenses whose commission would be
legally impossible"); Colquitt, supra note 13, at 741 (lamenting that some parties
"agree to a settlement based on a plea to a nonexistent crime").
240 See Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 1978 (asserting that "autonomy
and efficiency
support" plea bargaining). Not all commentators agree, however. See Alschuler,
ChangingPlea BargainingDebate, supra note 13, at 695-703 (noting that restrictions on
contractual autonomy are widely accepted and should be applicable to plea bargaining).
SeeJoseph Goldstein, ForHarold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 685 (1975) (contending that the rules governing plea bargaining "are rooted in a basic commitment of the
legal system to respect human dignity by protecting the right of every adult to determine what he shall do and what may be done to him"); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 97,
at 1933 (asserting that defendants who refuse to bargain, go to trial, and are convicted
"at least have the option, ex ante, of taking a different course of action" when plea
bargaining is allowed); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining,39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1121, 1136 (1998) (relating that "some commentators suggest that a pleabargaining system empowers defendants by giving them choices regarding the outcome over which they have no control in the trial process").
242 See Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 1970 (attributing the incorrect
separation of
the guilty from the innocent not to a "flaw in the bargaining process but [to] a flaw at
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innocent defendants to assess this risk and to opt for less severe punishment if it seems in their best interests to do so. Prohibiting plea
bargaining, in the guise of concern for innocent defendants, amounts,
on this view, to a paternalistic restriction on the defendants' legitimate
choices. 43
Plea bargaining, then, has flourished in the United States not only
because it fills a functional need but also because it reflects and reinforces fundamental features of American structures of authority and
ideology. Indeed, it is this ideological consistency that has caused
many American scholars, judges, and practitioners to embrace plea
bargaining not as a necessary evil but as a desirable feature of the
American criminal justice system.

44

The very fact that so few efforts

have been made to restrict, or even to regulate, plea bargaining in the
United States is in part a testament to plea bargaining's ideological
"fit. '' 2 45

Bargaining on the Continent, by contrast, is a different story.

For many years, what little bargaining took place was shrouded in se-

trial"); id. at 1978 (asserting that the imperfections in plea bargaining "reflect the imperfections of an anticipated trial").
243 See id. at 1976-77 (arguing that liberty is too important to be left solely to the
government and its agents, rather than to the criminal defendant); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 97, at 1925 (noting that "legal regulation is often motivated by paternalism").
244 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971)
("Disposition of
charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the [criminal] process but
a highly desirable part for many reasons."); People v. Selikoff, 318 N.E.2d. 784, 788-89
(N.Y. 1974) (asserting that "plea negotiation serves the ends ofjustice" and describing
its many advantages); Church, supra note 100, at 513 ("[P]lea bargaining in its broadest sense-the implicit exchange of sentencing consideration for a defendant's admission of guilt-need not be unfair to either the defendant or the public."); Easterbrook,
supra note 76, at 309, 308-22("[P]lea bargaining is desirable, not just defensible, if the
system attempts to maximize deterrence from a given commitment of resources.");
Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 1978 ("Plea bargains are compromises. Autonomy and
efficiency support them."); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 97, at 1911 (arguing that contract theory supports plea bargaining). Of course, as noted above, see supra note 13,
plea bargaining does have many foes.
245 It is notable that American efforts to restrict plea bargaining
have been more
successful in jurisdictions that, relatively speaking, were more bureaucratic and hierarchically organized. See Heumann & Loftin, supra note 106, at 401-02 (describing how,
long before a plea-bargaining restriction was adopted, the Wayne County prosecutor
had taken steps to bureaucratize the disposition process, so that "the probability of
compliance with the ban on plea bargaining... was higher in Detroit than it would be
in other large jurisdictions that are frequently unaccustomed to stringent organizational constraints"); Rubenstein & White, supra note 84, at 367-68 (observing that the
Alaska Attorney General had been able to virtually eliminate widespread, explicit plea
bargaining in part because "Alaska is a very unified jurisdiction from an administrative
standpoint" with "all state prosecution personnel" answerable to the Attorney General).
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246

crecy.
Now plea bargaining analogues have come to light, but they
247
In a 1983 article, for instance, Alremain extremely controversial.
bert Alschuler reported on interviews he had conducted with numerous Continental lawyers, academics, and judges, and noted that "these
sources generally bridled at any suggestion that European sentencing
practices might serve the same function as American plea bargaining;
they used words like 'ridiculous' and 'unthinkable.' 24s The hierarchical structure of Continental criminal justice systems also enables them
to better regulate any bargaining that is permitted, and they have
largely restricted bargaining to specific spheres that generally do not
include violent crimes. In contrast, as George Fisher has shown, when
bargaining emerged in the United States, it did so not in an organized, intentional manner, but rather sprung up in particular realms in
which the legislature's sentencing scheme enabled prosecutors to exercise control over the ultimate sentence via their charging deci249
sions.
In sum, the prevalence of plea bargaining in any given jurisdiction
is a function of thejurisdiction's practical need for alternative dispositions and of various structural and ideological features of the jurisdiction that can inhibit or facilitate the practice. The foregoing analysis
E.g., Herrmann, supra note 113, at 755 & n.2 (describing secrecy of German
plea bargaining). As noted above, supra text accompanying note 188, plea bargaining
was not publicly acknowledged even in England until the 1970s.
247 See, e.g., Damagka, supra note 136, at 483 (arguing
that, although "various kinds
of 'deals' with the defense have lately been legitimated in some continental jurisdictions, objections that these deals 'ontologically' belong in the sphere of civil litigation
still resonate ... and continue to make the extension of the polarization between party
contest and official inquest controversial"); Frase & Weigend, supra note 113, at 344-45
(remarking that the legality and desirability of plea bargaining are still hotly debated
in Germany); Herrmann, supranote 113, at 756 (maintaining that plea bargaining "has
given rise to much criticism and heated controversy in German legal publications and
in the media");Jung, supra note 170, at 61-62 (describing the controversy in Germany).
Hans-Heiner Kuihne, for instance, complains that the "problem with these arrangements [reached through bargaining] is that they are reached quasi privately, outside
the formal proceedings. Therefore, all procedural guarantees inherent in the formalized and public trial are running idle." Kfihne, supra note 162, at 157; see also Alfredo
Etcheberry, The Impact of the Nature and Volume of Crime and Administrative Processes on
Criminal Justice Systems: New Trends in Combating Organized Crime, in COMPARATIVE
246

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS:

FROM DIVERSITY TO RAPPROCHEMENT,

supra note

52,

at

333, 341-42 (asserting that plea bargaining within "certain limits is not to be rejected
altogether... [b]ut if the prevailing result is one in which plea bargaining is the
method used to handle a large majority of criminal cases, . . . it would amount to
abandoning of the social function of a public trial and of legal punishment").
248 Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial,
supra note 13, at
987.
249Fisher, supra note 24, at 868-916.

60

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 151: 1

suggests a close relationship between the use of plea bargaining and
the functional needs and theoretical underpinnings of adversary systems of procedure and, in particular, of the especially adversarial
American criminal justice system. Efficiently circumventing elaborate
and lengthy trial practices, satisfying the human need to cooperate,
and advancing the goal of conflict resolution and the value of individual autonomy, plea bargaining has become a pervasive and entrenched feature of the American criminal justice system. By contrast,
plea bargaining is of considerably less importance to Continental
criminal justice systems. The greater efficiency of Continental procedures renders plea bargaining of lesser functional value to Continental countries, and the practice is theoretically less consistent with various structural and ideological features of Continental criminal justice
systems. This background sets the stage for the following Part, which
describes the structural and procedural features of the international
criminal tribunals.
III.

THE PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

A. Introduction to the Tribunals: Organizationand Key Players
War broke out in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(former
Yugoslavia)
in250
1991 when many of its constituent republics
sought"
"
"
sought independence.
The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina saw
particularly brutal fighting following its declaration of independence,
and international observers soon began to document widespread violations of international humanitarian law. " In 1993, the United Na-

250

See generally M. CHERIF BAssIoUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 25-63 (1996) (describing the war in the former Yugoslavia); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T,
Judgement, paras. 9-10 (Aug. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Krstic, Judgement] (surveying political conditions in Yugoslavia from the late 1980s to 1992), at http://www.un.org/
icty/krstic/TrialCl /judgement/krs-tj010802e.pdf.
251 Following reports of "widespread violations of
international humanitarian law,"
the United Nations in 1992 established a Commission of Experts to examine and analyze
the information received. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/48
(1992). The Commission of Experts confirmed that grave breaches, including "ethnic
cleansing," mass killings, torture, and rape, were occurring. See Letter from the SecretaryGeneral to the President of the Security Council (Feb. 10, 1993) (on file with author); see
also Kelly Dawn Askin, The ICTY: An Introduction to its Origins, Rules andJurisprudence, in
ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD,
supra note 27, at 13, 15-16. For a description of the difficulties involved in establishing
the Commission and in the Commission's carrying out its mandate, see MICHAEL P.
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tions Security Council (Security Council), determining that the situation constituted a "threat to international peace and security," established the ICTY to prosecute those accused of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and violations of the laws and customs of war on the
territory of the former Yugoslavia sinceJanuary 1, 1991.252
A little more than a year later, brutal ethnic violence erupted in
Rwanda, a small country in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, whose
population has historically been divided into two predominant
253
groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi.
After an airplane carrying the
country's Hutu president was shot down, extremist Hutu immediately
began killing large numbers of Tutsi and moderate Hutu,254 massa25 5
cring between 500,000 and one million people in one hundred days.
Heeding calls for an international tribunal similar to the ICTY,2 6 the
W5 7
Security Council established the ICTR
and accorded it jurisdiction
25s
similar to that of the ICTY.
The seat of the ICTY is in The Hague,
The Netherlands, and the seat of the ICTR is in Arusha, Tanzania.
SCHARF, BALKANJUSTIcE 37-49 (1997).

252 S.C.Res. 808, U.N.SCOR,48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc.S/RES/808 (1993);

seealso S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993) [hereinafter ICIY Statute]. The ICIY has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes
against humanity, and the laws or customs of war pursuant to articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the
ICIY Statute. Id.
253 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 48 (1998).
254 Id. at 53; Morris, supra note
21, at 351.
255 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 58.
256 On June 28, 1994, the Commission on Human Rights
of the United Nations
reported on the gravity of the Rwandan situation. Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Rwanda, U.N. ESCOR, 51st Sess. at 5-8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (1994).
Two days later, the Security Council adopted Resolution 935 requesting the establishment of an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyze further evidence
of grave violations of humanitarian law in Rwanda. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3400th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994). The Commission recommended either the creation of a new international criminal tribunal or the expansion of the
ICTY's jurisdiction to cover crimes in Rwanda. Preliminary Report of the Independent
Commission of Experts Established in Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935, Commission of Experts on Rwanda, 49th Sess., Annex to the Letter, at 31-32, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/1125 (1994).
257 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 15,
U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 & Annex (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
258 Like the ICTY, the ICTR has jurisdiction over genocide and crimes against
humanity, although the definition of crimes against humanity differs between the ICTY
and ICTR statutes. Compare id. at art. 3, with ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 5. As
for war crimes, the ICTY has jurisdiction generally over "[v]iolations of the laws or customs of war" and specifically over grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, id.
at arts. 2-3, while the ICTR has jurisdiction over violations of article 3 common to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 4.
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The Tribunals have adopted virtually identical procedural rules
and are similarly organized.5 9 The Tribunals are comprised of three
organs: the Chambers, consisting of three Trial Chambers and an
Appeals Chamber; the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP); and the Registry, which assists both the Chambers and the OTP.26 ° The IClYs Appeals Chamber and Prosecutor also serve the ICTR.26' The Tribunals
began with two Trial Chambers but soon added a third, 62 and the
ICTY's Trial Chambers have recently been expanded by the addition
of twenty-seven ad litem judges.26 '3

The Tribunals have two official

languages-English and French. 64 Courtroom proceedings are typi259 See STEVEN

S.

RATNER &JASON

ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:

S.

ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY

176 (1997)

(noting that "the Rwanda Tribunal's judges adopted the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, with only minor changes"); Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Trial Procedures and Practices, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 21, at 552 n.6.
2W ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 11. The Registry has been
described as
both the "administrative arm of the Tribunal" as well as the 'judicial lung" in terms of
the management of facilities and of the administration of cases. ICTY Bulletin, No. 2,
Jan. 22, 1996, at 2. The Registry provides the Tribunals' security and translation services both to investigators and the chambers. Id. It manages the system of legal aid to
indigent defendants, runs the Victims and Witnesses Unit, and manages the Detention
Center, which houses defendants. Id. For a more detailed description of Registry decisions and their appealability, see Christian Rohde, Are Administrative Decisionsfrom the
Registry Appealable, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF
GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 27, at 509.
261 ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at arts.
12(2), 15(3).
262See S.C. Res. 1166, at para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1166 (1998)
(adding third Trial
Chamber to ICTY); S.C. Res. 1165, at para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1165 (1998) (adding
third Trial Chamber to ICTR).
263 Press Release, ICTY, Pool of 27 Ad Litem
Judges Elected by U.N. General Assembly (June 13, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p596-e.htm. The ad litem judges do not participate in pre-trial matters but are appointed to participate in
trials. Press Briefing, ICTY (Dec. 6, 2000), at http://www.un.org/icty/briefing/
PB061200.htm. With the addition of the ad litem judges, each Trial Chamber can be
divided into three sections containing both permanent and ad litem judges. ICTY
Statute, supra note 252, at art. 12(1). The ICTR has recently asked the Security Council for ad litem judges. Report of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarian
Law Committed in the Territoy of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsiblefor Genocide and
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of NeighbouringStates between 1January and
31 December 1994, U.N. ICTY, 56th Sess. at para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/56/351-S/2001/863
(2001) [hereinafter ICTR 2001 Annual Report]. These changes in the composition of
the Trial and Appeals Chambers required the Security Council to amend the ICY
Statute. See U.N. Doc. S/Res/1329 (2000).
264 ICTY
R.P. & EVID. 3(A)
(2001), http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/
IT32_rev24.htm (last updated Aug. 5, 2002) [hereinafter ICTY RPE]; ICTR R.P. &
EVID. 3(A) (2001), http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/rules/index.hun (last
visited Oct. 10, 2002) [hereinafter ICTR RPE].
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cally conducted in one of these two languages, or in Bosnian/
Croatian/Serbian at the ICTY and Kinyarwanda at the ICTR and simultaneously translated into the other languages.265
1. The Prosecutor's Office
Carla Del Ponte, the Tribunals' current Prosecutor, heads the
OTP and is assisted at each Tribunal by a Deputy Prosecutor. The
bulk of the OTP's work is conducted in two divisions: the Investigations Division and the Prosecution Division, which are headed by a
Chief of Investigations and Chief of Prosecution, respectively. The In-

vestigations Divisions are themselves divided into numerous investigations teams; the ICTY's investigations teams are assigned to particular
geographical areas, 266 while the ICTR's investigations teams typically
concentrate on prominent figures in the command structures of the
government, the military, and other walks of life, such as the media,
the clergy, and the business world. 6 ' Each ICTY investigations team is
headed by a team leader and a team trial attorney. Team leaders report to one of five Investigations Commanders, who themselves report
to the Chief of Investigations.268
The Prosecutor and other high-level OTP officials exercise a fair
degree of control both over the general scope of the investigations
and over their particulars. Unlike a domestic police force, which
normally investigates all serious crimes as they are brought to its atten269
tion, the Tribunals carefully select their targets of investigation, tak-

ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 3; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 3.
The ICTY Prosecutor, for example, initially launched thirteen investigations,
focusing on atrocities that occurred at
five concentration camps (the Susica camp in eastern Bosnia, the Omarska
camp, the Trnopolje camp, the Keraterm camp, and the Luka camp in
northwestern Bosnia); six Bosnian and Croat cities (Bosanski Samac in
northeastern Bosnia, Sarajevo and Stupni Do in central Bosnia, Srebrenica in
eastern Bosnia, and Zagreb and Vukovar in Croatia); and two areas (the Prijedor district in northwestern Bosnia and the Laiva Valley in central Bosnia).
SCHARF, supra note 251, at 85.
267 Carla Del Ponte, Address to the United Nations Security
Council by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
(Nov. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Prosecutor's 2001 Address to the Security Council] (on
file with author).
268 Post Summary, 2001 (Office of the Prosecutor: Investigations Division)
(on file
with author).
269 Payam Akhavan, Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribuna 20 HUM. Rs. Q. 737, 774-77 (1998) (describing the issues facing the Prosecutor in the selection of investigations).
265
266
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ing account of various factual, legal, and political considerations,"7 including the number of victims and scale of criminal activity, 271' the
availability of evidence and witness testimony, the desire to focus at-

tention on certain types of crime, including those involving sexual violence, the desire to develop and expand certain theories of criminal
liability, such as command responsibility, and, particularly at the ICTY,
the desire to prosecute some members of all the ethnic groups involved in the conflict. 2 The investigations, once selected, are care-

fully managed.
A successful investigation leads to an indictment.

Once an in-

dicted defendant is in custody, the case is assigned to a Senior Trial
Attorney from the Prosecution Division who is assisted by a Legal Officer. The team trial attorney of the investigation also joins the trial
team. The Senior Trial Attorneys typically have considerable trial experience, and the team trial attorneys, because they were involved in

the investigations, bring considerable factual knowledge; thus, they
make a formidable team.

Nonetheless, in comparison to American

prosecutors, their authority is fairly limited. The Prosecutor must approve each indictment and each amendment to an indictment. Al270 The ICTY's first Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, not surprisingly,
denied that
political considerations in any way influenced the Tribunals' prosecutorial strategy. See
RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 259, at 172; SCHARF, supra note 251, at 86 (describing
and doubting Goldstone's denial).
271 Prosecutor's 2001 Address to the Security Council, supra note 267 (noting that
"we have not investigated all crimes" and that "[w]e have concentrated on the areas in
which the worst massacres occurred"). Del Ponte explained:
[C]hoice of cases to pursue is not at all simple.... [Although vital to prosecute the architects of the atrocities, for] the local people, the victims and the
survivors, it was [the organizers at the district or local level] who brought
their world to an end, not the remote Governmental architects of the overall
policy of genocide. Unless these local leaders are brought to justice in both
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the ordinary population will not come to
terms with the past, and the process of reconciliation and building a stable
peace will suffer accordingly.
Id.
272 See Akhavan, supra note 269, at 781-82 (discussing ethnic parity in prosecutions); Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadi6 Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REv.
2031, 2039 (1998); Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of International
CriminalAdjudication,23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 440, 448-49 (1999). There were no Muslims
among the first fifty-two people indicted by the ICTY, but in response to criticism, the
ICTY's Prosecutor "announced that he would make a concerted effort to indict a Muslim,
to show the parties that the Tribunal was not one-sided." Michael Scharf & Valerie Epps,
The InternationalTrial of the Centuy? A "Cross-Fire"Exchange on the First CaseBefore the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 29 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 635, 645 (1996). The ICTR OTP has
also recently begun investigating allegations of crimes committed by Tutsi armed forces.
See Prosecutor's 2001 Address to the Security Council, supra note 267.
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though the Senior Trial Attorneys are afforded considerable discretion over trial strategy and the theory of the case, most regularly consult with their superiors about any significant decisions, particularly
any which might reflect on the reputation of the Tribunals or impact
other cases. Specifically, the Prosecutor is kept informed of plea negotiations; she provides guidelines for the concessions that can be ofagreement.273
fered in a particular case and must approve the plea
It is not surprising that the discretion of the Senior Trial Attorneys
is comparatively limited given the small number of Tribunal cases and
the gravity of the crimes prosecuted. An American prosecutor might
dispose of dozens of cases in a given month, and he will usually plea
bargain them or otherwise dispose of them in accordance with wellestablished practices that have been developed over a number of
years. Few of these domestic cases will be related to one another and
fewer still will generate any significant publicity. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor can be afforded considerable discretion over
virtually all decisions, including plea bargaining. By contrast, Tribunal cases are few, highly publicized, and often interrelated. The Tribunals together have fewer than fifty cases currently in pre-trial or trial
proceedings, so the Tribunals' Prosecutor has the practical ability to
supervise their progress. Most of the cases generate considerable publicity,274 and many of them are interrelated in that they feature defen-

273 Interview with Daryl Mundis, Legal Officer, Legal Advisory Section,
ICTY OTP
(Auq. 19, 2001).
both
in
the
news
media
and in the
activities
are
widely
publicized
The
Tribunals'
4

legal literature. See, e.g., Judge Releases Serbfrom Custody, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 30,
2001, at 5 (reporting on the provisional release of Biljana Plavgid); Steven Lee Myers, The
World; Wanted but how Badly?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 21, 2000 (reporting on arrests of Tribunal indictees); Tina Rosenberg, Defending the Indefensible, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 19,
1998 (describing defense of Dr. Milan Kovacevic, charged with genocide); Marlise
Simons, An Unexpected Reversal of War-Crimes Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at A7
("[ICTY] judges quashed the conviction of three Croatian fighters... and reduced the
sentences of two others in the same case."); Marlise Simons, 5 Bosnian Serbs Guilty of War
Crimes at Infamous Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2001, at A5 (reporting on the ICTY conviction of five Bosnian Serbs for their knowledge of and participation in the "rape, torture
and killing of Muslim and Croat men and women under their control"); Marlise Simons,
Serb Charged in Massacre Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1998, at A6 (reporting the
suicide of Slavko Dokmanovic, who had been indicted for aiding the massacre of several
hundred people who had taken refuge in a civilian hospital); Marlise Simons, Top Bosnian Serb Officer Arrestedfor U.N. Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1999, at Al0 (covering the
arrest of General Momir Talic); Marlise Simons, War Crimes Tial Seeks to Define the Balkan
Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1996, atA8 (describing prosecution strategy of defining what
happened in Yugoslavia as an international conflict, not just a local civil war, for the purpose of trying the defendants on charges of "grave breaches of the laws of war"); Marlise
Simons & Carlotta Gall, The Handoverof Miloievi6, N.Y. TIMES,June 29, 2001, atAl; see also
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dants who were the leaders of the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda and
who collaborated to pursue common ends. 7 5 Under these circumstances, there is an especially strong need for consistency in approach,
including in the conduct of plea negotiations, and considerable involvement by the Prosecutor is to be expected.
2. The International Community and the Cooperation of States
Because the Security Council established the Tribunals as Chapter
VII enforcement measures, their decisions and orders are binding on
all states. 216 States are required to cooperate with the Tribunals in

Patricia M. Wald, Judging War Crimes, I CHLJ. INT'L L. 189, 191 (2000) (noting that the
ICTY and the ICTR have "spawned over 300 articles in the international journals, more
than any other topic in international law in the last decade").
275 For instance, Blagki6, Kordi6, and Aleksovski all concerned Bosnian Croatian
defendants charged with committing war crimes and crimes against humanity against
Muslims in the Lagva Valley area of Central Bosnia. Blagkid was the commander of the
Croatian Defense Council armed forces headquarters during the relevant period, Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-94-14-T, Judgement, para. 9 (Mar. 3, 2000) [hereinafter
Blaki6,
Judgement],
at
http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialcl/judgement/
bla-tjOO0303e.pdf, Cerkez was commander of a brigade of the Croatian Defense Council, Kordi6 was the most important Bosnian Croatian political figure in the area, Prosecutor v. Kordid, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, para. 1 (Feb. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Kordid, Judgement],
at http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/judgement/
kor-tj010226e.pdf, and Aleksovski was the commander of the Kaonik prison, which detained Muslim men captured during the conflicts involving Bla~kid, Kordid, and
terkez, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement, paras. 23, 90
(June 25, 1999) [hereinafter Aleksovski, Judgement], at http://www.un.org/
icty/aleksovski/trialc/judgement/ale-tj990625e.pdf. Similarly, the indictments against
Biljana Plavgid and Momcilo Krajisnik note their association with indictee Radovan
Karad~id, Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-1, Amended Indictment, para. 2
(Mar. 21, 2000), at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kra-laiOOO321e.htm;
Prosecutor v. Plavgid, Case No. IT-00-40-I, Indictment, para. 2 (Apr. 7, 2000), at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/pla-iiOOO407e.htm,
and their highranking positions, as members of the collective Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will
likely mean that the cases against all three will also be intertwined with that of Slobodan Milogevid for crimes committed in Bosnia.
As for the ICTR, the Prosecutor has endeavored to join related cases, see infra text
accompanying note 377, but she has not always been successful, and some related cases
will be tried separately. See Alison Campbell, Rwandan War Crimes 7Tials-Appeal Court
Decision a Setback for Collective 7ials, INTERNEWS (June 8, 1998) (stating that the ICTR
Appeals Chamber "rejected an appeal from the Prosecutor which could have opened
the way for twenty-nine people to be indicted together"), available at http://
www.internews.org/activities/ICTRReports/ICTRNewsJun98.html.
270 See U.N. CHARTER art. 25. The United Nations considered establishing the
ICTY by means of a treaty but determined that concluding a treaty would take too
much time, and the resulting entity might be undermined if ratifications were not received from "those States which should be parties to the treaty if it is to be truly effective." Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808
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their investigations and prosecutions, 277 and in particular must "comply without undue delay" with any request to identify and locate persons, to take testimony and produce evidence, and to arrest or detain
278
persons, among other things.
State cooperation, or the lack thereof,
has proven a contentious issue at the ICTY in particular. 279 During its

at para. 20, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993); see also SCHARF, supra note 251, at 54-55 ("[I]t
would take time to negotiate a treaty and possibly years before enough governments ratified it."). The defendant in the ICTY's first trial maintained that the Tribunal was "invalid under the Charter of the United Nations" or "not duly established by law," contentions that the Tribunal rejected. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on
the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 1-44 (Oct. 2, 1995),
rerintedin 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1993-1998, at 33
(Andr6 Klip & G6ran Sluiter eds., 1999) [hereinafter I ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS].

277ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 29(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art.
28(1). One ICTY official has described state cooperation, and particularly the cooperation of the States of the former Yugoslavia, as "one of the most delicate areas in the
work of the Tribunal." Nikolaus Toufar, State Request for Review, in ESSAYS ON ICTY
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supranote 27, at
525, 525.
278 ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 29(2); ICTR Statute,
supra note 257, at art.
28(2). The U.N. Secretary-General's Report, appended to Security Council Resolution
827, establishing the ICTY, states that an "order by a Trial Chamber for the surrender
or transfer of persons to the custody of the International Tribunal shall be considered
to be the application of an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations." Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808, supranote 276, at para. 126.
279The countries to which ICTR defendants fled have typically been more
cooperative regarding their arrest and transfer than the states of the former Yugoslavia. In
January 1995, the leaders of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and
Zambia agreed to transfer defendants to the ICTR. Stuart Beresford, In Pursuit of International Justice: The First Four-Year Term of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, 8 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 99, 109 (2000); see also Prosecutor v. Bagilishema,
Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgement, para. 8 (June 7, 2001) [hereinafter Bagilishema,
Judgement] (stating that the defendant was arrested in South Africa), at
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Bagilishema/judgement/index.htm;
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, paras. 14-15 (May 21,
1999) (noting that defendant Kayishema was arrested in Zambia and defendant Ruzindana was arrested in Kenya), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/
KayRuz/judgement/index.htm; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, para. 9 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu, Judgement] (explaining that the
defendant was arrested in Zambia), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/
cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay0Ol.htm; Press Release, ICTR, ICTR/INFO-9-2-277.EN
(July 12, 2001), at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2001/277.htm (reporting on the arrests of three defendants in Switzerland, The Netherlands, and Belgium);
Press Release, ICTR, ICTR/INFO-9-2-254.EN (Nov. 25, 2000), at http://www.ictr.org/
wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/251.htm (reporting the arrest of defendant
Sagahutu in Denmark); Press Release, ICTR, ICTR/INFO-9-2-247.EN (Oct. 30, 2000),
at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/247.htm (announcing
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first two years of existence, the ICTY had no defendants in custody.
Dugko Tadi6 was not transferred to the ICTY until 1995, and another
year passed before any other indictees were transferred.8 0 The NATO
peace-keeping force stationed in Bosnia initially was not instructed to
arrest Tribunal indictees; 1 it was not until mid-1997 that the U.N.
force in Croatia and then NATO in Bosnia began detaining indictees.28 1 Cooperation has improved in recent years, particularly followthat defendant Muvunyi was arrested, detained, and transferred by the United Kingdom). But some African states have refused to cooperate. E.g., Press Release, ICTR,
ICTR/INFO-9-2-254.EN (Dec. 13, 2000), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/
PRESSREL/2000/254.htm (reporting the Prosecutor's observation that the "arrests of
some indicted individuals was being hampered by two African countries which were
harbouring them").
280 Askin, supra note 251, at 16-17. The
President of the ICTY has made eleven reports to the Security Council regarding lack of state cooperation, with the majority of
these complaining about the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's refusal to arrest persons
indicted by the Tribunal. Daryl A. Mundis, Reporting Non-Compliance: Rule 7bis, in
ESSAYS ON ITY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK McDONALD,
supra note 27, at 421, 424-36 (describing these reports). In response, the Security
Council has typically issued Presidential Statements which might, for instance, "deplor[e] the failure ... of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to execute arrest warrants
issued by the Tribunal" Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, U.N.
Doc. S/PRST/1996/23 (1996). These Statements seemed to have little, if any, effect.
State cooperation in the gathering of evidence was a problem in the Tribunal's
first trial in the Tadid case. On appeal, Tadid maintained that the Republika Srpska
intimidated certain defense witnesses into not appearing at trial, thus violating the
principle of equality of arms and prejudicing his right to a fair trial. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Opinion andJudgement, paras. 29, 34 (July 15, 1999), at http://
www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/index.htm. After canvassing the precedents
of the European Court of Human Rights addressing domestic proceedings, the Appeals
Chamber noted that domestic courts have the capacity to control matters that could materially affect the fairness of a trial. The ICTY, by contrast, must rely on the cooperation
of States but has no power to compel them to cooperate. Id. at para. 51. Consequently,
the Appeals Chamber held that the principle of equality of arms must be given a more
liberal interpretation than applicable in domestic courts, and it specified various practical
measures that the Trial Chambers could adopt in seeking to assist a party in presenting
its case, including taking evidence by video link, summoning witnesses and ordering their
attendance, and issuing binding orders to States for the taking and production of evidence. Id. at para. 52.
281 See THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES
OF AGE 281 (1998); Akhavan,
supra note 269, at 795-96 (discussing the international community's "unwilling[ness] to
make the sacrifices necessary to arrest indicted persons"); Gabrielle Kirk McDonald,
Reflections on the Contributionsof the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 155, 160 (2001); Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest
We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in InternationalCriminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 321, 358 (1999); Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: An Interim Assessment, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 22 (1997) (arguing that NATO's failure
to arrest Karadlid and Mladi6 "is accurately seen as a symptom of the international
community's ambivalence towards the Tribunal").
McDonald, supra note 281, at 161.
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ing the October 2000 ouster of former Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milogevic.
In June 2001, the new Yugoslav government succumbed
to Western pressure and transferred Milogevi6 to the ICTY to stand
trial on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in
Kosovo. 2814Milogevi's appearance increased the ICTYs authority and
2815
motivated further cooperation by the Balkan states.
Still, problems
persist. Former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karad~id and his military commander Ratko Mladi6 remain at large although they were indicted six years ago, and the ICTY continues to have difficulty obtain2816
ing access to documents, archives, and witnesses.

283

Press Release, ICTY, Milomir Stakic Transferred to the ICTY (Mar. 23, 2001)

(reporting on Yugoslavia's arrest and transfer of Milomir Stakic), at http://
www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p581e.htm; Press Release, ICTY, Dragen Obrenovic Transferred Into the Custody of the International Tribunal (Apr. 16, 2001) (reporting on
the arrest and transfer of Dragen Obrenovic by the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and
Herzegovina), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p586e.htm; see also Judge Claude
Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Nov. 27, 2001) (noting that "the number of people who have been arrested or who have voluntarily surrendered has multiplied in the last few months"), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/
speeches/jorda271 101sce.htm.
284 See Marlise Simons & Carlotta Gall, Milogevi6 is Given
to the U.N.for Trial in WarCrimes Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at Al ("Milosevic ... was the first former head
of state delivered by a government to face an international war crimes court.").
Milogevid was arrested by Yugoslav authorities in April 2001, Steven Erlanger & Carlotta
Gall, Miloevi6 Arrest Came with Pledgefor a FairTrial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001, at Al, an
arrest which largely resulted from American legislation that conditioned further aid to
Yugoslavia on its cooperation with the ICTY, Richard Holbrooke, Risking a New War in
the Balkans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, §4, at 15.
285 For instance, soon after Miloievi6 was transferred, the Bosnian
Serb government of the Republika Srpska indicated that it would be willing to arrest indicted suspects. Marlise Simons, Bosnian Serbs Are Ready to Seize Men for Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, July
5, 2001, at A7. Croatia, also under intense Western pressure to cooperate with the Tribunal, decided in July 2001 to send two indictees to the Tribunal, Carlotta Gall &
Marlise Simons, Croatiain Turmoil After Agreeing to Send 2 to Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2001, at A3, and in August 2001, the authorities of the Federation of BosniaHerzegovina for the first time arrested Bosnian Muslim indictees, Press Release, ICTY,
Arrest of General Enver Hadzihasanovic, General Mehmed Alagic and Colonel Amir
Kubura (Aug. 3, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p610-e.htm; 3 Bosnian
Muslim Officers Charged: Hague Court Indictments Cite Atrocities Against Serbs and Croats,
INT'L HERALD TRiB., Aug. 4-5, 2001, at 4.
286 E.g., Prosecutor's 2001 Address to the Security Council,
supra note 267; ICTY,
Weekly
Press
Briefing
(Oct. 3,
2001),
at http://un.org/icty/briefing/
PB031001.htm; ICTY, Weekly Press Briefing (Nov. 8, 2000), at http://www.un.org/
icty/briefing/PB081 100.htm.
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B. The Tribunals'Proceduraland Evidentiary Systems
The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR authorize the Tribunals'
judges to adopt Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE or rules). 8'
Although the Tribunals' initial set of rules contained both adversarial
and non-adversarial features, many commentators viewed the amalgam as a whole to bear more affinity to adversarial systems."'8 Recent
amendments to the rules, however, have tilted the balance in the
other direction. For reasons that will be developed in Part IV, Tribunal trials are extremely lengthy and costly, and recent rule amend-

287

ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 15; ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 14.

288

See HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH-

CENTURY EXPERIENCE 142 (1999) (stating the Tribunal's RPE, as adopted in 1994 and
amended in 1996, "tilt toward the common-law, adversarial mode because so many of
the judges come from that system"); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 259, at 169 (stating
in 1997 that "[a]lthough something of a hybrid, the [ICTY's] procedure more closely
resembles an adversarial model, rather than the inquisitorial system characteristic of
civil law countries"); SCHARF, supra note 251, at 67 ("The judges [initially] decided to
embrace a largely adversarial approach to their Rules of Procedure, rather than the
inquisitorial system prevailing in continental Europe."); Mark S. Ellis, Achieving Justice
Before the InternationalWar Crimes Tribunal: Challengesfor the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J.

COMP. & INT'L L. 519, 524 (1997) ("[T] he Tribunal's Rules of Evidence and Procedure
are based largely on an adversarial model and do not follow the inquisitorial approach
used in civil law systems."); Daryl A. Mundis, From "Common Law" Towards "Civil Law":
The Evolution of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 14 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 367, 368

(2001) (reporting that "the first few trials at the [ICTY] closely resembled common law
criminal trials"); Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedureand Evidence of the International Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 507, 508 (1994) (finding that, in

1994, "the rules tend[ed] to lean more toward the common law adversarial system than
toward the civil law inquisitorial system, in keeping with the Statute's preference for a
modified adversarial model"); Patricia M. Wald, To "EstablishIncredible Events by Credible
Evidence": The Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings,42

HARV. INT'L L.J. 535, 537 (2001) ("In their original form as adopted in 1994, the adversarial mode of trial predominated in the Rules."). But see Robinson, supra note 52,
at 588 (describing the "legal system established by the [ICTY] Statute and Rules [as]
neither common law accusatorial, nor civil law inquisitorial, nor even an amalgam of
both; it is suigeneris").

Tribunal judges are elected for a four-year term by the General Assembly from a
list of nominees submitted by states. ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. l3bis. The
ICTY's first judges came from countries with a variety of legal backgrounds, with no
one procedural system clearly dominating. Specifically, the ICTY's first judges were
Adolphus Godwin Karibi-White of Nigeria, Rustam Sidhwa of Pakistan, Elisabeth OdioBenito of Costa Rica, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald of the United StatesJules Desch~nes of
Canada, Antonio Cassese of Italy, George Michel Abi-Saab of Egypt, Li Haopei of
China, Claudejorda of France, Lal Chand Vohrah of Malaysia, and Sir Ninian Stephen
of Australia. Press Release, ICTY, International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia Opened on 17 November 1993 in The Hague (Nov. 15, 1993) (on file with
author).

2002]

PLEA BARGAINING OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES

71

ments have introduced more non-adversarial features in an effort to
289
simplify and expedite proceedings.
1. Pre-trial Procedures
As in Anglo-American countries, the Statutes of the Tribunals vest
in the Prosecutor, rather than the judges, the responsibility for investigating and prosecuting the crimes within the Tribunals' jurisdiction.290 Once formally charged, Tribunal defendants may plead guilty
or not guilty to each count in the indictment. 291 If the defendant
pleads guilty, no trial is held, and the parties proceed directly to a presentencing hearing. 292 If the defendant pleads not guilty, the parties
prepare for trial. As part of this preparation, the Tribunals require
substantial disclosure by both parties. The prosecution must disclose,
among other things, a witness list which must summarize each witness's testimony, an exhibits list;293 all material which accompanied the
indictment when confirmation was sought; copies of all statements of
witnesses that the prosecution intends to call at trial;294 and any exculpatory evidence.9 Upon request, the prosecution must allow the defense to inspect certain books, documents, photographs, and tangible

289

See generally McDonald, supra note 281, at 161-62; Mundis, supra note 288, at

382; Daryl A. Mundis, The Legal Characterand Status of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
of the ad hoc InternationalCriminal Tribunals, 1 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 191, 205 (2002).

290ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 16(1); ICTR Statute, supra note
257, at art.
15(1). In some Continental countries, judges bear at least some of this responsibility,
see Brouwer, supra note 108, at 212-13 (describing tasks undertaken by the French juge
d'instruction); Pradel, supra note 118, at 110, 125-26 (describing French juge
d'instruction); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 114, at 6-7 (describing the Belgian juge
d'instruction), although even in these countries many of the investigative functions previously carried out by the judge have been transferred to the police and prosecutor, see
supra note 119.
291 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62(iii); ICTR RPE, supra note
264, at R.
62(A) (iii).
292 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62bis; ICTR RPE,
supra note 264, at R. 62(B).
Before accepting a guilty plea, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that the plea (1)
has been made voluntarily; (2) is informed; (3) is not equivocal; and (4) is supported
by a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the defendant's participation in it. ICTY
RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62bis, ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62(B); see also Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and
Judge Vohrah, para. 8 (Oct. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Erdemovid, Joint Opinion of Judges
McDonald and Vohrah], at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/
erd-asojmcd971007e.htm.
29,ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 65ter(E).
294 Id. at R. 66(A)(i)-(ii); ICTR RPE, supra note 264,
at R. 66(A)(i)-(ii).
295ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 68; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R.
68.
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objects. 296 As for the defense, it must notify the prosecution if it intends to raise an alibi defense or any special defenses, such as lack of
mental responsibility, and must provide certain information regarding
the defenses." It must also provide the prosecution with a witness list,
a summary of witness testimony, and an exhibits list, and if the defense exercises its right to inspect tangible objects within the custody
or control of the prosecution, it must make available those same kinds
1 '
of objects within its custody or control.2
The Tribunals' disclosure
provisions thus steer a middle course between those typically found in
adversarial and non-adversarial systems. The Tribunals do not require
as much disclosure from the prosecution as most Continental countries, which make the prosecutor's entire file available to the defendant.00° However, they do require more disclosure than that typically
required of American defendants 0 l and prosecutors, since some of
the latter are required only to disclose exculpatory evidence and
statements of the defendant in their possession. 302
The objects must be "in the Prosecutor's custody or control" and "material
to
the preparation of the defence," or "intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at
trial or were obtained from or belonged to the accused." ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at
R. 66(B); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 66(B).
297 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 67(A) (ii)
(a)-(b); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at
R. 67(A)(ii)(a)-(b). With respect to an alibi defense, the defendant must inform the
prosecution of the places where they claim to have been, and with respect both to alibis and special defenses, the defendant must disclose the names and addresses of the
witnesses and any other evidence on which they intend to rely. ICTY RPE, supra note
264, at R. 67(A) (ii) (a)-(b); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 67(A) (ii) (a)-(b).
298 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R.
65ter(G).
299 Id. at R. 67(C); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 67(C).
For a discussion of the
many unresolved questions regarding these disclosure provisions, see generally Renee
Pruitt, Discovery. Mutual Disclosure,UnilateralDisclosureand Non-Disclosure Under the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF
GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supranote 27, at 305.
300 Supra text accompanying
note 113.
301 Only about one dozen American states
require defendants to provide witness
statements or give notice of defenses other than alibi and insanity, and only about half
the states require disclosure of witness lists. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 943-44.
302 See Craig Bradley, United States, in CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY,
supra note 23, at 395, 416-17; van Kessel, supra note 54, at 414 (noting "the American
system's aversion to unlimited pretrial discovery in criminal cases"). In recent years,
American jurisdictions have begun granting criminal defendants greater discovery
rights, see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, at 913-14, but those rights are still comparatively limited. Only slightly more than one-third of American jurisdictions require
prosecutors to disclose the statements of co-defendants and witnesses, but a majority of
American jurisdictions now require the disclosure of scientific reports relating to the
case, the defendant's criminal record, and documents and tangible items which will be
used at trial. Id. at 922-26. For a discussion of the disclosure obligations placed on
British and Irish prosecutors, see Feldman, supra note 183, at 119-21; Finbarr McAuley
296

2002]

PLEA BARGAINING OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES

73

Initially, the Tribunals left the parties to prepare for trial without
significant interference or oversight. Early Tribunal trials were labeled excessively lengthy and inefficient, however, so the Tribunals,
and especially the ICTY, have amended their rules to allow the judges
to exercise greater control over both the pre-trial phase and the trial
itself. The ICTY assigns a pre-trial judge soon after the defendant's
initial appearance and directs the judge to "ensure that the proceedings are not unduly delayed and ...[to] take any measure necessary
to prepare the case for a fair and expeditious trial., 30 ' The pre-trial
judge carries out this directive by, among other things, establishing a
work plan, which sets forth the parties' obligations and the dates upon
which they must be met. 30 4 The pre-trial judge also conducts status
conferences, which, among other things, "organize exchanges between the parties., 30 ' After preliminary motions are disposed of, the
pre-trial judge orders the parties to file a series of documents, including pre-trial briefs, witness lists, and exhibits lists. 306 With this information, the pre-trial judge records the points of agreement and disagreement over facts and law, and presents to the Trial Chamber,
among other things, all of the parties' filings and the transcripts of the
status conferences.307 Both Tribunals now require the Trial Chambers
to convene pre-trial conferences 8 and permit them to convene predefense conferences.3 0 9 The Trial Chambers are authorized during
these conferences to set the number of witnesses that the prosecution
and defense may call and to determine the time available to both par-

&

John O'Dowd, Ireland, in CRIMINAL
COMMUNITY, supra note 114, at 185.
303

PROCEDURE SYSTEMS

IN THE EUROPEAN

ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 65ter(A)-(B). To further expedite proceedings,

the ICTY has recently begun to grant legal officers greater responsibility over the pretrial stage in order to give the judges more time to try the cases. See Judge Claude
Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 283 (endorsing reforms that
give judges "a more active role both during the pre-trial phase and the trial itself').
34ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 65ter(D).
305 Id. at R. 65bis(A).
The ICTR permits a Trial Chamber or judge to convene a
status conference. ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 65bis.
306ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 65ter(E)-(G); see also id. at R. 90(G) (authorizing a Trial Chamber to "refuse to hear a witness whose name does not appear" on the
witness list). The ICTR permits, but does not require, a Trial Chamber or pre-trial
judge-if one is designated-to order the filing of the above-mentioned documents.
ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 73bis.
307 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at
R. 65ter (H), (L).
308 Id. at R. 73bis(A); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 73bis(A).
90,ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 73ter(A); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at
R.
73ter(A).
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ties for presenting their evidence.31 These pre-trial procedures resemble the procedures of many Continental countries, which typically
grant judges considerable. authority
to gather information and man11
age the case prior to trial.
Such management typically results in a
more efficient, streamlined trial.
2. Trial Procedures
The Tribunals' trial procedures are generally adversarial in nature, but again, recent amendments to the rules have introduced
more non-adversarial elements in the hopes of shortening the trials.
Tribunal trials, like those in Anglo-American countries, are divided
into a prosecution "case," in which the prosecution presents evidence
and calls witnesses who will testify on its behalf, and a defense "case,"
in which the defense team does the same.
The presentation of evi310

ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 73bis(C), (E) and R. 73ter(C), (E); see also ICTR

RPE, supra note 264, at R. 73bis(C)-(D) and R. 73ter (C)-(D) (outlining judicial authority over the introduction and examination of witnesses); Hafida Lahiouel, The Right of
the Accused to an Expeditious Trial, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN
HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supranote 27, at 197, 211 (noting that R. 65ter
was adopted to codify a practice by which "[j]udges had started taking a more active
role in trials by questioning counsel and witnesses, cutting off irrelevant or repetitive
testimony and excluding witnesses whose testimony is cumulative or of no material assistance with respect to disputed issues"); Mundis, supra note 288, at 374-75 (describing
the pre-trial conference in the Krnojelac case, conducted under a previous version of
the rules which did not authorize the Trial Chambers to set the number of witnesses,
and in which Judge Hunt, among other things, encouraged the prosecution to reduce
the number of witnesses; encouraged the prosecution to withdraw counts under Article 2 of the ICTY Statute because they would be too time-consuming to prove and similar counts were charged under Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute; and elicited several admissions from the defense that the prosecution had previously attempted to elicit
without success).
311 See Brouwer, supra note 108, at 209 (explaining
that French criminal law regards the pre-trial and trial phases "as one continuum and has to a considerable extent
judicialized the pre-trial phase"); Almiro Rodrigues & C6cile Tournaye, Hearsay Evidence, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK
MCDONALD, supra note 27, at 291, 293 (describing the non-adversarial judge's active
participation in the search for evidence); see also supra text accompanying notes 119122.
" 2 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 85(A); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 85(A).
After the prosecution's case closes, the Trial Chamber may enter ajudgment of acquittal if it finds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on the charges.
ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 98bis; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 98bis. The Trial
Chamber in Prosecutorv. Jelisi6, for example, propio motu, acquitted the defendant of
genocide at the conclusion of the prosecution's case. Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, Case No. IT95-10-T, Judgement, paras. 15-16 (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafterJelisi6, Judgement], at
http://www.un.org/icty/brcko/trialcl/judgement/el-tj991214e.pdf;
Prosecutor v.
Jelisid, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeal, paras. 30-40 (July 5, 2001) [hereinafter Jelisi6, Ap-
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dence and witness testimony also follows the adversarial model; the
parties examine the witnesses they call, and opposing parties can
cross-examine those witnesses.313 At the same time, the rules authorize
Tribunal judges to "exercise control over the mode and order of interrogating the witnesses and presenting evidence so as to make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth and avoid needless consumption of time. 3 14 Tribunal judges
may also order the submission of evidence; they may summon wit-

peal]
(reversing
Trial
Chamber's
acquittal),
at http://www.un.org/icty/
brcko/appeal/udgement/el-aj10705.pdf. In most cases, however, the Trial Chamber acts in response to a defendant's motion. See Prosecutor v. Kvodka, Case No. IT-9830/1-T, Decision on Defence Motions for Acquittal, paras. 16, 25 (Dec. 15, 2000) (acquitting defendants on charges relating to crimes committed in the Keraterm and
Trnopolje camps) (on file with author); Prosecution v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T,
Decision on Motion for Acquittal, para. 28 (July 3, 2000) (acquitting defendant Kunarac of plunder and holding that defendant Vukovic had "no case to answer" in relation to charges of rape and torture), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/
decision-e/00703DC213246.htm; Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2PT, Decision on Defence Motions for Judgement of Acquittal, paras. 35-36 (Apr. 6,
2000) (holding that Kordid and Cerkez had "no case to answer" with respect to plunder
at twelve locations but rejecting the remainder of the defendants' claims), at
http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/decision-e/00406DC512861 .htm.
In Continental countries, there is no division of evidence into one or the other
side's "case"; rather the "trial is in the nature of an official inquiry presided over by the
judge: whatever evidence he decides to examine becomes his-or, rather, the court'sevidence. Accordingly, there is strictly speaking no 'prosecutor's case' and there are
no 'witnesses for the prosecution."' Dama§ka, supra note 52, at 525; see also Langbein,
supra note 118, at 201 (observing that in Germany, "there is no occasion to think of the
'prosecution case"'); cf van Kessel, supra note 54, at 442-43 ("[W]itnesses technically
do not belong to the parties, but are called by the court.").
313 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 85(B); ICTR RPE,
supra note 264, at R. 85(B);
see also ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 21 (4) (e) (granting a defendant the right to
"examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him"); ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 20(4) (e) (same). See generally Rodrigues & Tournaye, supra note 311, at 295-96 (observing that the "presentation of evidence is more akin to the adversarial system than that in the inquisitorial system" because "[t]he parties control the evidence adduced and they can agree on the issues
they want to debate at trial").
914 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 90(F). This provision
was added to Rule 90 in
April 2001 seemingly in response to the suggestions of an expert group that examined
the operation and functioning of the Tribunals. The expert group encouraged the
judges to take more control over the examination of witnesses because it found the
parties' examination to be "characterized by the absence of crisp, focused questions
and by long, rambling answers tending to be ... vague, repetitive and irrelevant."
Daryl A. Mundis, Improving the Operation and Functioningof the InternationalCriminal Tribunals, 94 AM.J. INT'L L. 759, 764 (2000).
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nesses, and they may question those witnesses -judicial tasks common in Continental countries.
Although Tribunal judges have always had the authority to perform these functions, they have recently
made greater use of that authority in order to expedite proceedings.
The Tribunals' evidentiary rules are primarily Continental in
character in that they are few and relatively simple.:' In contrast to
the voluminous and complicated evidentiary codes found in American
jurisdictions, the Tribunals address the bulk of evidentiary matters in
one rule, which provides, among other things, that a Chamber "may
320
admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value."

ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 98; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 98;
see also
Robinson, supra note 52, at 583-84 (noting that in Blaikid, the Trial Chamber called
nine witnesses); Blaikid, Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 56 & nn.114-19 (describing the Trial Chamber's summoning of various witnesses).
316 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 85(B); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 85(B).
317 See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
315

318

See Judge Claude Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for

the former Yugoslavia, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note
283 (explaining that judges ought to have a more active role in expediting proceedings); Judge Navanethem Pillay, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Address to the United Nations Security Council (Nov. 27, 2001) (reporting
the consensus among Tribunal judges "that there was a need for greater control over
the presentation of evidence by the parties"), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/
For instance, in Prosecutor v. Kordid, the
ENGLISH/speeches/pillay271101sc.htm.
prosecution planned to call twenty-seven rebuttal witnesses. In order to expedite the
trial, the Trial Chamber refused to allow that many witnesses, ordering that "only
highly probative evidence on a significant issue in response to Defence evidence and
not merely reinforcing the Prosecution case-in-chief" would be permitted. Mundis,
supra note 288, at 376; see alsoJelisid, Appeal, supra note 312, at para. 16 (observing that
"in long and complicated cases, such as most of those which come to the Tribunal, it is
necessary for the Trial Chamber to exercise control over the proceedings" and further
noting that "control may well need to be vigorous, provided of course that it does not
encroach on the right of a party to a fair hearing").
The judges are also active as factfinders; in a recent ICTR trial, the judges visited
the sites of the alleged massacres, Bagilishema, Judgement, supra note 279, at para. 10,
and in a recent ICTY trial, the judges made plans for an on-site visit but cancelled
them due to security concerns, Prosecutor v. Kupregkid, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, para. 19 Uan. 14, 2000), at http://www.un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2/
judgement/kup-t0001 14e.pdf.
319 See Gideon Boas, Admissibility of Evidence Under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
of the ICT: Development of the Flexibility Principle, in EssAYs ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 27, at 263, 265 ("It is
clear that the principle of 'la libert6 de la preuve' understood in the French criminal
law system, allowing the court to rule any form of evidence admissible, is to an extent
present in the Rules and practice of the ICTY."); Rodrigues & Tournaye, supra note
311, at 296 (explaining that "the ICTY Rules have adopted a free system of evidence,
both with regard to admissibility and evaluation, characteristic of the civil law model").
1CTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 89(C); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 89(C).
I20
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Hearsay is in principle admissible, and the Tribunal evaluates its admissibility in the same way it does any other evidence. 2 ' These liberal
evidentiary rules are seen as appropriate to enable the Tribunals to
create a historical record3 22 and to combat the difficulties that parties
in the Tribunals necessarily encounter in gathering evidence.323
As noted above, recent amendments to the rules have sought to
shorten Tribunal trials. Following Continental procedures, defendants are now permitted to make an opening statement which pre324
cedes the prosecution's presentation of evidence.
Such statements
can provide the prosecution with information that enables it to reduce the evidence presented (in the event the defendant concedes
certain points) or to tailor its case to the defenses likely to be pre-

Rule 89 reads in full:
(A) A Chamber shall apply the rules of evidence set forth in this Section, and
shall not be bound by national rules of evidence.
(B) In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall apply
rules of evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law.
(C) A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.
(D) A Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.
(E) A Chamber may request verification of the authenticity of evidence obtained out of court.
(F) A Chamber may receive the evidence of a witness orally or, where the interests ofjustice allow, in written form.
ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 89; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 89.
321See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence
Motion on
Hearsay, paras. 7, 15-19 (Aug. 5, 1996) [hereinafter Tadi6, Decision on the Defence
Motion on Hearsay] (explaining that hearsay is admissible where it is relevant and has
probative value), reprinted in INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
JUDICIAL REPORTS 111, 115-17, U.N. Sales No. E/F.02.III.P.2 (2002).
32 See Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Evidence Before the ICTY,
in ESSAYS ON ICTY
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 27,
at 249, 252-53 (discussing the trial record's role in preventing historical revisionism).
323 See Rodrigues & Tournaye, supra
note 311, at 296.
324 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 84bis, ICTR RPE, supra note 264,
at R. 84; see
also Damagka, supra note 52, at 529 ("[I] n all continental systems the defendant is used
as an evidentiary source before any other evidence has been examined at trial."); Lahiouel, supra note 310, at 210 (observing that the procedures providing for a defendant's voluntary statement "draw from the civil law inquisitorial system in which it is
common for the accused to make whatever statement he wishes about the case");
Mundis, supra note 288, at 373 (explaining that Rule 84bis "has its origins in the civil
law tradition, in which the accused is often called upon, at the outset of the trial, to
provide the examining magistrate or prosecutor with his or her version of the events in
question").
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sented.325 Further, because hearsay is admissible, the Tribunals have
begun to rely on alternative means of presenting evidence in an effort
326
The Tribunals, and espeto reduce the number of live witnesses.
cially the ICTY, are increasingly relying on documentary evidence, including transcripts from related trials,"' affidavits, depositions, and
compilations of evidence by experts,"' and they have begun making
greater use ofjudicial notice as a means of reducing the time devoted
to establishing background facts that have already been established in
329
other cases.
See Dama~ka, supra note 52, at 529-30 ("At the beginning of the case the [Continental] prosecutor may sit back and expect that leads or [incriminating] evidence...
will come out of [the defendant's] interrogation. Also, the prosecutor may hope that
the concocted story of a guilty defendant will crumble in the light of testimony of subsequent witnesses."); Lahiouel, supra note 310, at 210 n.61 (stating that time would
have been saved in BlakiW if the accused had made a statement at the beginning of the
trial); Mundis, supra note 288, at 373-74 (arguing that considerable time might have
been saved in Blaki had Rule 84bis been in existence). An expert group that recently
assessed the Tribunals' functioning recommended that the defendant be required to
describe in general terms the nature of his defense so that if the defendant asserted a
different theory at trial, the Trial Chamber could "draw the appropriate conclusions."
Mundis, supra note 314, at 766-67.
326 Previous versions of the ICTY's rules had provided that "witnesses shall, in
principle, be heard directly by the Chambers," but that provision was deleted in December 2000. Compare ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 90(A), Revision 18 (amended
July 14, 2000), http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev18.htm#Rule 90, with ICTY
RPE, supra note 264, at R. 90, Revision 19 (amended Dec. 1 & 13, 2000), at http://
www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_revl9con.htm. The ICTR RPE still contain the provision. See ICTR RPE, supranote 264, at R. 90(A).
327 See ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 92bis(D) (authorizing the
admission of a
transcript); see also Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Decision on Prosecution's
Application to Admit Transcripts Under Rule 92bis (May 23, 2001) (admitting transcripts
of several witnesses but requiring cross-examination with respect to some), at http://
www.un.org/icty/sikirica/trialc/decision-e/10523AE515806.h tm; Prosecutor v. Kordid &
terkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Decision on the Prosecution Application to Admit the
Tulica Report and Dossier into Evidence (July 29, 1999) (admitting transcripts from
the Blagki6 case and documentary evidence, including photographs and video footage),
at http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/decision-e/90729EV58864.htm; Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, paras. 14-21 (Feb. 16, 1999) (affirming the Trial Chamber's decision to
admit the transcript and video-recording of a witness's testimony in the Blagki6 case),
reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS:
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1997-1999,
245-47 (Andr6 Klip & G6ran Sluiter eds., 1999) [hereinafter 3 ANNOTATED LEADING
325

CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS].
.329 See ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 92bis(A) (authorizing the
admission of a
written statement of a witness in lieu of oral testimony under certain conditions); see
also Lahiouel, supra note 310, at 209 (discussing the use of exhibits, affidavits, and
depositions); May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 256-61.
329 See Prosecutor v. Kvo6ka, Case No. IT-98-30-1, Decision on Judicial Notice (June
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3. Sentencing
The Tribunals are limited in their selection of penalties to terms
of imprisonment; they cannot impose fines or issue death sentences.330
In determining the length of the imprisonment, the Tribunals' Statutes and rules instruct them to take into account various factors, including the gravity of the offense and the individual circumstances of
the defendant, 331 the general practice regarding prison sentences in
the courts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (for the ICTY and
ICTR, respectively) as well as any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 3 ' That is the extent of the guidance provided to-or the constraints imposed upon-the Trial Chambers. The Tribunals' Statutes
and rules delineate no aggravating circumstances and only one mitigating circumstance: "substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor by
the convicted person before or after conviction. 3 3 Further, the Statutes and the rules do not provide any guidance as to the comparative
"gravity" of the various offenses within the Tribunals' jurisdiction; nor
do they indicate which "individual circumstances" might be relevant
to sentencing or how they might be relevant.
8, 2000) (taking judicial notice of facts contained in a previous judgment), at
http://www.un.org/icty/kvocka/trialc/decision-e/00608AF112963.htm; Prosecutor v.
Simi6, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on the Pre-Trial Motion by the Prosecution Requesting the Trial Chamber to Take Judicial Notice of the International Character of
the Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Mar. 25, 1999) (refusing to take judicial notice of
the international character of the armed conflict but taking judicial notice of BosniaHerzegovina's proclamation of independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia on March 6, 1992 and of the subsequent recognition of the new State by the
European Community and the United States), at http://www.un.org/icty/simic/
trialc3/decision-e/90325PT56373.htm; Lahiouel, supra note 310, at 210 n.60 (observing that the Trial Chamber in Kvodka took judicial notice of facts in previous cases
which relieved the Prosecutor of proving those items).
330ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 24(1); ICTR Statute, supra
note 257, at art.
23(1). The Tribunals can impose terms up to and including the remainder of the
convicted person's life. ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 101 (A); ICTR RPE, supra note
264, at R. 101(A); see also Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing
Judgement, para. 25 (Nov. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Erdemovi6, First Sentencing Judgement] (noting that death sentences are not available in sentencing), reprinted in INT'L
CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, JUDICIAL REPORTS, supra note 321, at
1593. The Tribunals can, however, "order the return of any property and proceeds
acquired by criminal conduct, including duress, to their rightful owners." ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 24(3); ICTR Statute, supra note 257, at art. 23(3).
ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 24(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 257,
at art.
23(2).
332 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 101 (B)
(i)-(iii); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R.
101 (B) (i)-(iii).
333 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 101
(B) (ii); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R.
101(B) (ii).
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The Trial Chambers consequently have broad discretion in sentencing, discretion that they have not, through their case law, attempted to limit in any significant way. In Furundija,the Appeals
Chamber denied a prosecution request to delineate sentencing guidelines on the ground that it would be "inappropriate to establish a definitive list of sentencing guidelines for future reference, when only
334
certain matters relating to sentencing are at issue before it now.
With respect to the gravity of the offense, an ICTY Trial Chamber in
Tadi6 attempted to impose some structure on the sentencing process
by holding that, all things being equal, a punishable offense, if
charged and proven as a crime against humanity, is more serious and
should ordinarily entail a heavier penalty than if it were proceeded
upon as a war crime:
However, the Appeals Chamber rejected this
hierarchy, holding that in law there is "no distinction between the seriousness of a crime against humanity and that of a war crime. ''3 6 Fi-

334 Prosecutor v. Furundija, Case
No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, para. 238 (July 21,
2000), at http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/appeal/udgement/fur-ajOO0721e.pdf.
335 Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
Sentencing Judgement, para. 73 (July
14, 1997) [hereinafter Tadid, Sentencing Judgement], reprinted in 1 ANNOTATED
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 276, at 498; see also
Erdemovid, Joint Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 292, at paras.
20-26.
336 Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A
& IT-94-1-Abis, Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, para. 69 (Jan. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Tadid, Appeals Sentencing Judgement], at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-asjOOO]26e.pdf;
see
also Prosecutor v. Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, paras. 240-43 (July 21,
2000) [hereinafter Furundlija, Judgement] (echoing the Tadid Appeals Sentencing
Judgement); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgement and Sentence,
para. 449 (Dec. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Rutaganda,Judgement and Sentence] ("Whereas
in most national systems [penalties track] the gravity of the offence, [the ICTR] Statute
does not rank the various crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal ....
In
theory, the sentences are the same for each of the three crimes, namely a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment."), reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at 709, 781. In two recent cases,
however, ICTY Trial Chambers indicated that defendants convicted of persecution as a
crime against humanity deserve a more severe penalty than defendants convicted of
other crimes against humanity, because persecution, unlike other crimes against humanity, requires a showing of discriminatory intent. Prosecutor v. Todorovi6, Case No.
IT-95-9/1, Sentencing Judgement, paras. 32, 113 (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter Todorovid, Sentencing Judgement], at http://www.un.org/icty/todorovic/judgement/
tod-tj01073le.pdf; Blagkid,Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 785. Further, an ICTR
Trial Chamber stated that violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
and Protocol II thereto are "lesser crimes than genocide or crimes against humanity."
Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 14. The ICTR has not expressly ranked genocide and crimes against humanity, id., but it has, at times, called
genocide "the crime of crimes," Akayesu, Sentence, supra note 21, at para. 8; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, para. 15 (Feb. 5, 1999) [hereinafter
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nally, although the Chambers must consider the general sentencing
practices of the courts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, they
have held themselves not to be bound by those practices. s
In some cases, the Trial Chambers provide a detailed discussion of
various sentencing objectives, 338 but these considerations rarely seem
to play any significant role in the ultimate sentence imposed. The
Chambers have also delineated various aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but their treatment of these factors has not always been
consistent or cogent. For instance, the ICTR has repeatedly treated as
an aggravating circumstance the fact that the offenses for which the
defendant stands convicted are "extremely serious.,3 3 The ICTR has

Serushago, Sentence], reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at 823, 826, suggesting that it may be the most serious of the crimes falling within the ICTR's jurisdiction. Such distinctions are of less
import in the ICTR, however, because the Chambers have repeatedly held that a genocide took place in Rwanda during the period over which the ICTR has jurisdiction, see,
e.g., Akayesu, Judgement, supra note 279, at para. 129; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No.
ICTR-96-13,Judgement and Sentence, para. 931 (Jan. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Musema,
Judgement and Sentence],
at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/
Musema/judgement/6.htm; Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-951-T,Judgement, para. 528 (May 21, 1999), reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at 555, 657, and all of the ICTR
defendants convicted thus far have been convicted of genocide, either alone, or in
combination with crimes against humanity.
337 See Prosecutor v. Delali,
Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, para. 813 (Feb. 20,
2001) [hereinafter Delali, Judgement], at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/
judgement/cel-aj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A, Reasons
for Judgement, para. 30 (Apr. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Serushago, Appeal] (observing
that the Trial Chamber is obliged only to take account of the sentencing practices in
Rwanda),
at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/serushago/decisions/
app20000406.htm; Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 23 (determining that the sentence applicable in Rwanda "is but one of the factors to take into
account in determining sentences").
338 See, e.g.,
Todorovi6, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 336, at paras. 28-30 (discussing general considerations for sentencing); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement, paras. 836-44 (Feb. 22, 2001) (describing general
sentencing factors), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/kun-tjOlO
222e.pdf; Blagki6,Judgement, supra note 275, at paras. 761-64 (explaining the purposes
served by the defendant's sentence); Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgement, paras. 1230-34 (Nov. 16, 1998) (considering sentencing objectives), reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra
note 327, at 363, 629-30.
339 Rutaganda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 468;
Musema,
Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 1001. In Ruggiu, an ICTR Trial
Chamber made the cryptic and not very helpful remark that "[g]enocide and crimes
against humanity are inherently aggravating offences because they are heinous in nature and shock the collective conscience of mankind." Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No.
ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, para. 48 (June 1, 2000) [hereinafter Ruggiu,
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also deemed aggravating other facts that would seem incorporated in
the crimes themselves. 4 0 Equally inappropriately, the ICTY has considered a defendant's failure to cooperate with the prosecution an aggravating circumstance341 even though a defendant is under no obligation to cooperate. The Tribunals have done a bit better at identifying
relevant mitigating circumstances, but their application has not always
been consistent. For instance, some Trial Chambers have considered
as mitigating the fact that the defendant has no prior convictions342 or
has young children, 343 while others have noted that many, if not most,

Judgement and Sentence], at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/
Ruggiu/judgement/rug010600.htm.
For instance, in Musema, after the Trial Chamber held the defendant criminally
responsible under Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute as the superior of certain employees who committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal because the defendant "failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission"
of those crimes, Musema, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 889-926,
the Trial Chamber went on to consider as an aggravating factor the fact that "Musema
did nothing to prevent the commission of the crimes and that he took no steps to punish the perpetrators over whom he had control," id. at para. 1004. See also id. at para.
1002 (considering as an aggravating factor the fact that Musema "took no steps to prevent tea factory employees or vehicles from taking part in the attacks"). In Kayishema,
the Trial Chamber considered as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the defendants "voluntarily committed and participated in the offences," Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, at Sentence para. 13 (May 21, 1999) [hereinafter Kayishema, Judgement], reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at 555. One would expect voluntary commission to be the norm and that any showing of involuntariness would constitute a mitigating factor. See Erdemovid,Joint Opinion ofJudges McDonald and Vohrah,
supranote 292, at paras. 81, 88 (holding that duress is not a complete defense for charges
of crimes against humanity or war crimes which involve the killing of innocent people
but that it can be used in mitigation of punishment).
Although it is inappropriate to consider these facts aggravating circumstances, one
must sympathize with the ICTR Trial Chambers in that they are directed to consider
aggravating circumstances for crimes, like genocide, that are so heinous that it is difficult to envisage their aggravation. In Erdemovid, an ICTY Trial Chamber took a more
sensible approach, holding that "when crimes against humanity are involved, the issue
of the existence of any aggravating circumstances does not warrant consideration." Erdemovid, First SentencingJudgement, supra note 330, at para. 45.
341Blaikid,Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 774 ("[The] Trial
Chambers have,
on several occasions, ruled that failure to co-operate constitutes an aggravating circumstance.").
342 Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence,
supra note 339, at paras. 59-60; Jelisid,
Judgement, supra note 312, at para. 124; Aleksovski, Judgement, supra note 275, at
para. 236; Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, para. 284 (Dec.
10, 1998) [hereinafter Furundlija, Judgement], reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES

OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 327, at 685; Akayesu, Sentence, supra note 21.
343 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing
Judgement, para.
16(i) (Mar. 5, 1998) [hereinafter Erdemovid, Second Sentencing Judgement] (listing
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persons convicted of international crimes will be in similar circumS•
344
stances so that little weight can be accorded to such considerations.
In addition, while both Tribunals appear to consider the young age of
a defendant as a mitigating circumstance, there is no consensus regarding the definition of "young": the ICTY considers defendants
aged nineteen to twenty-three to be young, while the ICTR appears to
345
define youth in the thirty-two to thirty-seven-year-old range.
The one mitigating circumstance that the rules expressly identify"substantial cooperation with the prosecutor by the convicted person
before or after conviction",41-is most often invoked in cases in which
the defendant has pled guilty. The Tribunals have considered a defendant to have substantially cooperated with the Prosecutor 347 when

the fact that the defendant has a three-year-old child under "mitigating factors"), reprinted in 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra
note 276, at 685.
344 See Furund~ja, Judgement, supra note 342, at para. 284 (refusing to
give "significant weight" to "the fact that the accused has no previous convictions and is the father of
a young child" because these same factors apply to many defendants);Jelisi6, Judgement,
supra note 312, at para. 124 (referring to the Trial Chamber's admonition in Furundiija, that such considerations cannot be given too much weight). The Yugoslavian
Tribunal rejected the notion that the Trial Chamber should consider the goal of incapacitation as a general sentencing factor on the basis that
[i]n many, if not most cases before the International Tribunal, the convicted
persons would have no record of previous criminal conduct relevant to those
committed during the armed conflict. In practically all cases before the International Tribunal, the convicted persons would be first time offenders in relation
to internationalcrimes.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement, para. 843
(Feb. 22, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/udgement/kun-tjOI0222e
.pdf.
345 Blagkik, Judgement, supra note
275, at para. 778 (summarizing ICTY
and ICTR
sentencing decisions). Interestingly, in Krnojelac, the ICTY Trial Chamber noted that it
"had regard in sentencing" to the fact that the defendant was, at the time of sentencing, sixty-two years old, but it did not explicitly pronounce that fact to be a mitigating
circumstance. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25,Judgement, para. 533 (Mar.
15, 2002) [hereinafter Krnojelac, Judgement], at http://www.un.org/icty/krnojelac/
trialc2/judgement/krn-tj020315e.pdf. Other mitigating circumstances include a defendant's voluntary surrender, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-9623/1-T, Judgement, para. 868 (Feb. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Kunarac, Judgement], at
Prosecutor v.
http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/udgement/kun-tjO0O222e.pdf;
Kupregki6, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, paras. 843, 850, 853 (Jan. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Kupreiki6, Judgement], at http://www.un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2/judgement/
kup-tj000114e.pdf; Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 34, and poor health,
supra note 250, at para. 716.
Krstic,Judgement,
346
.
E.g., ICTY RPE, supra note 264, atR. 101 (B) (ii).
347 The Appeals Chamber has held that it is for the Tribunal, not
the Prosecutor,
to decide whether the defendant has provided the Prosecutor substantial cooperation.
SeeJelisid, Appeal, supra note 312, at para. 126 (explaining the responsibility of the
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he has testified for the prosecution in other trials or has promised to
do So,48 and even when he has admitted certain facts at trial." 9 In one
case, a defendant's substantial cooperation after his conviction provided grounds for the Appeals Chamber to reduce his sentence on
appeal.35 ° While one might consider that a guilty plea, in and of itself,
constitutes substantial cooperation with the prosecution, the Chambers have typically treated it as an independent mitigating factor:
Similarly, they have considered expressions of remorse, which also are
most likely to appear in cases in which the defendants have pled
52
guilty, to be an independent mitigating circumstance .
35 3
The Tribunals' Trial Chambers have acquitted three defendants

Trial Chamber to determine "whether the cooperation should be considered substantial and therefore whether it constitutes a mitigating factor").
348 See Todorovi6, Sentencing Judgement,
sufffa note 336, at para. 84 (taking note
of defendant's plea agreement, in which the defendant agreed to assist prosecutors in
ongoing and future investigations); Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 3133 (terming the defendant's cooperation "substantial and ongoing" and pointing out
that defendant had agreed to testify in other pending trials); Kambanda, Judgement
and Sentence, supra note 1, at paras. 46-47 (relying on Prosecutor's confirmation of
defendant's "substantial co-operation," both by providing information to prosecutors
and agreeing to testify in future trials); Erdemovid, Second Sentencing judgement, supra note 343, at para. 16(iv) (noting that the defendant's testimony provided investigators with new information).
549 See Musema, Judgement and Sentence, supra
note 336, at para. 1007 (finding
that these admissions "facilitated an expeditious trial").
350Prosecution v. Kupregkid, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal
Judgement, paras. 461463 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Kupre~kid, Appeal Judgement], at http://www.
un.org/icty/kupreskic/appeal/judgement/kup-aj01 1023e.pdf.
See Todorovd, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 336, at paras. 74-88 (setting
out four mitigating factors: "[t]he accused's guilty plea, his substantial cooperation
with the [p]rosecution, his expressed remorse for his crime, and the question of his
diminished mental capacity"); Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at
paras. 53-58 (looking first at the defendant's level of remorse, as expressed through his
guilty plea, and then at his cooperation with the Prosecutor as an independent mitigating circumstance); Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 31-35 (dealing with
the cooperation factor separately from the guilty plea factor); Kambanda, Judgement
and Sentence, supra note 1, at paras. 46, 61 (assessing defense counsel's claims of cooperation and "plea of guilty" as "[separate] factors in mitigation"); Erdemovi6, Second Sentencing Judgement, supra note 343, at para. 16 (enumerating four mitigating
factors and dealing separately with defendant's cooperation and his admission of
guilt).
See, e.g., Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at paras.
52-80; Erdemovi6, Second Sentencing Judgement, supra note 343, at para. 16(iii); see also Akayesu, Sentence, supra note 21, at paras. 31-32.
353See Bagilishema, Judgement, supranote 279 (acquitting Ignace
Bagilishema); Kupre~kid, Judgement, supra note 345, at para. 769 (acquitting Dragan Papid); Delalii,
Judgement, supra note 337, at paras. 721, 1285 (acquitting Zejnil Delalid).
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and convicted thirty-eight,354 nine of whom pled guilty. 55 The Trial
Chambers have sentenced the thirty-eight convicted to terms of imprisonment ranging from two-and-one-half years' to life imprisonment.31 The Appeals Chamber has also been heavily involved in sen354 For a list of these cases, see infra note
356.

Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Sentencing Judgement, paras.
17-39
(Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement], at http://www.un.org/
icty/sikirica/judgement/sik-tsjO 11 13e.pdf; Todorovid, Sentencing Judgement, sura
note 336, at para. 17; Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 10;
Jelisid, Judgement, supra note 312, at para. 11; Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at
para. 6; Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 5; Erdemovid, Second Sentencing Judgement, supra note 343, at para. 5.
356An ICTY Trial Chamber imposed the two-and-one-half-year
sentence on Zlatko
Aleksovski, see Aleksovski, Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 244, and ICTR Trial
Chambers have sentenced five defendants to life imprisonment for genocide and
crimes against humanity, see Musema, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336 (sentencing defendant to life imprisonment for genocide and for extermination and rape
as crimes against humanity), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/
Musema/judgement/8.htm; Rutaganda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at
785 (sentencing defendant to life imprisonment for genocide and for extermination
and murder as crimes against humanity); Akayesu, Sentence, supra note 21, at 817
(sentencing Akayesu to life imprisonment for genocide, incitement to commit genocide, and extermination as a crime against humanity); Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at 807 (sentencing defendant to life imprisonment for genocide);
Kayishema, Judgement, supra note 340, at para. 32 (sentencing Kayishema to life imprisonment for genocide).
In between those extremes, ICTY Trial Chambers sentenced Milorad Krnojelac to
seven-and-a-half years' imprisonment for persecution and inhumane acts as crimes
against humanity and cruel treatment as a violation of the laws and customs of war,
Krnojelac, Judgement, supra note 345, at para. 536, sentenced Stevan Todorovi6 to ten
years' imprisonment for persecution as a crime against humanity, Todorovi6, SentencingJudgement, supra note 336, at para. 115, sentenced Dugko Sikirica, Damir Dogen,
and Dragan Kolundlija to fifteen years', five years', and three years' imprisonment, respectively, for persecution as a crime against humanity, Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at para. 245, sentenced Miroslav Kvodka, Milojica Kos, Mlado
Radik, Zoran 2igid, and Dragoljub Prca6 to seven years', six years', twenty years', twentyfive years', and five years' imprisonment, respectively, for persecution as a crime
against humanity and murder, torture, and cruel treatment, Prosecutor v. Kvodka, Case
No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, paras. 754, 757, 760, 763, 766 (Nov. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Kvodka, Judgement],
at http://www.un.org/icty/kvocka/trialc/judgement/
kvo-tjOl1002e.pdf, sentenced Radislav Krstic to forty-six years' imprisonment for genocide, Krstic, Judgement, supra note 250, at para. 727, sentenced Dario Kordi6 and
Mario Cerkez to twenty-five years' and fifteen years' imprisonment, respectively, for
crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of
the laws and customs of war, Kordi6, Judgement, supra note 275, at 310, sentenced
Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic to twenty-eight years', twenty
years' and twelve years' imprisonment, respectively, for crimes against humanity and
violations of the laws and customs of war, Kunarac, Judgement, supra note 345, at
paras. 885, 887, 890, sentenced Tihomir Blagkik to forty-five years' imprisonment for
persecution as a crime against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war,
Blagki, Judgement, supra note 275, at 270, sentenced Zoran Kupregki6, Mirjan Ku355
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tencing, hearing appeals to virtually every sentence that the Trial
Chambers have issued. The Appeals Chamber has held that it will not
substitute its sentence for that of a Trial Chamber unless it believes
that the Trial Chamber has committed a discernible error in exercising its discretion or has failed to follow applicable law.3 57 Despite that
deferential-sounding standard of review, the ICTY Appeals Chamber
has revised four of the six sentences on which it has passed judgment,
increasing the sentences in two of the cases and decreasing them in
the other two. 358 One notable fact about all the sentences, whether

pregkid, and Vlatko Kupre~kid to ten years', eight years', and six years' imprisonment,
respectively, for persecution as a crime against humanity, and it sentenced Vladimir Santid and DragoJosipovic to twenty-five years' and fifteen years' imprisonment, respectively,
for murder as a crime against humanity, Kupre~kid,Judgement, supranote 345, at 324-27,
sentenced Goran Jelisid to forty years' imprisonment for crimes against humanity and
violations of the laws and customs of war, Jelisid, Judgement, supra note 312, at para.
139, sentenced Dugko Tadid to twenty-five years' imprisonment for murder as a crime
against humanity, Tadid, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 335, at para. 32, sentenced
Anto Furundlija to ten years' imprisonment for torture as a violation of the laws and
customs of war, Furund~ija, Judgement, supra note 342, at 748, sentenced Hazim Delid,
Esad Land~o, and Zdravko Mucid to twenty years', fifteen years', and seven years' imprisonment, respectively, for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the
laws and customs of war, Prosecutor v. Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, para.
1285 (Nov. 16, 1998), reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 339, at 640-45, and sentenced Dra2en Erdemovid to

five years' imprisonment for violations of the laws and customs of war, Erdemovi6, Second Sentencing Judgement, supra note 343, at 670. The ICTR sentenced Georges
Ruggiu to twelve years' imprisonment for persecution as a crime against humanity and
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence,
supra note 339, at Verdict, sentenced Obed Ruzindana to twenty-five years' imprisonment for genocide, Kayishema, Judgement, supra note 340, at para. 32, and sentenced
Omar Serushago to fifteen years' imprisonment for genocide and crimes against humanity, Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at 833-34.
Delali,Judgement, supra note 337, at para. 725.
358 See id. at paras. 851, 853 (holding that in sentencing
Mucid to seven years' imprisonment, the Trial Chamber "did not have sufficient regard to the gravity of the offences committed by Mucid in exercising its sentencing discretion, and as a result it
imposed a sentence which did not adequately reflect the totality of Mucid's criminal
conduct," and suggesting that a sentence of approximately ten years' imprisonment
would be more appropriate); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, paras. 186, 191 (Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement]
(increasing defendant's sentence from two-and-one-half years' imprisonment to seven
years' imprisonment), at http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/appeal/judgement/aleasj000324e.pdf; Tadid, Appeals Sentencing Judgement, supra note 336, at paras. 55-58
(reducing defendant's sentence from twenty-five years' imprisonment to twenty years'
imprisonment).
In Delali, Aleksovski, and Tadi, the Appeals Chamber effectively reversed the Trial
Chambers' sentencing analysis; by contrast, in KuprekiL, the Appeals Chamber reversed certain of the Trial Chambers' factual findings that were relevant to the sentences the Trial Chamber had imposed, and primarily for that reason the Appeals
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imposed by a Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber, is that they
have never exceeded the sentence recommended by the prosecution.

Chamber reduced the defendants' sentences. Kupregkid, Appeal Judgement, supra
note 350, at paras. 438, 465.
In the first round of sentencing in Erdemovi, the prosecution recommended
a
sentence not exceeding ten years, Erdemovi6, First Sentencing Judgement, supra note
330, at text accompanying n.140, and the Trial Chamber sentenced Erdemovid to ten
years' imprisonment, id. at text accompanying n.141. In the second round of sentencing, the parties agreed in a plea agreement "that seven years' imprisonment would be
an appropriate sentence," Erdemovid, Second Sentencing Judgement, supra note 343,
at para. 18, but the Trial Chamber sentenced Erdemovid to five years' imprisonment,
id. at para. 23.
In the initial Tadid sentencing judgment, the prosecution asked for a sentence of
life imprisonment, Tadid, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 335, at para. 5, and the
Trial Chamber sentenced Tadi6 to twenty years' imprisonment, id. at para. 74. In the
second round of sentencing, following an appeal in which Tadi6 was convicted of additional counts, the prosecution asked for a fifteen-year sentence of imprisonment for
the additional counts to be served in addition to the original twenty-year sentence.
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Sentencing Judgement, para. 4 (Nov. 11,
1999), at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/udgement/tad-tsojrob991111e.pdf.
The Trial Chamber imposed a total sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment. Id. at
para. 32.
The prosecution in Aleksovski asked the Trial Chamber to impose a ten year sentence, Aleksovski, Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 232, and it imposed a sentence
of two-and-one-half years, id. at para. 244. On appeal, the prosecution asked for a sentence of not less than seven years, Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement, supra note 358, at
para. 179, and the Appeals Chamber sentenced Aleksovski to seven years' imprisonment, id. at para. 191.
The prosecution in Kordid submitted "that a sentence of life imprisonment for
both accused is appropriate in this case, with a recommendation that Kordid serve a
minimum of 30 years and Cerkez a minimum of 25 years." Kordid, Judgement, supra
note 275, at para. 844. The Trial Chamber sentenced Kordid to twenty-five years' imprisonment and Cerkez to fifteen years' imprisonment. Id. at paras. 854, 856. In Krstic,
the prosecution recommended that General Krstic receive consecutive life sentences
for each of his convictions. Krstic, Judgement, supra note 250, at para. 690. The Trial
Chamber sentenced Krstic to forty-six years' imprisonment. Id. at para. 726.
In Jelisi, the prosecution asked for a sentence of life imprisonment, Jelisid,
Judgement, supra note 312, at para. 119, and the Trial Chamber sentenced Jelisid to
forty years' imprisonment, id. at para. 139. In Todorovid, the parties entered into a plea
agreement prohibiting the prosecution from recommending a sentence in excess of
twelve years' imprisonment. Todorovi6, SentencingJudgement, supra note 336, at para.
11. The prosecution recommended a sentence of twelve years' imprisonment, id., at
para. 22, and the Trial Chamber sentenced Todorovid to ten years' imprisonment, id.
at para. 115.
In Sikirica, the parties entered into plea agreements in which the prosecution
agreed not to recommend sentences exceeding seventeen years', seven years', and five
years' imprisonment for Sikirica, Dogen, and Kolundlja, respectively. Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at paras. 25, 31, 37. The prosecution recommended the maximum sentences for each defendant, id. at para. 42, and the Trial
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Tribunal defendants can appeal their convictions,
and, as in
many Continental countries, the prosecution can also appeal.36 In

Chamber sentenced Sikirica, Dogen, and Kolund~ija to fifteen years', five years', and
three years' imprisonment, respectively, id. at para. 245.
In Kvoka, the prosecution recommended sentences of life imprisonment for
Radid and 2igid, Kvodka, Judgement, supra note 356, at para. 695, and the Trial Chamber sentenced them to twenty- and twenty-five year terms of imprisonment, respectively, id. at paras. 745, 750. In that same case, the prosecution recommended that Kos
be sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment and that Kvodka and Prcad each be
sentenced to thirty-five years' imprisonment. Id. at para. 695. The Trial Chamber sentenced Kos to six years' imprisonment, id. at para. 735, Kvodka to seven years' imprisonment, id. at para. 718, and Prca6 to five years' imprisonment, id. at para. 726.
In Musema, Rutaganda, and Kambanda, the prosecution recommended sentences
of life imprisonment, and those are the sentences that the Trial Chambers imposed.
Musema, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 994; Rutaganda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 464; Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence,
supra note 1, at para. 60.
In Akayesu, the prosecution recommended a series of sentences, ranging from fifteen years' to life imprisonment, for the nine crimes of which Akayesu was convicted,
and the Trial Chamber imposed life imprisonment for several of the crimes for which
the prosecution sought it and, for the remainder, shorter terms of imprisonment than
the prosecution had recommended. Akayesu, Sentence, supra note 21. In Kayishema,
the prosecution sought life sentences for both defendants, Kayishema, Judgement, supra note 340, at Sentence para. 25, and the Trial Chamber imposed a life sentence on
Kayishema and a sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment on Ruzindana, id. at Sentence paras. 27-28. In Ruggiu, the prosecution asked that a twenty year term of imprisonment be imposed, Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 81,
and the Trial Chamber sentenced Ruggiu to twelve years' imprisonment, id. at Verdict.
In Kunarac and Kupreiki, the Trial Chamber indicated that the prosecution submitted sentencing recommendations, but it did not state what those recommendations
were. Kunarac, Judgement, supra note 345, at para. 824; Kupregkid, Judgement, supra
note 345, at para. 835. In Furund&ija, the Trial Chamber noted that the prosecution had
not made a "specific recommendation for the length of sentence." Furundija, Judgement, supranote 342, at para. 279.
In Bla§kk, Delali6, and Serushago, the Trial Chambers gave no indication that the
prosecution had made sentencing recommendations. Delali came before the Trial
Chamber for a re-sentencing following an appeal, and at that time the prosecution
sought a ten year sentence for Muci& Prosecutor v. Muci6, Case No. IT-96-21-TbisR117, Sentencing Judgement, para. 23 (Oct. 9, 2001) (on file with author). The Trial
Chamber sentenced Mucid to nine years' imprisonment. Id. at para. 27.
30 ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 25(1); ICTR Statute,
supra note 257, at art.
24(1).
361 ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 25(1); ICTR Statute,
supra note 257, at art.
24(1). Appeals must allege "a) an error on a question of law invalidating the decision;
or b) an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice." Id. Prosecutors
can appeal acquittals in most Continental countries. See, e.g., Dannecker & Roberts,
supra note 120, at 442-43 (summarizing German criminal appellate procedure); Richard S. Frase, Introduction to THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1, 36 (Gerald
L. Kock & Richard S. Frase trans., 1988); Swart, supra note 114, at 314 (describing ap-
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virtually all Tribunal cases to date, one or both of the parties have63
362 Indeed, so many appeals were filed
taken advantage of this right.
that changes had to be made. Specifically, the Tribunals recently
added two judges to the Appeals Chamber 1 4 and amended their rules
to restrict interlocutory appeals. 365 Appeals are attractive to both parties because of their likelihood for success. The Appeals Chamber,
particularly of the ICTY, regularly reverses Trial Chamber decisions.
Chamber affirm
In only one of seven ICTY appeals did the Appeals
6
the Trial Chamber's judgment in all respects.3
IV. PLEA BARGAINING AT THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

Parts I and II analyzed plea bargaining's functional and ideological role in various domestic jurisdictions, while Part III described the
Tribunals' structure and procedural system. Parts I through III, then,
lay the necessary foundation for this Part's examination of plea bargaining in the Tribunals. Section A will apply the functional, ideological, and structural frameworks developed with respect to domestic
criminal justice systems to the international tribunals. In doing so, it

pellate procedures in The Netherlands); Van den Wyngaert, supra note 114, at 47 (describing appellate procedures in Belgium); Weigend, supra note 127, at 201 (describprocedures in Germany).
ing appellate
362
For instance, the only ICTY defendants who failed to appeal were precluded
from doing so; they had entered into plea agreements with the prosecution wherein
both parties agreed not to appeal any sentences that fell within the range that they had
agreed upon, and they were sentenced within that range. Todorovi6, Sentencing
Judgement, supra note 336, at paras. 11, 115; Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra
note 355, at paras. 25, 31, 37, 235, 239, 243. As for the ICTR, seven of nine convicted
defendants have appealed. ICTR 2001 Annual Report, supra note 263, at para. 34.
363 See McDonald, supra note 281, at 162 ("By March 2000... the appellate judges

had a docket of over forty ICTY and ICTR matters.... While this figure represents a
normal, or even light workload for a national court, it swamped the Tribunal.").
364 ICTR 2001 Annual Report, supra note 263, at para. 46; Press Release, ICTR, The
Security Council Enlarges the Appeals Chamber (Dec. 5, 2000), http://www.ictr.org/
wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/253.htm.
365 Report of the Secretaiy-General on the Work of the Organization,
U.N. GAOR, 56th

Sess., Supp. No. 1, at para. 207, U.N. Doc. A/56/1 (2001). Further, to manage appellate proceedings, the ICTY has appointed pre-appeals judges in a number of cases. See
Prosecutor v. Blakid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Decision on Appellant's Request for an Extension of Time and Authorization to Exceed the Page Limit on his Reply to the
Prosecutor's Response to Appellant's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence on Appeal
Pursuant to Rule 115 (Apr. 20, 2001) (referring toJune 8, 2000 order appointing preappeals judge); Prosecutor v. Delali6, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Order Appointing a PreAppeal Judge (Oct. 12, 1999), described in ICTY judicial Supplement, No. 8 (Nov. 15,
1999), at 3.
366 Furundlija,Judgement, supranote 336, at Disposition.
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will set forth certain hypotheses concerning the importance of plea
bargaining and the role that it is apt to play in the international tribunals. Section B will test those hypotheses against Tribunal practice to
date by describing the ICTY and ICTR cases that have been resolved
by guilty plea. Section C summarizes the evolution that plea bargaining has undergone in the Tribunals and explains the particular forms
of plea bargaining that have emerged as products of the Tribunals'
unique structural and ideological features.
A. Plea Bargainingin ComparativePerspective

1. The Tribunals' Functional Need for Plea Bargaining
Part I developed the correlation in the domestic setting between
time-consuming, complex procedures and the use of plea bargaining.
As a result of a variety of factors that do not arise in the domestic setting, Tribunal trials are exceptionally lengthy, costly, and complicated;
thus, plea bargaining has the potential to play a vital functional role in
the administration of international criminal justice in the Tribunals.
The average ICTY pre-trial period lasts a little over ten months,
and the average ICTY trial takes a little over a year. 367 The ICTY's first
trial, Tadi6, was relatively short, lasting only 6 months and featuring
126 witnesses, 461 exhibits, and a 7015-page transcript.

The ICTY's

Kordi6 trial was more typical, however, lasting 20 months and featuring
241 witnesses, 4665 exhibits, and a transcript of more than 28,000
pages. 369 Fewer witnesses typically appear at ICTR trials, -70 but the tri-

367

Report on the Operation of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugosla-

via Presented by Judge Claude Jorda on Behalf of the Judges of the Tribunal, U.N. Doc.
A/55/382-S/2000/865 (2000) [hereinafterJorda Report], at http://www.un.org/icty/
pressreal/RAP000620e.htm.
3CAProsecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgement,
paras. 27-34
(May 7, 1997), reprnted in 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS, supranote 276, at 299-301; May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 250.
369
Kordi6, Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 3. The Blagkik trial lasted more
than two years and featured 158 witnesses and more than 1300 exhibits. Blagki6,
Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 19. The eelebidi trial covered a period of nineteen
months and featured over 1500 exhibits and a transcript of more than 16,000 pages.
Delali6, Judgement, supra note 337, at para. 33. The Kuprekid trial featured 157 witnesses and 700 exhibits. Prosecutor v. Kupre~kid, supra note 318, at para. 29; see also
May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 250 (reporting the number of witnesses and exhibits
and stating that such figures "led President McDonald to say that 'these are not trials
involving ordinary crimes"').
370 E.g., Akayesu, Judgement, supra note 279,
at para. 24 (reporting that 41 witnesses were heard and 155 exhibits introduced); see also Report of the InternationalCrimi-
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als themselves can take just as long to complete. 1 The lengthy periods during which defendants have been held in pre-trial detention
have led some to question whether the Tribunals are observing the
defendants' right to an expeditious trial.372 Defendants have been denal Tribunalfor the Prosecutionof Persons Responsiblefor Genocide and Other Serious Violations
of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 53, at
paras. 145-46, U.N. Doc. A/55/435-S/2000/927 (2000) [hereinafter ICTR 2000 Annual
Report] (noting that thirty witnesses appeared in Musema and that thirty-three witnesses
appeared in Bagilishema).
371 One of the ICTR's first trials, Akayesu, was tried in
sixty days of hearings that fell
within a nearly fifteen-month period. Akayesu, Judgement, supra note 279, at paras. 928; see also ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra note 370, at paras. 145-46 (noting that the
Musema trial lasted five months and that the Bagilishema trial lasted eleven months).
372 See Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role
and Effectiveness of the International Criminal TribunalforRwanda and the Rwandan NationalJusticeSystem in Dealingwith
the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 184, 193 (2000) (remarking that
"[e]arly procedural errors and delays may be leading to due process violations"); Lahiouel, supra note 310, at 197; see also Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19AR72, Decision, para. 106 (Nov. 3, 1999) (dismissing charges against defendant and releasing him due to pre-indictment delay), reprinted in 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 1, at 169; ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra note 370, at annex III, para. 8 (noting that several defendants in the Butare cases have
been detained for more than three years before trial).
These delays occur despite the fact that various treaties protect the right to be tried
without unreasonable delay. E.g., American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, art. 7(5), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 147 (entitling any person detained "to trial within a
reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings"); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 9(3), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (providing that "[a]nyone arrested or detained on a criminal
charge.., shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release"); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 5(3), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 226 (providing that "[e]veryone arrested or detained ... shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial")..
Recently, however, the ICTY has begun making greater use of provisional release
to reduce pre-trial detention. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Simid, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Milan Simi's Application for Provisional Release (May 29, 2000) (granting defendant's motion for provisional release), at http://www.un.org/icty/simic/trialc3/
decision-e/00529PR512846.htm; Judge Releases Bosnian Serb from Custody, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Aug. 30, 2001, at 5 (reporting on the provisional release of Bijana Plavi6); Press
Release, ICTY, Enver Hadzihasanovic, Mehmed Magic and Amir Kubura Granted Provisional Release (Dec. 13, 2001) (announcing the provisional release of three defendants justified by, among other things, the fact that they voluntarily surrendered to the
Tribunal), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p649-e.htm. At their outsets, the Tribunals' RPE provided that "[r]elease may be ordered by a Trial Chamber only in exceptional circumstances," a requirement that has since been eliminated. Compare
ICTY, R.P. & EVID. 65(B) (as amendedJuly 2, 1999), at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/
rpe/IT32_rev16.htm, with ICTY, R.P. & EVID. 65(B) (as amended Nov. 17, 1999), at
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev17.htm.
Many motions for provisional
release, however, continue to be denied. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-
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tained for up to four years during pre-trial, trial, and appellate proceedings,3 and the length of detention might well increase as the
Tribunals experience greater success in obtaining custody over indictees who must then join the queue.
The considerable length and cost of Tribunal trials has generated
much criticism3v4 and consequently spurred reform. The Tribunals

99-36-PT, Decision on Motion by Momir Talic for Provisional Release, paras. 38, 46
(Mar. 28, 2001) (denying a motion for provisional release because the tribunal was not
satisfied that Talic would appear for his trial), at http://www.un.org/icty/brdjanin/
trialc/decision-e/10328PR215226.htm; Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29, Order
on the Defence Motion for Provisional Release (July 27, 2000) (denying the defendant's motion for provisional release and describing the length of pre-trial detention
as acceptable), at http://www.un.org/icty/galic/trialc/order-e/00727PRl 13247.htm;
Prosecutor v. Kvodka, Case No. IT-98-30/1, Decision on Motion for Provisional Release
of Miroslav Kvodka (Feb. 2, 2000) (denying motion for provisional release and noting
both the likelihood that the accused would pose a danger to victims and witnesses, and
that the Trial Chamber anticipates an early trial commencement date), at http://
www.un.org/icty/kvoca/trialc/decision-e/00202PR512949.htm.
373 Lahiouel, supra note 310,
at 201.
374 See, e.g., John E. Ackerman, Assignment of Defence
Counsel at the ICTY, in ESSAYS
ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra
note 27, at 167, 170 ("One of the major criticisms levelled at the Tribunal is the length
of trials."); Carroll, supra note 372, at 181 ("The ICTR has been criticized for not
achieving its mandate swiftly enough."); Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness:
Counseling the Accused in Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 545, 623 (1998) (noting that the ICTR's "slowness is perceived as foot-dragging by
many Rwandans"); Patricia McNerney, The InternationalCriminal Court: Issues for Consideration by the United States Senate, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 188-89 (2001)
(questioning the efficacy of the Tribunals and noting that in 2000, the United States
was assessed $58 million for its 25% share of the expenses of the two tribunals); Mundis, supra note 314, at 759 (describing the justified criticism of the Tribunals' "inordinately long trials"); Penrose, supra note 281, at 364-69 (criticizing the pace of the Tribunals' proceedings); Robinson, supra note 52, at 584 (noting that the ICTY's record
of completed cases "on its face ... would seem to be poor"); Wald, supra note 288, at
536 ("The Tribunal has been criticized widely for not moving its docket faster."); James
Blount Griffin, Note, A Predictive Frameworkfor the Effectiveness of International Criminal
Tribunals, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 405, 432 (2001) (describing the ICTR as "too
slow for the demands of justice"); Press Release, International Crisis Group, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed (June 7, 2001) (describing
the number of ICTR trials completed as "lamentable" and noting that the group's report-Tibunal PnalInternationalpour le Rwanda: L 'urgence dejuger-"calls on the UN
Security Council to review the performance of the [ICTR] and its judges, demand a
trial schedule giving priority to suspects already in custody, and importantly set a final
date for the completion of investigations"), at http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/
projects/showpress.cfm?reportid=305. But see Press Release, ICTR, Statement by the
Registrar, Mr. Adama Dieng, on the Report of the International Crisis Group (June 11,
2001) (responding to the criticisms of the International Crisis Group), at http://
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2001/9-3-01.htm.
Some of the most
trenchant criticism of the ICTY's slow pace has come from victims of the Yugoslavian
conflict. See Sanja Kutnjak lvkovic, Justice by the International Criminal Tribunalfor the
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have sought to enhance general productivity by making more efficient
use of courtroom space... and judicial resources.
The Prosecutor,
particularly in the ICTR, has made efforts to combine related cases:
she has filed joint indictments and motions forjoinder of defendants
to consolidate several indictments into a single trial. 3" Also, recogniz-

Former Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 309, 329 (2001) (reporting the results of
studies examining war victims' perceptions of the ICTY and noting that one of the
most frequent objections was the Tribunals' slow pace).
375See Lahiouel, supra note 310, at 207 (describing the effort by
the ICTY to conduct trials "for no more than some hours per day, in order to make the courtrooms
available for other cases").
376 For instance, the Tribunals amended Rule 62 of their RPE to provide
that the
initial appearance of the defendant could be conducted before a single judge rather
than the full Trial Chamber. Compare ICTY, R.P. & EVID. 62 (as amended July 2, 1999)
(requiring that "[u]pon transfer of an accused to the seat of the Tribunal . . . [t]he
accused shall be brought before that Trial Chamber without delay"), at http://
www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_revl6.htm, with ICTY, R.P. & EVID. 62 (as amended
Nov. 17, 1999) (providing that "[u] pon transfer of an accused to the seat of the Tribunal ... [t]he accused shall be brought before that Trial Chamber or a Judge thereof"),
at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32-rev17.htm. Rule 15 was amended so that
it no longer disqualifies a judge who confirmed an indictment against a defendant
from sitting at that defendant's trial. Compare ICTY, R.P. & EVID. 15 (as amended July
2, 1999) (disqualifying the judge who "reviews an indictment against an accused, pursuant to Article 19 of the Statute and Rules 47 or 61"), at http://www.un.org/icty/
basic/rpe/IT32_rev16.htm, with ICTY, R.P. & EVID. 15 (as amended Nov. 17, 1999)
(stating explicitly that the review of an indictment does not disqualify the judge), at
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32-rev7.htm. In the July, 2001 amendments to
the ICTYs RPE, Rule 65ter was amended to authorize a Senior Legal Officer to perform some of the functions previously assigned to the pre-trial judge. Compare ICTY,
R.P. & EVID. 65ter (as amended Dec. 1 & 13, 2000) (designating a pre-trial judge alone
to be responsible for the pre-trial hearings), at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/
IT32_revl9.htm, with ICTY, R.P. & EVID. 65ter (as amended July 12, 2001) (allowing
the Senior Legal Officer to oversee implementation of the work plan developed during
the pre-trial phase), at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev21.htm.
77 See Beresford, supra note 279, at 129-30; ICTR 2000 Annual Report,
supra note
370, at paras. 138-39 (noting that such actions have been taken and that their "objective is to maximize efficiency in the use of judicial resources, to spare victims and witnesses the inconvenience, exposure and emotional burden of having to repeat their
testimony in several trials, and to facilitate proof of the conspiracy to commit genocide,
the theory that undergirds the prosecution"); see also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza,
Case No. ICTR-97-19-I, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion forJoinder and Decision
on Barayagwiza's Extremely Urgent Motions for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Waiver of
Time Limits Under Rule 72(A) and (F) of the Rules (June 6, 2000) (granting the
Prosecutor's motion for joinder of cases), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/
ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs06O600.htm.
The Prosecutor has not
been able to pursue that strategy as effectively at the ICTY because that Tribunal has
had such difficulty obtaining custody over some defendants whose cases might otherwise be joined to those of defendants already in custody. For instance, in November
1995, the Prosecutor brought an indictment against six Croatians alleged to have
committed atrocities in the Larva Valley area of Central Bosnia. One of these defen-
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ing that scarce Tribunal resources are best spent prosecuting the political and military leaders who planned and instigated the atrocities
rather than their subordinates who carried out their plans, the Prose-8
cutor has withdrawn indictments against several lower-level officials.
Finally, as described above, recent amendments to the RPE (and especially to the ICTY RPE) have introduced procedural elements
found in continental systems in an effort to reduce the length and
cost of Tribunal trials.
These efforts will no doubt expedite proceedings considerably,
but there are a variety of reasons why Tribunal proceedings are apt to
remain relatively lengthy, complicated, and costly. The fact that Tridants, Tihomir Bla~kid, voluntarily surrendered himself to the Tribunal in April 1996;
the prosecution then prepared an amended indictment charging only him, and he was
tried separately. BlakU,Judgement, supra note 275, at paras. 2, 18. Two other defendants, Dario Kordid and Mario Iterkez, did not surrender to the ICTY until October
1997, and the prosecution prepared a separate indictment for these two and tried
them together. Kordi6, Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 2. The Trial Chamber
granted the fourth defendant's motion to separate his trial from the others, Prosecutor
v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-PT, Decision of Trial Chamber 1 in Respect of the
Motion of 19June 1997 Requesting Separation of Trials (Sept. 25, 1997) (on file with
author), and the prosecution withdrew the charges against the remaining two defendants, Prosecutor v. Skopljak, Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, Order on Prosecutor's Motion
for Leave to Withdraw the Indictment Against Pero Skopljak (Dec. 19, 1997), at
http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/order-e/kor-worder2-971219e.pdf;
Prosecutor
v. Santi6, Case No. IT-95-14/2-PT, Order on Prosecutor's Motion for Leave to Withdraw
the
Indictment
Against
Ivan
Santid
(Dec.
19,
1997),
at
http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/order-e/kor-worderl-971219e.pdf.
In Kvo~ka,
however, the Trial Chamber began a trial involving four defendants; when a fifth coindictee was subsequently arrested, the Trial Chamber adjourned the trial, ordered the
joinder of trials, and recommenced against the five defendants. Prosecution v. Kvodka,
Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, para. 768 (Nov. 2, 2001), at http://
www.un.org/icty/kvocka/triale/judgement/kvo-tjO11002e.pdf. For further examples
of potential joinders obstructed by difficulty in obtaining custody, see Press Release,
ICTY, The Indictment Against Vinko Pandurevic is Unsealed (Dec. 14, 2001), at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p651-e.htm; Weekly Press Briefing, ICTY (Feb. 27,
2002), at http://www.un.org/icty/briefing/PB270202.htm.
378 ICTY Bulletin, No. 21,July 27, 1998, at 4; see also Sean
D. Murphy, Progressand
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 57, 74-75 (1999) (describing withdrawn indictments); id. at 59 ("Since 1997,
the ICTY [P]rosecutor has pursued a strategy that calls for indicting only high-level
offenders .... ); Press Release, ICTR, Tribunal to Target 'Big Fish' (July 3, 1997) (announcing steps taken to improve "effectiveness and efficiency, including targeting the
so called 'big fish' who were involved in the 1994 Rwanda genocide"), at
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1997/060.htm.
At the same
time, the "trials of accused who are alleged to have been the veritable architects of the
killings will necessarily be legally and factually more complex and take longer than the
trials of persons of lesser rank and status." ICTR 2001 Annual Report, supra note 263, at
para. 42.
379 See supra Part
III.B.2.
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bunal trials are held far from the locations of the crimes makes it
time-consuming and expensive for the parties to investigate the cases
and locate witnesses and evidence.' 8° Witnesses can be particularly difficult to find because they dispersed following the crimes,38 or be1382
cause they fear coming forward.
As mentioned above, parties before

380

See, e.g., Kupre~kid, Appeal Judgement, supra note 350, at para. 44 (describing

the "numerous practical difficulties that all parties at trial before the Tribunal face in
locating all relevant witnesses and documentary evidence from distant countries, not
always co-operative with the Tribunal").
g See ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra note 370, at para. 78
(noting that in
Bagilishema, fifteen defense witnesses were called from twelve different countries).
382 See Christine Chinkin, The Protection of Victims
and Witnesses, in SUBSTANTIVE
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW supra, note

AND

21, at 456; see also

Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, Order in the Matter of the
Prosecutor's Ex Parte Further Allegations of Contempt, para. II (July 19, 2001), at
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/nyiramasuhuko/decisions/190701.ht
m; Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Allegations of Contempt, The Harmonisation of the Witness Protection Measures and
Warning to the Prosecutor's Counsel, para. 2 (July 10, 2001) (describing the prosecution's allegations that members of the defense team contacted prosecution witnesses
and "attempted to 'mak[e] them change their mind not to testify for the Prosecution"'), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/nyiramasuhuko/decisions/
100701b.htm; LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROSECUTING GENOCIDE IN
RWANDA: A LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE ICTR AND NATIONAL TRIALS, at
III(D) (4) (1997) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT] (detailing violence suffered by ICTR witnesses including raids often targeting genocide victims and "targeted
killing to eliminate potential witnesses"), available at http://www.lchr.org/
pubs/rwanda.htm; SCHARF, supra note 251, at 139 (noting that the prosecution in the
Tadid case had "been forced to pare down the number of... [eyewitnesses] because several had become unwilling to testify"). Because the Tribunals' ability to ensure protection is far more limited than that of a domestic court, Tribunal witnesses have particular
reason to fear testifying. See Chinkin, supra, at 456 (noting that Tribunals "cannot draw
upon domestic resources such as police, witness protection programmes and support
services"). To combat these fears as much as possible, the Tribunals have adopted a
number of rules providing for the protection of victims and witnesses. See ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 39(ii) (authorizing the Prosecutor to take "special measures to provide for the safety of potential witnesses and informants" during investigations); ICTR
RPE, supra note 264, at R. 39(ii) (same); ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 69(A) (authorizing "the non-disclosure of the identity of a victim or witness who may be in danger or at
risk"); ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 69(A) (same); ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R.
75 (authorizing the Trial Chambers to order "measures to prevent the disclosure to the
public or the media of the identity or whereabouts of a victim or a witness"); ICTR RPE,
supra note 264, at R. 75 (same); see also Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision
on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses,
para. 86 (Aug. 10, 1995) (permitting certain witnesses to testify anonymously), reprinted in
1 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 276,
at 74. Despite their best efforts, the Tribunals are not always able to prevent violence to
witnesses. In January 1997, "Hutu extremists murdered a witness, her husband, and
seven children after she appeared before the . . . [ICTR] and was promised protection. Another tribunal witness was killed with his daughter, brother, nephew and
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the ICTY in particular have experienced difficulties obtaining access
38t3
to documents and witnesses, difficulties which inevitably increase
the time and cost of trial preparation. The Tribunals often attempt to
assist the parties in securing evidence and witness testimony,
but
these attempts can be unsuccessful and, even when successful, can be
time-consuming, because the Tribunals themselves have no enforcement mechanisms and thus must rely on states' voluntary compliance.38 Even when states do comply, the logistics can prove daunting.
For instance, numerous lower-level participants in the Rwandan genocide are currently in Rwandan prisons awaiting trial or serving sentences. Both ICTR prosecutors and defendants frequently seek testimony from these Rwandan prisoners. The Tribunals' rules authorize
a judge or Trial Chamber to order the transfer of such detained persons, but the party requesting the transfer must first obtain documenseven others the previous December." Nasser Ega-Musa, Another Failure ofJustice in Africa,WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1997, at A21.
Defense witnesses may also be reluctant to come forward because they fear prosecution themselves or retaliation at home. See Kupregki6, Appeal Judgement, supra note
350, at para. 173 (noting that the defense had difficulty persuading Bosnian Muslim
victims to testify in favor of the Bosnian Croat defendants, even though they were otherwise agreeable to doing so, because the witnesses feared "the condemnation and
harassment within the close-knit Muslim community that would surely follow from associating themselves with the Defendants"), at http://www.un.org/icty/kupreskic/
appeal/judgement/kup-aj011023e.pdf; SCHAR, supra note 251, at 103 (noting that
some defense witnesses "dreaded the local warlord, Prijedor Police Chief Simo Drjac,
who made it clear that he did not recognize the legitimacy of the Tribunal"). Consequently, the Tribunals have authorized protective measures to encourage defense witness
testimony as well. See id. at 103 (speaking of the use of protective measures such as granting "temporary immunity to defense witnesses who come to the Hague" and allowing
others "to testify from Bosnia by video-link").
383 See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement,
paras. 29-56 (July 15,
1999) (discussing the appellant's argument that a "lack of cooperation and ... obstruction" by several governmental authorities in providing access to appellant witnesses compromised his case, thereby depriving appellant of a fair trial), reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 327, at 771-78; Delalid, Judgement, supra note 337, at paras. 55-57 (describing the issuances of subpoenas
and other difficulties in obtaining witness testimony), reprinted in 3 ANNOTATED
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS,

supra note

327, at 385-86;

Weekly Press Briefing, ICTY (Nov. 8, 2000) (addressing questions about the cooperation
of several nations in providing the tribunal with necessary witnesses and documentation),
at http://www.un.org/icty/briefing/PB081100.htm.
s4 For instance, in Kupreiki6, the Trial Chamber summoned Muslim defense witnesses as "court witnesses" so that the witnesses would not be associated with the Croatian defendants. Kupreikid, Appeal Judgement, supra note 350, at paras. 173-75.
385See ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra note 370, at para. 80 (noting that "[w]
ithout
the cooperation of countries such as Benin, the Congo, France, Kenya, Mozambique,
Mauritania, Swaziland, Rwanda, the United Kingdom, Zambia and Zimbabwe, none of
the witnesses would have been able to be heard by the Tribunal").
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tation from the detaining state establishing that the witness is not required for any criminal proceedings in the detaining state during the
period that the witness is required by the Tribunal, and that the witness's transfer will not extend the period of the witness's detention. s6
Even when this documentation is provided, motions for transfer are
387
often opposed, thus necessitating an exchange of briefing.
Another factor contributing to the considerable length of Tribunal proceedings is the nascent state of the law to be applied in those
proceedings. The Tribunals were charged with prosecuting genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes at a time when genocide had
never before been prosecuted, and the contours of all the crimes were
in some doubt: Thus the Tribunals, particularly at the outset, had to

386

ICTR RPE supra note 264, at R. 90bis.

387See Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T,
Decision on the

Prosecutor's Motions for Leave to Call Additional Witnesses and for the Transfer of
Detained Witnesses, paras. 1-8 (July 24, 2001) (recounting several motions, countermotions and supplemental motions relied on by the Tribunal in issuing its decision),
at
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/nyiramasuhuko/decisions/2407
01.htm; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Motion to Reinstate a Witness on the List of Witnesses to Be Called at Trial and Order
for the Transfer of Four Detained Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 90bis, paras. 1-4 Uune
29, 2001) (listing the submissions of the parties, including motions, summaries of witness testimony and a letter), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/
kajelijeli/decisions/290601.htm; Prosecutor v. Bagambiki, Case No. ICTR-9946-I, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for the Transfer of Detained Witnesses Pursuant to
Rule 90bis (Aug. 23, 2000) (considering several briefs and other papers in reaching its
decision to transfer eleven witnesses to a detention center), at http://www.ictr.org/
But see Prosecutor
wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Imanishimwe/decisions/230800a.htm.
v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-1, Order for Temporary Transfer of Three Detained
Witnesses (AFZ, AG1, AHA) Pursuant to Rule 90bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Sept. 26, 2000) (granting unopposed motion), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/
ENGLISH/cases/barayagwiza/decisions/260900.htm; ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra
note 370, at para. 78 (noting that in Bagilishema, the Victims Support Section produced
three detainee witnesses from Kigali).
388 See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and
Judgement, para. 694
(May 7, 1997) (noting that persecution as a crime against humanity "has never been
clearly defined"), reprintedin 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS, supra note 276, at 435; Louise Arbour, Foreword to SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 21, at ix, x
("[C]ertain elements of certain offences and doctrines of criminal responsibility, and a
myriad of issues of procedure and evidence remain to be elaborated in all their detail.");
Schrag, supra note 281, at 18 n.9; Developments in the Law-InternationalCriminalLaw, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1998 (2001) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] ("The crimes
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICTR-genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes as described in the Geneva and Hague Conventionswere vaguely defined and seldom enforced prior to the creation of the tribunals.").
When the Tribunals have been asked to clarify the elements of a crime or defense in
advance, they have refused. See Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Order on
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receive submissions and hear argumentation on issues as fundamental
as the elements of the crimes with which the defendants were
charged. The procedures applicable in international tribunals were in
an even earlier stage of development;s"9 consequently, the Tribunals
often have found themselves inundated with pre-trial and trial motions seeking the resolution of multifarious issues regarding, for instance, the admissibility of evidence"o the form of indictments, 9' the
protections afforded to victims and witnesses,"" and the length of pretrial detention79 among many, many others. 94

Esad Land2o's Request for Definition of Diminished or Lack of Mental Capacity (July
15, 1998), at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/order-e/80715MS2.htm.
389 See W.J.

Fenrick, InternationalHumanitarianLaw and CriminalTrials, 7 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 26 (1997) ("[A]lthough it is practicable to determine a rea-

sonably specific list of offenses under international humanitarian law, it is much more
difficult to determine the applicable law for evidentiary or procedural matters....").
390See, e.g., Tadid, Decision on the Defence Motion on Hearsay,
supra note 321, at
para. 5 (stating that "there is no [ICTY] rule that calls for the exclusion of out-of-court, or
hearsay, statements," thus requiring a determination of admissibility by the Tribunal),
reprinted in 1 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra
note 276 at 195.
391 See generally Michael J. Keegan & Daryl A. Mundis, Legal Requirements
for Indictments, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK

MCDONALD, supra note 27, at 123-36 (describing the basic requirements of drafting an
indictment or charging document for the ICTY).
392 See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, paras. 4-11 (Aug. 10,
1995), reprinted in I ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS, supranote 276, at 155-56.

393See, e.g.,
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, paras.
41-113 (Nov. 3, 1999) (dismissing indictment against defendant as a result of preindictment delay) (on file with author); Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-9719-AR72, Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration (Mar. 31, 2000) (quashing its earlierjudgment) (on file with author).
See Blaski,Judgement, supra note 275, at para. 19 (noting that "[t]he proceedings against Tihomir Bla[gkid] before the Tribunal were complex and at each stage
gave rise to many questions, often without precedent" and further noting that during
the "pretrial phase, the Tribunal rendered eighty-two interlocutory decisions"); Delalid,Judgement, supra note 337, at paras. 33-83 (noting that "[t]he Trial Chamber had
been called upon to address a host of unprecedented procedural and substantive issues relating to the trial" and describing them); ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra note
370, at paras. 15, 17, 18 (highlighting that in only one year the Trial Chamber ruled on
twenty-eight motions in Nahimana, thirty-seven motions in Ndayambaje, and eighty-three
motions in Niyitigeka); id. at annex I (setting forth the pre-trial litigation in
Bagilishema); id. at annex II (noting that the Trial Chamber was "inundated with pretrial motions, which contributed to the delay in the commencement" of trial in the

"media" cases); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 388, at 1998 (noting that the

"attorneys who represent the first waves of defendants in international criminal courts
since Nuremberg must often litigate numerous essential, yet inchoate and untested,

2002]

PLEA BARGAINING OFINTERNATIONAL CRIMES

99

The elements of the crimes within the Tribunals' jurisdiction,
even when clearly delineated, are complex and time-consuming to
prove. For instance, to prosecute murder as a crime against humanity
in the ICTY, the prosecution must prove not only that the defendant
killed the victim but that the murder was committed as part of an
armed conflict that was directed against a civilian population.9 ' To
prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions under article 2
of the ICTY Statute, the prosecution must prove that the offenses took
place in the context of an international armed conflict.316 Establishing
these and other elements often requires days of witness and expert
testimony and the introduction of dozens, if not hundreds, of exhibits. 39' Indeed, whereas the typical domestic criminal case concerns

questions of law by referring to case law and statutes scattered across the globe, buried
for fifty years, and written in languages from Norwegian to Hebrew").
Although numerous motions can be expected given how new and unsettled this area
of law is, some motions are frivolous and criticized as such. See Prosecutor v. Krajisnik,
Case No. IT-00-39-1, Decision on Motion ChallengingJurisdiction-With Reasons, para. 27
(Sept. 22, 2000) (noting that the "Tribunal as a whole is overburdened with work" and
admonishing that the "Trial Chambers should not be called upon to adjudicate on arguments in motions that have already been definitively determined by the Appeals
Chamber"), at http://www.un.org/icty/krajisnik/trialc/decision-e/00922JN513918.htm.
395ICTY Statute, supra note 252, at art. 5. The definition of crimes against humanity in the ICTR's statute does not include a nexus to an armed conflict. ICTR Statute,
supra note 257, at art. 3.
396See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 79-84 (Oct. 2, 1995) (citing and
explaining article 2 of the ICTY Statute); see also W. Hays Parks, 28 GEO.WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 207, 213 (1994) (book review) ("[I]t is much easier to gain conviction of
an accused for the simple and well-established offense of murder than it is to allege").
and rove-a war crime ....
R7 See SCHARF, supra note 251, at 137 (noting that the first five weeks
of the Tadie
trial elapsed "without a shred of testimony as to the alleged crimes of the defendant" because the prosecution had to prove "that the conflict was international and that the
abuses were widespread and systematic" and consequently "took a very cautious approach
and elicited a lot of evidence in support of [that] . .. determination"). As former ICTY
President McDonald noted:
It is time-consuming to prove, or to respond to, a charge that offences have
been committed as part of a widespread or systematic campaign, as is required
for establishing crimes against humanity. Similarly, proof that a conflict is international requires considerable evidence that goes beyond proof of the specific crimes with which the accused is charged. Finally, proving or defending
against an allegation of genocide is more complex than the core crime of
murder.
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Speech at the Inauguration of NewJudges (Nov. 16, 1998),
quoted in May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 250; see also May & Wierda, supra note 322, at
250 (noting that "it may be necessary for the Prosecution to call evidence relating to
the historical and political background if these are not familiar to the Trial Chamber"). Moreover, because many witnesses are themselves victims or are relatives of vic-
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one crime committed in one specific location, Tribunal trials often
concern widespread atrocities occurring in many locations and taking
place over a period of months. 3'8 The difference in size and scale between Tribunal trials and domestic trials makes it difficult to compare
the two, even superficially. Few domestic trials will have as many as
fifty witnesses; in contrast, only one ICTY trial so far has had fewer
than fifty witnesses and most have had more than one hundred, each
of whom, on average, take up a full trial day:
The way in which Tribunal crimes are defined also leads to complexity and inefficiency. Many of the crimes overlap, 400 and many offenses can be charged as more than one crime. As one commentator
noted:
[T] he four offences set out in the Statute of the Tribunal can be committed in numerous ways. No less than eight individual types of conduct
amount to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The offence of
violation of customs of war specific to ICTY is not fully defined, rather,
five acts are indicated as non-exhaustive examples. The rest has to be
found in customary international law. Therefore, the position of the
Prosecution has been that it has no choice but to indict for as many
crimes as appear to have been committed and to introduce as much evi-

tims, "they tell their stories in their own way and at their own pace." Lahiouel, supra
note 310, at 204. "It is difficult to ensure that the examination is rapidly focused on a
particular piece of evidence." Id.
398See May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 249-50 (discussing the broader scope of
cases before the Tribunal in comparison with cases before domestic courts).
399See Wald, supra note 288, at 549 (reporting the average number of witnesses
heard by the Tribunal and the nature of the witnesses' testimony); see also Lahiouel,
supra note 310, at 204 (discussing delays in a case before the Tribunal due to the large
number of witnesses called, exhibits required, and other practical considerations);
Robinson, supra note 52, at 584 (commenting on the large scale of Tribunal hearings,
specifically with regard to the number of witnesses and the length of their testimony).
As two ICTY officials have noted:
[T]he nature of the crimes within the mandate of the ICTY is drastically different from the national prosecution experience of any individual. There is
no legal system in the world that deals on a routine basis with the types of
cases that fall within the mandate of the ICTY or with the limitations that the
ICTY faces in the exercise of itsjurisdiction.
Keegan & Mundis, supra note 391, at 124; see also ICTR 2001 Annual Report, supra note
263, at para. 40 ("It is important to recall, however, that conducting judicial proceedings at the international level is a far more complicated task than at the national
level.").
400 See Gabrielle
Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman, Introduction to
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note

21, at xiii, xiv (noting that certain "crimes tend to fall under more than one general
heading").
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dence and as many witnesses as appear necessary to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for all of them.

Additional delays are caused by the need for language translation.
While the ICTY's simultaneous translations of courtroom proceedings
are considered very good,4 °2 the ICTR has experienced some difficulty
because the syntax and everyday modes of expression in Kinyarwanda-the language spoken by most ICTR witnesses-are complex
and difficult to translate into French or English.0 In both Tribunals,
large quantities of documentary evidence also must be translated, and
these translations can take considerable time.40 4 Indeed, the transla401
402

Lahiouel, supra note 310, at 203 (footnote omitted).
Problems do arise, however. In the Tadk trial, for instance, Prosecutor Michael

Keegan expected a prosecution witness to place Tadi6 at the scene of one of the crimes.
When asked whether Tadi6 was present, however, the witness answered "no," a response
Keevn later attributed to translation problems. ScHARF, supranote 251, at 162.
See Akayesu, Judgement, supra note 279, at para. 145. The Chamber went on to
explain that the "difficulties affected the pre-trial interviews carried out by investigators in
the field, as well as the interpretation of examination and cross-examination during proceedings in Court." Id. Testimony in Kinyarwanda is first translated to French and then
from French to English, "entail[ing] obvious risks of misunderstandings in the English
version." Id.; see also Musema, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 102
(noting "the significant syntactical and grammatical differences between" French, English, and Kinyarwanda); Rutaganda, judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para.
23 (noting the translation-related difficulties); ICTR 2001 Annual Report, supra note
263, at para. 40 (listing "interpretation of testimony from Kinyarwanda into French
and English" as one of the problems contributing to the difficulty of "conducting judicial proceedings at the international level"). The ICTR has, at times, relied on the testimony of a linguistic expert to clarify the meaning of certain terms, and it has noted
various cultural factors that affect witness testimony. See Akayesu, Judgement, supra
note 279, at para. 156 (referring to an expert's testimony that in the Rwandan culture,
people sometimes do not answer questions directly); Musema, judgement and Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 103 (noting that "cultural constraints appeared to induce [witnesses] to answer indirectly certain questions regarded as delicate"). In addition, a linguistic expert testified in Akayesu that "most Rwandans live in an oral tradition
in which facts are reported as they are perceived by the witness, often irrespective of
whether the facts were personally witnessed or recounted by someone else." Akayesu,
Judgement, supra note 279, at para. 155; see also Musema, Judgement and Sentence, supra
note 336, at para. 103 ("[T]here appears... to be in Rwandan culture a 'tradition that
the perceived knowledge of one becomes the knowledge of all'....").
404 E-mail from Jenny S. Martinez, former ICTY Junior
Legal Officer, to Nancy &
Bruce Combs (Aug. 16, 2001, 22:27:13) (on file with author). Complaints about translation delay are rampant in the ICTY, where the translators are regularly unable to
meet the word requirements set for them. Interview with F. Indeed, at times, the Tribunals have lacked the resources to translate all the documents that might ideally be
translated. See Wald, supra note 288, at 541 (noting that a Trial Chamber was receptive
to the prosecution's proposal to introduce summaries of witness testimony, but "the
proposal floundered on the requirement by the Trial Chamber that the summaries be
given in advance to the defendants in their native language [and] (the translation facilities of the ICTY were not adequate for the job)" (parentheses in original)); Press
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tion of documents caused sufficient delays in ICTR trials that the Tribunal recently amended its rules to allow defendants to use outside
translation
services instead of relying on the ICTR translation sec• 403
tion.
Language difficulties can also impede the speedy issuance of
judgments. Many, if not all, of the judges can speak both French and
English at least at a rudimentary level, but most are considerably more
proficient in one and prefer to work in that language. Thus, the
judges must wait for drafts of the Tribunals' lengthy judgments to be
406
translated before they can be discussed.
In addition, without the aid
of simultaneous interpretation, informal oral communications about
the cases can prove time-consuming and awkward.
In sum, although the Tribunals' efforts to shorten and simplify
their proceedings are laudable, they will not result in short, simple
proceedings. The Tribunals, then, have a functional need for alternative methods of case disposition, and plea bargaining seems an attractive means of avoiding the time-consuming, costly trials that otherwise
must take place. But, as developed in Part II, functional value is not
the only factor influencing the prevalence of plea bargaining in a
criminal justice system. Other factors, which will be addressed next,
include the structure of the criminal justice system and its prevailing
ideology.
2. The Structural and Ideological Components
As a structural matter, the OTP is relatively hierarchical, at least in
comparison to the offices of most American district attorneys. With
respect to plea bargaining, specifically, the Prosecutor must approve
any concessions that are offered as well as the ultimate plea agreement, leaving the Senior Trial Attorneys and their assistants without
substantial authority over the content of the bargain. Further, the

Release, ICTR, Media Trial Opens (Oct. 23, 2000) (reporting that the ICTR's President denied a defendant's request to translate all seventy-one issues of a newspaper of
which the defendant was editor because the Tribunal "did not have the resources" to
do so), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/245.htm.
405 See ICTR 2000 Annual Report, supra note 370, at para.
58 ("These amendments
... [n]ow give the defence the option of utilizing outside translation services, instead
of relying on the ICTR translation section, to translate documents, thus reducing the
delays caused by the translation of documents .. " (footnote omitted)).
406 See ICTR 2001 Annual Report, supra note 263, at para. 48 (acknowledging that
"[t]he translations of decisions and other documents prepared by the judges... [is] a
major problem"); id. at para. 64 (reporting that although the written judgment in the
Kayishema appeal was ready in June 2001, "it has not been made available for distribution, due to translation difficulties").
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ideological elements underpinning the adversary system and reinforcing the use of plea bargaining in the United States do not feature so
prominently in Tribunal proceedings. As Part II described, plea bargaining is most likely to flourish in a procedural system that prizes
party autonomy and participation and that conceives of adjudication
largely in terms of its ability to resolve disputes. The Tribunals' initial
procedures did permit the parties to operate with a great deal of
autonomy; as a general matter, Tribunal proceedings were structured
in the form of a contest between two relatively unregulated parties,
both of whom had substantial control over the development and presentation of their cases.
However, recent reforms undertaken to expedite proceedings
have altered, perhaps fundamentally, the nature of Tribunal proceedings by moderating the contest form and by transferring much party
control to the judges. Although the parties continue to be primarily
responsible for preparing their cases, the Tribunals now carefully
monitor that preparation during the pre-trial phase. The parties must
provide their opponents and the Trial Chamber substantial documentation, which reduces surprise and educates the Trial Chamber about
the case prior to trial, thus allowing the Trial Chamber to direct subsequent proceedings. In particular, this documentation allows the
Trial Chamber to restrict the number of witnesses that the parties may
call and to reduce the amount of time that the parties may use for examining their witnesses. Although the parties retain primary responsibility for calling, examining, and cross-examining the witnesses that
do appear, the Trial Chambers have begun playing a greater role in
that arena as well. Thus, although adversarial elements clearly remain
in Tribunal proceedings, the proceedings now bear a much closer resemblance to the official inquiries of Continental jurisdictions, which
are predominantly directed from above, by the court, rather than
propelled from below, by the parties.
The highly adversarial procedures utilized in the United States reflect not only the considerable value placed on party autonomy, but
also the conception of adjudication as primarily a method of dispute
resolution. As discussed in Part II, plea bargaining, by which the parties negotiate a mutually beneficial outcome, both reflects and reinforces this conception of adjudication in the United States. It is not a
conception of adjudication, however, that seems appropriate to inter-
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national tribunals prosecuting the gravest of crimes. 4°7 The Tribunals'
primary and most obvious purpose, of course, is to pass judgment on
individuals accused of committing crimes within the Tribunals' jurisdiction, a purpose that can be viewed more or less in terms of dispute
resolution, as comparison of the American and Continental criminal
justice systems shows. However, unlike any domestic criminal justice
system, the Tribunals also were established to "contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace,"0 and to "contribute to the settlement of wider issues of accountability, reconciliation and establishing
the truth behind the evils perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia" 400 and
Rwanda.410 One way that the Tribunals try to do this is by creating a
historical record,4t which is designed to thwart later attempts at revisionism" 2 and to help promote reconciliation and healing.4 3 Under
407 Damaka

acknowledges that even in Anglo-American jurisdictions, "criminal
law enforcement cannot entirely be fitted into the conflict-solving mode of proceeding," but he notes that "more contest forms can be identified in Anglo-American
criminal prosecutions than in any other contemporary system of criminal justice."
DAMA KA, FACES OFJUSTICE, su~ra note 53, at 222.
408 S.C. Res, 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/808 (1993).
400
Erdemovid, Second SentencingJudgement, supra note 343, at para. 21.
410 See May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 252 (noting that the ICTY "was established
to contribute to peace in the region by dispensing justice and deterring future
breaches of humanitarian law" and that one way it does so is by providing "a reliable
historical record"). As Rodrigues and Tournaye state:
Many victims or their relatives, years later, are still carrying out investigations
with a view to discovering how and where their friends, neighbours or relatives
disappeared. Their relentless quest for truth must be addressed as a prerequisite to peace, and the Tribunal, notably through its procedure, has to take this
into account.
Rodrigues & Tournaye, supra note 311, at 296-97.
U See Alvarez, supra note 272, at 2044-46 (discussing how
the Tribunals help to
preserve the collective memory). Alvarez, however, goes on to detail why the demands
of criminal prosecution preclude the rendering of a nuanced history. Id. at 2055-56.
412 As Madeleine Albright, then-United States Ambassador to the United
Nations,
noted, one of the Tribunals' primary functions is to "establish the historical record before the guilty can reinvent the truth." Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in InternationalCriminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 430 (2001).
After the conclusion of the ICTY's first trial,Judge McDonald observed:
[W]e have begun the task of creating a historical record. In the Judgement
that followed the conclusion of our first full trial ....we established as ajudicial fact what happened in a corner of north-eastern Bosnia in 1992, findings
that no amount of revisionism or amnesia will erase.
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Remarks to the Georgetown and George Washington International Law Societies, 2d Annual International Law Weekend Conference (Feb. 7,
1998), quoted in May & Wierda, supra note 322, at 253. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials have served the same function. See Bernard D. Meltzer, War Crimes: The Nuremberg
7fial and the Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 895, 902 (1996) ("The
evidence of the Holocaust was so strong in 1945 that I doubt that anyone then foresaw
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these circumstances, the dispute resolution that results from Tribunal
trials seems much less important than other values that the adjudication serves. 41 4 The very notion, then, that a Tribunal prosecutor and
defendant would negotiate for the defendant to plead guilty to a
crime that does not accurately reflect his criminal behavior, as not infrequently occurs in the United States, would seem perverse at best.
Theoretical and practical considerations aside, certain structural
aspects of the Tribunals and their procedures may also impede plea
bargaining. For one thing, the typical Tribunal defendant has committed large-scale atrocities motivated by intense nationalism or ethnic or religious hatred. Such a defendant is more apt to consider a
guilty plea abhorrent, viewing it as capitulation before an illegitimate
411
international body than the typical domestic defendant who commits his crimes for more mundane reasons. The nascent state of the
international criminal law applied in the Tribunals acts as another
impediment to the conclusion of plea bargains. Most defendants in
domestic jurisdictions are charged with crimes that have been prosecuted hundreds, if not thousands, of times before. The elements of
those crimes are well-established, and the quantum of proof necessary
to prove those elements is equally well-established. Thus, a defendant
considering a guilty plea before a domestic court is well-informed as
to the likelihood that he will be convicted if he instead proceeds to
trial. By contrast, at the time the Tribunals were established, the

the so-called Auschwitz lie-the recent denials that the Holocaust actually happened.
The trial record surely serves as a corrective of such fantastic revisionism."); Richard A.
Minear, The Individual, the State, and the Tokyo Trial, in THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS
159, 160 (Chihiro Hosoya et al. eds., 1986) ("The Tokyo trial was-or purported to be-a
legal proceeding; but its purpose was as much historical as legal: to establish once and
for all the record ofJapanese misdeeds in the Pacific.").
413 Akhavan, supra note 269, at 766 (positing that individualization of
guilt shifts
victims' anger away from the entire ethnic group, thus promoting reconciliation).
414 Of course, it is conceivable that plea bargaining can
also advance these other
values. As I will discuss below, Tribunal judges have recently begun to claim that guilty
pleas advance the Tribunals' truth-telling function by conclusively establishing the
truth in relation to a crime. See infra text accompanying notes 685-95. However, as I
will discuss, the granting of sentencing concessions and the bargaining process itself
have the capacity to subvert the Tribunals' truth-telling function as much as to advance
it.

See Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-99-37, Decision on Preliminary Motions, para. 5 (Nov. 8, 2001) (noting the defendant's argument that the Tribunal is an
"illegal entity"), at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/triale/decision-e/1 1108738168
29.htm; Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion on
Jurisdiction for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 2 (Oct. 2, 1995) (on file
with author) (describing the defendant's challenges to the Tribunal, including that it
is an illegitimate body).
415
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crimes within their jurisdiction and their defenses were relatively
vague concepts whose elements were anything but clear.41' The contours of the crimes are quickly being refined with each Tribunal trial,
but uncertainties remain, and these uncertainties may make a trial
appear a more promising prospect than it otherwise would be.
Finally, the Tribunal judges' wide discretion in sentencing inhibits
plea bargaining by making a guilty plea a potentially perilous exercise
for defendants. George Fisher's examination of nineteenth-century
Massachusetts criminal proceedings persuasively shows that plea bargaining emerges where defendants can be assured of sentencing concessions in exchange for their guilty pleas.417 In Massachusetts, plea
bargaining arose initially in cases in which the prosecutor, by dropping charges, had the unilateral power to restrict the sentence that
the judge could impose. 4'8 Later, in Massachusetts and elsewhere,
judges also saw the advantages of encouraging guilty pleas, so prosecutors became free to engage in explicit sentence bargaining with the
assurance that the judges would sentence accordingly.41 9 In comparison, at least until very recently, Tribunal prosecutors could offer Tribunal defendants only weak assurances. Tribunal prosecutors may
drop charges, but doing so by no means guarantees that the defendant will receive any particular sentence on the remaining charge(s),
let alone a sentence that the defendant considers acceptable. The
Prosecutor can, in addition, promise to recommend a certain sentence. Such a promise is of some value, since up until now, a Trial
Chamber has never imposed a sentence longer than that which was
sought by the prosecution. Still, the Trial Chambers are by no means
restricted from doing so, and the Appeals Chamber's inclination to
revise sentences creates an additional worry for a defendant who is
counting on a reduced sentence as compensation for relinquishing
his chance for acquittal at trial.

417

Supra text accompanying notes 388-89.
See generally Fisher, supra note 24.

418

Id. at 868-93.

416

Id. at 864.
See Todorovid, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 336, at para.
79 ("Although
the Plea Agreement does indicate a range within which the parties have agreed Todorovi6's sentence should fall, the Trial Chamber reiterates that it is in no way bound
by this agreement. It is the Chamber's responsibility to determine an appropriate sentence."); Erdemovi6, Second Sentencing judgement, supra note 343, at para. 19 ("The
parties themselves acknowledge that the plea agreement has no binding effect on this
419
420

Chamber.").
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The foregoing analysis indicates that with respect to plea bargaining, the Tribunals have conflicting tendencies. While certain procedural features of the Tribunals and the purposes they are intended to
serve can be viewed as militating against plea bargaining, Tribunal trials are exceedingly lengthy, costly, and complex and thus constitute
ideal targets for alternative methods of disposition. The foregoing
analysis also suggests that plea bargaining's role in the Tribunals is
likely to change as the Tribunals and the field of international criminal law mature. Bargains should become easier to conclude as more
trials are held because the crimes which form the subject of the trials
will become better defined and the sentencing practices of the judges
will become at least somewhat more predictable. Both the prosecution and the defense will thus be better informed as to the value of the
rights they are relinquishing and the concessions they will receive in
return. Further, the longer the Tribunals are in existence and the
more trials they hold, the less publicity each case will receive. Because
plea bargains are generally considered unseemly, they are more apt to
be concluded when they do not fall squarely in the public glare. In
sum, as the Tribunals conduct more trials, they will begin more closely
to resemble domestic courts; that is, they will become bodies that
prosecute relatively well-established crimes, sentence along relatively
predictable patterns, and conduct their business largely outside the
public view. For all of these reasons, plea bargaining is more likely to
occur. The practical need to avoid the lengthy, costly Tribunal trials is
likely to overshadow any ideological and symbolic factors militating
against plea bargaining. The next section describes the Tribunals'
guilty plea cases, and it along with the following section show that plea
bargaining has evolved from a shadowy, questionable practice to an
unconcealed, encouraged feature of the Tribunals' administration of
criminal justice.
B. The Tribunals' Guilty Plea Cases
Of the thirty-eight Tribunal defendants who have been convicted,
nine pled guilty. The circumstances surrounding their guilty pleas
varied widely as did the resulting sentences. Subsection 1 describes
the ICTY cases while subsection 2 describes the ICTR cases.
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1. The ICTY's Guilty Plea Cases
a. Background421
From 1945 until 1990, Yugoslavia was composed of six republics:
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. Most of the republics were predominantly populated by one
ethnic group with Bosnia-Herzegovina a multi-ethnic exception, having substantial Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian populations. For many
years, these and other ethnic groups lived together peacefully, but the
economic woes and the end of communist rule in the late 1980s set
the stage for rising nationalism and ethnic friction. In 1991, the republics began declaring independence from the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. While some secessions were followed by only short-lived
armed conflict, the fighting between the Serbs,
-- 422 Croats, and Muslims in
Bosnia-Herzegovina was fierce and lengthy.
The Bosnian conflict
resulted in approximately 200,000 deaths,422 approximately 20,000
rapes, 424 the forced relocation of more than two million people, 425 and
426
the "reappearance of concentration camps on European soil.
Fighting continued until 1995 when the Presidents of BosniaHerzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Croatia entered
427
into the Dayton Peace Accords.
421

The facts surrounding the war resulting from the dissolution of the former

Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide are too complicated to relate in detail. Consequently, this subsection and the corresponding subsection addressing Rwanda, see infra
Part IV.B.2, will provide only summary background treatment.
422 See Krstic, Judgement, supra note 250, at
paras. 7-10 (explaining the history of
the re *on, the ethnic composition of the region, and the ensuing conflict).
42 Rosemary E. Libera, Divide, Conquer, and Pay: Civil Compensation for Wartime
Damages, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 291, 293 (2001).
SCHARF, supra note 251, at 52; Makau Matua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors:
The
Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 223 (2001).
1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO
THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, at xiii (1995);
Lynn Hastings, Implementation of the Property Legislation in Bosnia-Herzegovina,37 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 221, 221 (2001).
426 Developments in the Law, supra note 388, at 1953;
see also SCHARF, supra note 251,
at 31-32 (describing reports of ethnic cleansing received by the United States, Britain,
and France in 1991).
427 The Accords affirm the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina
as comprising
two entities: the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian Republika Srpska.
In addition, they provide for democratic elections, international monitoring, and human rights guarantees. Christine Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality: Democracy and Citizenship of Women in the Dayton Peace Accords, 26 YALEJ. INT'L L. 103, 105-07
(2001). For more detailed treatments of the Dayton Peace Accords, see Paola Gaeta,
The Dayton Agreements and InternationalLaw, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 147, 147-50 (1996); John
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b. Erdemovi6
In July 1995, Serbian forces launched an offensive against the
primarily Muslim city of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia. 428 Thousands of
Bosnian Muslim civilians fled, some to a nearby United Nations compound and some to the woods. 29 Serbian forces separated the Bosnian Muslim men from the women and children, transported the men
to various sites, and executed approximately seven thousand of
them.43 ° One of these sites was the Branjevo Farm in Pilica, and one of
the soldiers assigned to the executions was Dra.en Erdemovi6, a
Croat, who had reluctantly joined the Bosnian Serb army. 43 Erdemovid and the other soldiers shot and killed approximately 1200 unarmed Muslim men during a five-hour period, with Erdemovi6 killing
approximately seventy of them. 432 Erdemovi6 stated that he initially refused to carry out the executions but was threatened with instant death.
He was told: "If you don't wish to do it, stand in line with
the rest of
"4 3
them and give others your rifle so that they can shoot you.
The ICTY had never heard of Dralen Erdemovi6 or the Branjevo
Farm until Erdemovid brought himself and the massacre to the Tribunal's attention. While in Belgrade, Erdemovi6 made several at-

R.W.D. Jones, The Implications of the PeaceAgreements for the InternationalCriminalTribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 226, 226-44 (1996).
428 See Krstic, Judgement, supra note 250, at paras. 11, 31 (describing the religious
composition of Srebrenica and the initial stages of the offensive).
29 Id. at para.
37.
430
Erdemovid, First Sentencing Judgement, supra note 330, at para. 76; Krstic,
Judgement, supra note 250, at para. 1. For comprehensive discussions of the Srebrenica massacre, see JAN WILLEM HONIG & NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA: RECoRD OF A
WAR CRIME (1996); DAVID ROHDE, ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA,
EUROPE'S WORST MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR II (1997).

431 Erdemovi6 maintained that he had tried to avoid the war altogether.
He ignored summonses to join the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was mobilized into the
Croatian Defence Council (HVO) but left that organization after he was arrested and
beaten by HVO soldiers for having helped a Serbian woman and her children return
to their territory. He also unsuccessfully sought to obtain identity papers that would
have enabled him to go to Switzerland with his wife. Erdemovi6, First Sentencing
Judgement, supra note 330, at para. 79; see also Akhavan, supra note 269, at 791-92 (describing Erdemovid's efforts to avoid military service).
432 Erdemovi6, Second Sentencing judgement,
supra note 343, at para. 15. Erdemovid himself did not know how many he killed, but estimated that it was between seventy and one hundred. During his testimony in the Rule 61 hearing against Karadi6
and Mladi6, Erdemovid stated: "I cannot estimate but, to be quite frank, I would rather
not know how many people I killed." Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T,
Prosecutor's Brief on Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, at n.8 (Nov. 11, 1996) [hereinafter Erdemovi6, Brief on Aggravating and Mitigating Factors] (on file with author).
433 Erdemovi6, First SentencingJudgement, supra note 330,
at para. 80.
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tempts to contact the Tribunal, mostly through journalists to whom he
told his story, and these attempts led to his arrest by Yugoslav authorities.434 He was subsequently transferred to the Tribunal... and was
charged with one count of a crime against humanity, and in the alter46
native, one count of a violation of the laws or customs of war. 1 Im-

mediately upon his arrival at the Tribunal, Erdemovid provided the
prosecution with a great deal of information about the Srebrenica
massacres,437 and on his initial appearance before the Trial Chamber,
he pled guilty to the count of a crime against humanity.438 He also testified on behalf of the prosecution in the Rule 61 proceedings in the
Karad~ik case. 439 The prosecution described Erdemovi6's cooperation
as "substantial, full and comprehensive" and in particular noted that
Erdemovi6 had provided the prosecution with facts of which they had
previously been unaware, enabling them to initiate on-site investiga40
Erdemovi6 also retions that confirmed ErdemoviCs statements.
peatedly
expressed remorse about what had happened at SreS 441
brenica.
The Trial Chamber accepted Erdemovi 's guilty plea, dismissed
the alternative war crimes count,442 and subsequently sentenced him to
ten years' imprisonment.443 The Trial Chamber did not accept Erdemovi6's claim to have acted under duress because he did not produce
Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Transcript, 31-34, 37-38 (Jan. 14,
1998) [hereinafter Erdemovid, Transcript], at http://www.un.org/icty/transe22/9801
14it.html.
435 Erdemovid, First Sentencing Judgement, supra note 330, at para.
2; Erdemovid,
434

Transcript, supranote 434, at 25-26.
436 Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgement, para. 3 (Oct. 7, 1997).
437 Erdemovi6, Transcript, supra note
434, at 35-38.
438 Erdemovi6, First SentencingJudgement, supra note 330, at paras. 3, 10.
439 Id. at para. 6. Rule 61 provides for something of a mini-trial in cases
in which a
warrant for arrest has not been executed within a reasonable period of time. Rule 61
proceedings allow the prosecution to introduce in open court (and thus preserve) witness testimony, documentation, physical evidence, and the like. If a majority of the
Trial Chamber concludes that "there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed all or any of the crimes charged in the indictment, it shall so determine." ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 61(c). If a majority of the Trial Chamber
additionally determines that the failure to execute the arrest warrant resulted from a
refusal to cooperate by the state concerned, then it can transmit a certification of its
conclusions to the U.N. Security Council as a basis for possible sanctions. Id. at R.
61 (d).
440 Erdemovid, Second SentencingJudgement, supra
note 343, at para. 16(iv); Erdemovi6, First SentencingJudgement, supranote 330, at para. 99.
441 Erdemovid, Transcript, supra note 434, at 48.
442 Erdemovi6, First SentencingJudgement, supra note 330, at para. 3.
443 Id.at text accompanying n.141.
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any evidence corroborating that claim.44 ' The Chamber did, however,
consider the extreme remorse that Erdemovid repeatedly expressed
and his substantial cooperation with the prosecution to be mitigating
factors and discussed these at length, noting in particular that the
prosecution had made Erdemovi6 no promises in exchange for his testimony.4
As for Erdemovi6's guilty plea, the Trial Chamber men446
tioned it as a mitigating factor at the very end of the opinion, but the
very cursory reference and its placement indicate that the Trial Chamber did not place substantial weight on it in mitigation.
Erdemovid appealed, and the Appeals Chamber sent the case back
447
to the Trial Chamber.
In doing so, the Appeals Chamber made certain pronouncements about the advantages of guilty pleas and plea
bargaining. Judges McDonald and Vohrah noted that common-law
countries recognize the benefits that guilty pleas provide "to the public
in minimising costs, in the saving of court time and in avoiding the in-

Id. at para. 91.
Id. at para. 99; see also Erdemovid, Brief on Aggravating and Mitigating
Factors,
supra note 432, § E (Nov. 11, 1996) (telling the court that "[n]o promises were made
by the OTP to Mr. Erdemovid to induce his co-operation"). The Chamber also considered other mitigating factors: Erdemovid's youth; his subordinate level in the military
hierarchy; the fact that he did not constitute a danger; the corrigible character of his personality; and the fact that he would serve his sentence in a prison far from his own country. Erdemovid, First SentencingJudgement, supra note 330, at para. 111.
446 Erdemovid, First SentencingJudgement, supra note
330, at para. 111.
447The Appeals Chamber held that before a Trial Chamber can accept a
guilty plea,
it must satisfy itself that the plea is voluntary, informed, and not equivocal. Erdemovi6,
Joint Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 292, at para. 8. In a subsequent case, defendant Dragoljub Kunarac pled guilty to rape as a crime against humanity, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, Transcript, 5-6 (Mar. 9, 1998),
but then-President Cassese declined to accept the plea, finding that it was not informed.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, Transcript, 44-45 (Mar. 13,
1998).
The Erdemovid Appeals Chamber further held that, all things being equal, an offense charged as a crime against humanity is more serious and should entail a harsher
penalty than the same offense charged as a war crime. Erdemovi6, Joint Opinion of
Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 292, at para. 20. Because Erdemovid was
charged with alternative counts of a crime against humanity and a war crime and pled
guilty to the crime against humanity-the more serious crime-the Appeals Chamber
concluded that his plea was not informed. See id. at para. 26 ("Had he been properly apprised of the less serious charge and his entitlement to plead to it, we have grave doubts
that he would have continued to plead guilty to the more serious charge."); Prosecutor v.
Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen,
para. 5 (Oct. 7, 1997) (finding that while the guilty plea was voluntary, it was not sufficiently informed or unambiguous to be acceptable).
444

445
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convenience to many, particularly to witnesses." 44"
opine that the institution of the guilty plea should
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They went on to

find a ready place in an international criminal forum such as the International Tribunal confronted by cases which, by their inherent nature,
are very complex and necessarily require lengthy hearings if they go to
trial under stringent financial constraints arising from allocations made
by the United Nations itself dependent upon the contributions of
States.449

Striking a similar note, Judge Cassese's separate and dissenting
opinion also noted the financial and logistical difficulties of conducting
criminal trials in international tribunals and concluded that by pleading
guilty the defendant "undoubtedly contributes to public advantage."4 " °
Judge Cassese went on to describe the benefits that a guilty plea secures for a defendant himself, and in particular noted that "the accused may expect that the court will recognise his cooperative attitude
by reducing the sentence it would have imposed had there not been a
plea of guilty: in other words, the accused may hope that the court
will be more lenient in recognition of his admission of guilt."45 ' Judge
Cassese thus endorsed implicit plea bargaining, but he ended his endorsement there. He went on to say that:

448

Erdemovid, Joint Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 292, at

para. 2.
449 Id.

Erdemovid, Cassese Dissent, supra note 143, at para. 8. The following is Judge
Cassese's full treatment of the difficulties attendant upon international criminal trials:
It is apparent from the whole spirit of the Statute and the Rules that, by providing for a guilty plea, the draftsmen intended to enable the accused (as well
as the Prosecutor) to avoid a possible lengthy trial with all the attendant difficulties. These difficulties-it bears stressing-are all the more notable in international proceedings. Here, it often proves extremely arduous and timeconsuming to collect evidence. In addition, it is imperative for the relevant
officials of an international court to fulfil the essential but laborious task of
protecting victims and witnesses. Furthermore, international criminal proceedings are expensive, on account of the need to provide a host of facilities
to the various parties concerned (simultaneous interpretation into various
languages; provision of transcripts for the proceedings, again in various languages; transportation of victims and witnesses from far-away countries; provision of various forms of assistance to them during trial, etc.).
450

Id.

Id. Judge Cassese also noted that by pleading guilty a defendant might "salve
his conscience and atone for his wrongdoing." Id. He also will "avoid the indignity
and the possible demoralisation of undergoing a trial," as well as the attendant psychological ordeal, and he will "eschew the public exposure that may ensue from trial, and
the adverse consequences for his social position and the life of his family and relatives." Id.
451
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[B]oth the Statute and the Rules deliberately do not make provision for
plea bargaining-or, at least, for any endorsement or acknowledgement
by the Chambers of out-of-court plea bargaining. This means, among
other things, that the framers of the Statute and the Rules aimed at
averting those distortions of the free will of the accused which may be
452
linked to plea bargaining.

the Trial Chamber, Erdemovi6 pled
before
At his next appearance
•
1
453
guilty to the war-crimes charge, and at the second sentencing hearing,
the prosecution and defense presented the Trial Chamber with an
American-style "Plea Bargain Agreement." 454 The agreement recorded
that the parties had agreed, among other things, on the "factual basis of
the allegations" and, in particular, that Erdemovi6 had acted under duress.455 The parties further agreed that "seven years' imprisonment
would be an appropriate sentence in this case, considering the mitigating circumstances, "456 and the prosecution "agreed not to proceed with
the alternative count of a crime against humanity., 45 7 At the presentencing hearing, the prosecution emphasized the enormous value of
Erdemovi 's cooperation4 and the fact that it was offered "freely and
4 :'
without expectation of leniency,4 0 and "at some personal
voluntarily,"

452

Id. at para. 10.

453 Erdemovi6, Second SentencingJudgement, supra note 343, at
para. 8.

Id. at para. 18.
Id. at para. 18(c).
456 Id. at para.
18(d).
457 Id. at para.
18(e).
458 Erdemovi6, Transcript, supra note 434, at 28. The prosecution noted the
particular value of the information that Erdemovid provided, stating, for instance, that information regarding the massacre at the Branjevo Farm in Pilica
was not available to the Office of the Prosecutor in any great detail prior to
the assistance that was given by Mr. Erdemovi[6]. The location of the site
was... of significant importance to the Office of the Prosecutor and permitted an exhumation to be carried out at the site where the victims were uncovered.
Id. The prosecution also noted that the ICTY had a greater need for such information
than a domestic jurisdiction because
in national jurisdictions the prosecutor officials [sic] have access to police
forces who are mobile on the ground and can obtain evidence and information much more readily and easily than occurs with the Office of the Prosecutor here in the Tribunal, which to a large extent is dependent upon the cooperation of states and other international and non-international bodies, before that information can be collected and gathered.
Id.
459 Id. at 29.
4W See id. at 38, 46 (asserting that Erdemovid repeatedly did
not attempt to trade
information for a reduced sentence or charge).
454
455
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risk" to Erdemovi6 himself.4 .. In addition, the prosecution emphasized that Erdemovid was fully aware that his coming forward would
likely result in his prosecution for international crimes.462
While noting that it was in no way bound by the recommendations
in the plea agreement, the second Trial Chamber stated that it took
them "into careful consideration" in determining Erdemovid's sen463
tence.
In addition, the second Trial Chamber showed greater appreciation for the utility of guilty pleas and a greater willingness to reward
them, perhaps in consequence of the Appeals Chamber's discussion of
the question. Thus, instead of treating Erdemovid's guilty plea as something of an afterthought, perhaps as a factor that should not be discussed too openly, the second Trial Chamber announced that "[a]n
admission of guilt demonstrates honesty and it is important for the International Tribunal to encourage people to come forth, whether already indicted or as unknown perpetrators."464 The Trial Chamber further noted that Erdemovid's "voluntary admission of guilt which has
saved the International Tribunal the time and effort of a lengthy investigation and trial is to be commended. 465
In March 1998, nearly eighteen months after the first Trial Chamber pronounced its ten-year sentence upon Erdemovi6, the second
Trial Chamber sentenced him to five years' imprisonment.46 6 Some of
the difference between the two sentences presumably reflected the belief-which has subsequently been invalidated-that a war crime should
ordinarily result in a lighter penalty than a crime against humanity. But
one suspects the second Trial Chamber's greater appreciation for ErdemoviC's guilty plea also played a role. The Trial Chamber noted the
benefits that a guilty plea affords to the Tribunal and the desirable
qualities that it reflects in the defendant who makes it.467 And because
Erdemovid was that rare defendant whose guilty plea did seem motivated by true remorse and a desire to state the truth, the Trial Chamber's words rang true, which would not always be the case in subsequent
cases.

461
462
463
464

45

467

Id. at 29.
Id. at 45-46.
Erdemovid, Second SentencingJudgement, supra note 343, at
para. 19.
Id. at para. 16(H).

Id.
Id. at para. 23.
Id. at para. 16.
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c. Jelisi6
The next ICTY defendant to plead guilty, Goran jelisi6, was not
nearly so sympathetic a character as his predecessor. Jelisi6 was the de
facto commander of the Luka detention camp, the camp to which Muslim men were transported and imprisoned following the Serbs' May
1992 attack on Br~ko, in northeastern Bosnia. 46s Jelisi6 presented himself to his Muslim detainees and later to the Tribunal as the "Serbian
Adolf' and allegedly told the detainees that 70% of them were to be
killed and the remaining 30% beaten. 9 Jelisi6 reportedly declared that
he had to execute twenty to thirty people in a morning before being
able to drink his coffee and allegedly kept detainees informed of the
running count of Muslims that he had killed.47 ° On May 11, 1992, he
471
claimed to have killed 150 people.
In an amended indictment, Jelisi6 was charged with one count of
genocide and thirty-nine counts of crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war.47 Jelisi6 pled not guilty to the count
of genocide, but, after indicating his willingness to plead guilty to thirtyone of the war-crimes and crimes-against-humanity counts, 473 the parties
prepared an "Agreed Factual Basis for the Guilty Pleas to be Entered by
Goran Jelisi6," and the prosecution dropped the remaining war-crimes
and crimes-against-humanity counts.474 In the Agreed Factual Basis,
Jelisi6 admitted to killing thirteen people,476 inflicting bodily harm on
four people,476 and stealing money from the Luka camp detainees. 77
More specifically, Jelisi6 admitted to severely beating some of his victims
Jelisi6,Judgement, supra note 312, at paras. 18, 21.
at para. 102. He went on to state that of the 30% who would be beaten, only
4% "might not be badly beaten." Id.
470 Id. at para.
103.
468

469Id.

471

Id.

472 Prosecutor

v. Jelisid, Case No. IT-95-10-PT, Amended Indictment, paras. 16-41
(Mar. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Jelisid, Amended Indictment), reprinted in Int'l Tribunalfor
HumanitarianLaw Committhe Prosecution of PersonsResponsiblefor Serious Violations of Int 'l
ted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Y.B. 1998, at 168, U.N. Sales No.

E.00.III.P.1 [hereinafter Int'l Tribunal, 1998 Y.B.).
473 Jelisi6,Judgement, supranote 312, at paras. 8, 11,
24.
474 Id. at para. 10. CompareJelisid,Amended Indictment, supra
note 472, at paras.
16-41, with Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Second Amended Indictment,
paras. 15-63 (Oct. 19, 1998) [hereinafter Jelisi6, Second Amended Indictment], reprinted in Int'l Tribunal, 1998 Y.B., supra note 472, at 178.
475 Jelisi6,Judgement, supra note 312, at paras. 3, 38.
476 Id. at paras. 3, 42-44.
477Id. at paras. 3, 49.
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with truncheons and clubs before killing them. 478 The Trial Chamber
noted the "repugnant, bestial and sadistic nature" ofJelisi6's crimes.74 9
The Trial Chamber held a trial on the genocide count and acquitted Jelisi6 after hearing only the prosecution's submissions. 48 ° At the
pre-sentencing hearing on the counts to which Jelisi6 had pled guilty,
the prosecution sought a sentence of life imprisonment. 48' The prosecution maintained that Jelisi6's cooperation had "not been substantial
and ongoing," and it contended that his guilty plea should not be considered a substantial mitigating factor. 48' The prosecution maintained
that, unlike some guilty pleas, Jelisi 's did not evidence remorse or
spare the victims the burden of testifying, since he went to trial on the
genocide count.4"" Further, the prosecution noted thatJelisi6 was aware
of incriminating evidence in the prosecution's possession, and that he
had admitted little more than what was shown in the evidence.484
The Trial Chamber did not impose a life sentence but came close,
sentencing Jelisi6 to forty years' imprisonment for the crimes to which
he had pled guilty. 8 5 Unlike the second Erdemovk Trial Chamber,
which spoke so glowingly about Erdemovi 's guilty plea, the Jelisi Trial
Chamber gaveJelisi6 little, if any, credit for his plea. Although the Trial
Chamber "considered [Jelisi6's] guilty plea out of principle," it went on

478

Id. at para. 38.

479 Id. at para.
130.
480 Id. at para. 15. The Appeals Chamber subsequently reversed
the Trial Cham-

ber's conclusion that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a conviction on genocide.Jelisid, Appeal, supra note 312, at para. 57. However, it did not send the case back
to the Trial Chamber for a new trial. Id. at paras. 73-77.
481 Jelisid,Judgement, supra note 312, at para.
119; Prosecution v.Jelisid, Case No.
IT-95-10-T, Transcript, 3070, 3132 (Nov. 25, 1999) [hereinafterJelisid, Transcript], at
http://www.un.org/icty/transel0/991125it.htm.
Jelisid, Transcript, supra note 481, at 3077-79. In particular,
the prosecution
maintained that:
[Jelisi6's] cooperation was not significant and did not contribute in a meaningful way. It did not contribute to the effective arrest of other defendants or
to the effective pursuit of other suspects or targets, and it did not lead to significant investigations. The defendant did not surrender himself voluntarily.
The information provided was not considered by the Prosecution as useful,
taking into consideration the fact that it was mainly public information or information of common knowledge, except with respect to his own acts. The
Prosecution considers part of the information to be unreliable or incorrect
because of inconsistencies and because of the sanitised version of events
given.
Id. at 3078.
483 Id. at 3079-80.
484 Id. at 3080-81.
485 Jelisid,Judgement, supra note 312, at para. 139.
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to note that Jelisi6 was fully aware of photographs that showed him
committing some of the crimes and "demonstrated no remorse ... for
the crimes he committed., 486 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber accorded
"only relative weight to his plea.,187 The Trial Chamber further noted
that Jelisi's crimes were committed under particularly aggravating circumstances" 488 that far outweighed the mitigating circumstances.8 The
Trial Chamber noted in particular JelisiC's "cold-blooded" and "enthusiastic" commission of the crimes, which, according to the Trial Chamber, attested
"to a profound contempt for mankind and the right to
490
life."
Although Jelisi6 pled guilty, the case did not involve a plea bargain
because Jelisi6 got nothing in return for his plea. According to one of
JelisiCs lawyers, Jelisi6 pled guilty, over the objections of his lawyers, on
the mistaken belief that his guilty plea would be considered substantial
cooperation with the prosecution.49' In fact, prosecution lawyers told
Jelisi6 that they would offer him nothing for his plea 492 and true to their
word, they sought the harshest available sentence. The prosecution did
withdraw eight of the thirty-nine counts of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, but it did so as a result of evidentiary deficiencies, not
to grantJelisi6 a concession. As for the Trial Chamber, by imposing a
forty-year sentence on the thirty-one-year-oldJelisi , 4494 it issued the practical equivalent of a life sentence, showing that no implicit plea bargaining took place.

486 Id.
487

at para. 127.

Id.

488 Id.
489

at para. 129.
See id. at para. 134 (explaining why the Trial Chamber imposed such a high

standard).
490 Id. at paras. 130-31.
41 Telephone Interview with Nicola Kosti6, Defense Counsel
(Oct. 25, 2001).
492 Telephone Interview with Terree Bowers, former ICTY Senior Trial Attorney
(Oct. 30, 2001).
493 Id. Indeed, the withdrawal, whatever the reason for it, was
not likely to (and did
not) result in a substantial sentence reduction given the counts that remained. Of the
eight dropped charges, four related to the killing of two people, two related to the general conditions at the Luka camp, and two related to the torture of a victim thatJelisi6
admitted to killing. While these charges are obviously serious, they do not add substantially in quality or quantity to the egregious criminal conduct
to which Jelisi6 pled guilty.
494 Jelisi6,Judgement, supra note 312, at para. 124.
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d. Todorovi6
Stevan Todorovi6, the third ICTY defendant to plead guilty, was indicted along with four other defendants for atrocities committed as part
of the Serbs' ethnic cleansing of Bosanski Samac and Od~ak in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina. 4115 Following the Serb take-over of Bosanski
Samac in April 1992, Todorovi6, a wicker-furniture factory executive,
was appointed Chief of Police of Bosanski Samac.406 Todorovi6 participated in the take-over of the municipality and in the deportation and
detention of the non-Serb population .
While acting as police chief,
Todorovi6 engaged in murder, sexual assaults, and beatings.49 As a result of these offenses, Todorovi6 was charged with twenty-seven counts
of crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
and violations of the laws and customs of war. 499)
Todorovi6 pled not guilty to these counts5°° and prepared, along
with his co-defendants, for trial. Unlike his co-defendants, however,
Todorovic held a bargaining chip-the ability to embarrass NATOthat would assist him in obtaining sentencing concessions. Todorovi6
had been captured by four bounty hunters while in his home in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."' He was allegedly dealt a heavy blow
"
to the head02
while being transported to Bosnia-Herzegovina and into
the hands of the NATO forces deployed there (SFOR) .
Upon his
According to the indictment, Croats and Muslims accounted for 17,000 of
the
total population of 33,000 of Bosanski Samac prior to the Serb take-over of the municipality in April 1992. By May, 1995, fewer than 300 of the 17,000 Croat and Muslim
residents remained. Prosecutor v. Simid, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Second Amended Indictment, para. 8 (Mar. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Simid, Second Amended Indictment], at
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/sim-r2ai990325e.pdf.
496 Id. at para.
17.
497 Todorovid, SentencingJudgement, supra note
336, at paras. 35, 42, 45.
498 Id. at paras.
36-41.
499 Simi6, Second Amended Indictment, supra note
495, at paras. 29-30, 34, 38, 4047.
500 Todorovid, SentencingJudgement, supra
note 336, at paras. 2, 4.
501 See Major Christopher M. Supernor, International
Bounty Hunters for War Criminals: Privatizing the Enforcement ofJustice, 50 A.F. L. REV. 215, 217 n. 11 (2001); Marlise
Simmons, War Crimes Court Takes It Easy on a CooperativeBosnian Serb, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
1, 2001, at A4 (reporting that the method of Todorovid's arrest set his case apart from
others and was a difficult issue for the court to handle). A regional court in Serbia
subsequently convicted nine people of "kidnapping for money." 9 Convicted of Kidnap
of War-Crimes Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at Al5; see also Prosecutor v. Todorovid,
Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript, 786 (Dec. 13, 2000) (detailing the defense counsel's
discussion of Todorovid's capture and his capturers' subsequent prosecution), at
http://www.un.org/icty/transe9/001213.htm.
502 See Susan Lamb, Illegal Arrest and theJurisdiction of the ICTIY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 27,
at 27, 35 n.33 (discussing Todorovid's injury); Laura Palmer & Cristina Posa, The Best495
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hands of the NATO forces deployed there (SFOR) .0 Upon his arrival
at the ICTY, Todorovi6 asked for an evidentiary hearing to address the
legality of his arrest. °4 Once the Trial Chamber granted his request for
an evidentiary hearing, Todorovi6 filed a motion for judicial assistance,
asking the Trial Chamber to order "NATO/SFOR or other military and
security forces operating in Bosnia to provide documents and witnesses
regarding Todorovi6's detention" and transfer to Bosnia.0
The Trial
Chamber granted Todorovi's motion, over SFOR's vehement objections, and ordered SFOR and the states participating in SFOR to provide Todorovid with, among other things, the names of the persons who
had transported him to Bosnia-Herzegovina and copies of correspondence, audio and video tapes, and pre- and post-operations reports relating to TodoroviCs arrest. 50 NATO, the United States, and several
other NATO states appealed, and the Appeals Chamber stayed the Trial
Chamber's decision pending appeal.5 7
While the case was pending before the Appeals Chamber,
Todorovid and the prosecution negotiated a plea agreement. Pursuant
to the plea agreement, Todorovi6 pled guilty to one count of persecution as a crime against humanity, s0s promised to testify against his codefendants and in other proceedings-one of which may be the
Miloievi case°O-and withdrew his motions challenging the legality of

Laid Plans: Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords in the Courtroom and on the Ground,

12 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 361, 382 n.116 (1999) (repeating the defense attorney's statements that Todorovid was hit in the head with a baseball bat during his capture).

Sean D. Murphy ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating To InternationalLaw, 95 AM.J. INT'L L. 387, 401 (2001).
504
Id.
503

Id. at 401; see also Prosecutor v. Simid, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Motion
for Judicial Assistance to Be Provided by SFOR and Others, para. 1 (Oct. 18. 2000)
[hereinafter Simid, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance], at http://
www.un.org/icty/simic/trialc3. For a detailed treatment of Todorovi6's motions regarding his arrest, see Lamb, supranote 502, at 34-36.
506 Simid, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance,
supra note 505, at disposition.
507 Prosecutor v. Simid, Case No. IT-95-9-A, Decision and Scheduling
Order (Nov.
8, 2000), at http://www.un.org/icty/simic/appeal/decision-e/01 108JA314063.htm; see
also Wald, supra note 288, at 549 n.64 (noting the "high-decibel protests by NATO
countries and SFOR" against the Trial Chamber's order of disclosure).
50s Todorovid, SentencingJudgement, supra note 336, at para. 4.
509 Id. at para. 84. Todorovid's plea agreement remains under seal, so the particu505

lars of his promises to cooperate are not available. However, a Tribunal prosecutor
told the New York Times that Todorovid, because of his position, had valuable information about the wartime political chain of command-in particular the role of the
paramilitary groups from Serbia and their connections with the Belgrade government.
According to the prosecutor, the trail "could well lead" to Milogevid. Simmons, supra
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his arrest."' The prosecution, for its part, withdrew the remaining
twenty-six countsr" and agreed to recommend to the Trial Chamber a
prison sentence of between five and twelve years. ' 2 Both parties agreed
not to 513appeal any sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber within that
range, and both parties agreed that if either side did not fulfil its end
of the bargain, the plea agreement would be dissolved and the case
would proceed to trial. t4 Todorovi6 thus represents the first ICTY case to
expressly feature plea bargaining.
Although on the surface, the withdrawal of twenty-six of the twentyseven counts would seem a substantial prosecutorial concession, in fact,
it had limited significance because the one count to which Todorovid
pled guilty encompassed the offenses contained in the other twenty-six
counts. Specifically, in the twenty-six counts that the prosecution
dropped, Todorovi6 was alleged to have participated in the deportation
and transfer of non-Serb civilians; " ' to have ordered the torture of a
Muslim civilian;... and to have killed, beaten, and sexually assaulted
other, specified non-Serb civilians. 7
The one count to which
Todorovi6 pled guilty-persecution as a crime against humanitycharged Todorovid with the same offenses; and in pleading guilty,
note 501. At Todorovid's sentencing hearing, the Senior Trial Attorney described Todorovid's cooperation with the prosecution as follows:
I can confirm that Mr. Todorovi6 has spoken with representatives of our offices on multiple occasions, and on each occasion he has participated in a
fully cooperative and forthright manner. Some of the information he has
provided might not have been accessible to the Prosecution but for his cooperation. Mr. Todorovid has agreed to continue his cooperation, and there are
plans to interview him on future occasions. In addition, he has agreed to testify at the trial in this case and in other cases in which his assistance might be
useful.
Prosecutor v. Todorovid, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript, 54-55 (May, 4, 2001) (on file
with author).
510 Todorovid, Sentencing Judgement, supra note
336, at para. 5.
511 Prosecutor v. Todorovi, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Decision on the Prosecution
Motion to Withdraw Counts of the Indictment and Defence Motion to Withdraw Pending
Motions, para. 5 (Feb. 26, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/todovoric/trialc/
decision-e/10226DC515095.htm; Todorovid, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 336, at
para. 5.
512 Todorovid, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 336, at para.
11.
513
Id.
514 Id. at para. 8; see also Prosecutor v. Todorovi, Case No.
IT-95-9/1, Transcript,
810-12 (Jan. 19, 2001) (reserving the right of the Prosecutor to reinstate the indictment should the accused fail to fulfil his obligations under the plea agreement), at
http://www.un.org/icty/transe9/010119iaed.htm.
515 Prosecutor v. Simid, Second Amended Indictment, supra note 495, at paras.
38,
4047.
516 Id. at para. 47,
517 Id.

at paras. 4346.
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ed Todorovi6 with the same offenses; and in pleading guilty, Todorovi6
admitted in a written "Factual Basis for the Crimes to which Stevan
Todorovi6 has pled guilty" to the same killing, beatings, sexual assaults,
torture, and deportations that were included in the twenty-six dropped
518
Thus, the withdrawal of the twenty-six counts should have
counts.
made little or no difference to Todorovid's sentence. The real sentencing concession bestowed on Todorovi6 was the prosecution's promise
not to seek a sentence exceeding twelve years' imprisonment. At
Todorovi's sentencing hearing, the prosecution opined that had
Todorovi6 been convicted at trial, he probably would have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment ranging from fifteen to twenty-five
519
years or more.
On this point, the Trial Chamber agreed. Although the Trial
Chamber repeatedly noted that it was not bound by the plea agreement, 2° it sentenced Todorovi6 to ten years' imprisonment52 '-thus
within the range specified by the parties-and stated that it would have
sentenced Todorovi6 to a much longer term of imprisonment but for
522
Inhis timely guilty plea and his cooperation with the prosecution.
deed, if Todorovi represents the first ICTY case in which prosecutorial
plea bargaining became evident, it also represents the Trial Chambers'
first explicit blessing of plea bargaining. Specifically, the Trial Chamber
expressly held "that a guilty plea should, in principle, give rise to a reduction in the sentence that the accused would otherwise have received. 52 In justifying this view, the Trial Chamber not only noted the

See Todorovid, SentencingJudgement, supra note 336, at paras. 7, 9.
Prosecutor v. Todorovid, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript, 55 (May 4, 2001) (on
file with author). That estimate seems reasonable: Tadi6 received a twenty-year sentence for somewhat similar conduct, and Tadi6 did not hold a superior position as did
Todorovi6. AndJelisid, even after pleading guilty, received a forty-year sentence. Jelisid
killed more people than Todorovi6, so he deserved a harsher sentence, but there are
many terms of imprisonment that are shorter than forty years and longer than twelve
years.
520
Todorovid, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 336, at paras. 16, 79, 86.
521 Id. at para 115.
522 Id. at para. 114. The prosecution sought the maximum
sentence that it could
had already
Todorovi6
that
argued
years-and
the
plea
agreement-twelve
under
seek
been compensated for his cooperation and guilty plea by the prosecution's promise not
to seek a sentence longer than twelve years' imprisonment, so that the Trial Chamber
should not impose a shorter sentence. Id. at para. 68. The Chamber rejected that argument, holding that "the fact that an accused has gained or may gain something pursuant to an agreement with the Prosecution does not preclude the Trial Chamber from
considering his substantial cooperation as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing." Id.
at para. 86.
518

519

523

Id. at para. 80.
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financial and logistical advantages of guilty pleas, 524 it set forth an additional benefit, stating that "[a] guilty plea is always important for the
purpose of establishing the truth in relation to a crime." ' Finally, the
Trial Chamber gave Todorovid credit for remorse. At his sentencing
hearing, Todorovid had made a statement, expressing his "profound
repentance and remorse."526 He told the Trial Chamber that he had
not wanted to become police chief, that he had lacked the courage to
prevent the atrocities, and that if allowed to return to Bosnia, he would
"invest every effort in the new multi-ethnic Bosnia" as a means of atoning for his sins."' The Trial Chamber considered these expressions of
remorse sincere and treated them as a mitigating factor:
e. Sikirica
In April 1992, Serb forces took control of the town of Prejidor, in
northwestern Bosnia-Herzegovina and soon after began seizing Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats and transferring them to detention facilities. Sikirica involved one of those detention facilities-the Keraterm
camp-and featured as defendants Dugko Sikirica, Keraterm's Commander of Security, and Damir Dogen and Dragen Kolundija, two of
Keraterm's shift leaders.52' Keraterm's detainees were kept in appalling
conditions. They were confined in crowded rooms where there was so
little space that they had to take turns standing." They had little or no
'531
532
access to medical care, toilets, or water and were fed only starvation
0
rations.
Most detainees were beaten on arrival at the camp,5 4 and
guards and visitors thereafter beat the detainees at will, killing many of
them.5 15 In the camp's most notorious incident-the so-called Room 3
massacre-Serb forces entered Keraterm, locked approximately 150 to

524 Id.

Id. at para. 81.
Id. at para. 90.
527 Prosecutor v. Todorovid, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript,
59-62 (May 4, 2001).
528 Todorovid, SentencingJudgement, supra note 336, at para. 92.
529 Sikirica, SentencingJudgement, supra note
355, at paras. 118, 153, 200.
530 Id. at paras.
62-63.
5 Id. at paras. 68,
74.
Id. at para. 73.
Id. at para. 70. Each detainee lost, on average, forty-four pounds.
Id. at para.
525
525

72.
544

53

Id. at para. 57.
Id. at paras. 84-100.
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200 detainees in a room, and fired upon them with machine guns, kill536
ing virtually all of them.
Recounting these and other facts, the indictment charged the defendants with persecution as a crime against humanity and several other
In addition, the indictment
crimes against humanity and war crimes.
charged Sikirica with one count of genocide and one count of complicity to commit genocide. All three defendants pled not guilty and proceeded to trial.5 39 At the close of the prosecution's case, the three defendants filed motions for acquittal. The Trial Chamber granted
Sikirica's motion with respect to the counts of genocide and complicity
to commit genocide, and it granted Dogen's motion with respect to
four counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes involving the
beating of detainees because the prosecution conceded that "the only
evidence connecting Damir Dogen to the alleged incident [was] excul,,541
patory in nature.
Following the Trial Chamber's judgment, Sikirica and Dogen put
on their defenses, but when it came time for Kolund~ija to put on his
defense, he instead pled guilty. He and the prosecution entered into a
plea agreement in which he pled guilty to one count of persecution as a
crime against humanity, and the prosecution dropped the remaining
four counts.542 Three days after Kolund~ija entered his guilty plea,
Sikirica and Dogen informed the Trial Chamber that they too had entered into plea agreements with the prosecution wherein they pled
guilty to one count of persecution as a crime against humanity, and the
prosecution dropped the remaining counts. 543 Although all three defendants pled guilty to the count of persecution as a crime against humanity, they acknowledged varying levels of culpability. The persecu(a) murder; (b)
tion count alleged persecution by five methods:
torture and beating; (c) sexual assault and rape; (d) harassment, hu536

Id. at paras. 101-03.

537Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-PT, Second Amended Indictment (Jan.

3, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/sik-2aiOOI 220e.htm.
538 Id. at paras.
26-34.
539 Sikirica, SentencingJudgement, supra note
355, at paras. 2-4.
540Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgement on Defence Motions
to
Acquit, paras. 97, 172 (Sept. 3, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/sikirica/judgement/
010903r98bis-e.pdf.
541 Id. at paras.
134, 151.
542 Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at paras. 12-13; Prosecutor v.
Kolund~ija, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Admitted Facts Relevant to the Plea Agreement for
Dragan Kolundlija, para. 7 (Sept. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Kolund~ija, Plea Agreement]
(on file with author).
543Sikirica, SentencingJudgement, supra note 355, at paras. 14-15.
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miliation, and psychological abuse; and (e) confinement in inhumane
conditions." Sikirica acknowledged participating in all of those methods and in particular admitted to killing one detainee;545 Dogen admitted to participating in (b), (d), and (e) ;546 and Kolundija admitted only
(e) .54 All three defendants acknowledged the murders and beatings
that took place at Keraterm and the inhumane conditions prevailing, 548
but the plea agreements also noted the defendants' limited responsibilities. They stated, for instance, that none of the defendants had had
the power to punish subordinates549 and that they had little, if any, ability to prevent other persons, not on the staff, from entering Keraterm at
will and mistreating the detainees.
Sikirica's and Dogen's plea agreements stated that they were not responsible for ensuring adequate food,
water, clothing, medical assistance, and accommodation for the detainees,5 5 1 and Dogen's and Kolundfija's plea agreements• noted
certain ef552
forts that those defendants had made to assist detainees.
The Sikirica plea agreements and sentencing proceedings bore
great similarity to those of Todorovi. As in Todorovi6, the prosecution in
Sikirica agreed to recommend sentences that fell within specified
ranges, and both parties agreed not to appeal any sentence that fell
within that range. Specifically, the prosecution agreed to recommend

544 Id. at para.
18.

545 Id. at paras. 18,
21.
546 Id. at para. 26.
547 Id.

at para. 32.
Kolund~ija, Plea Agreement, supra note 542, at para. 3; Prosecutor
v. Doen,
Case No. IT-95-8-T, Joint Submission of the Prosecution and the Accused Damir Dogen
Concerning a Plea Agreement and Admitted Facts, paras. 8-10 (Sept. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Dogen, Plea Agreement] (on file with author); Prosecution v. Sikirica, Case No.
IT-95-8-T, Joint Submission of the Prosecution and the Accused Du~ko Sikirica Concerning a Plea Agreement and Admitted Facts, paras. 8-10 (Sept. 6, 2001) [hereinafter
Sikirica, Plea Agreement] (on file with author).
549 Sikirica, SentencingJudgement, supra note
355, at paras. 19, 27.
550 Id. at paras.
20, 28, 34.
551 Id. at paras.
19, 27.
552 Kolund~ija, Plea Agreement, supra note 542,
at paras. 4-5; Dogen, Plea Agreement, supra note 548, at para. 13; see also Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T,
Prosecution's Sentencing Brief, paras. 70, 86 (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Sikirica,
Prosecution's Sentencing Brief] (recording that while not responsible for prisoner
conditions, Sikirica attempted to improve them) (on file with author); Sikirica, SentencingJudgement, supra note 355, at paras. 27, 29, 33-35 (stating that all three defendants attempted to improve conditions of detainees). Indeed, at trial, forty-one prosecution witnesses testified about Kolundlija's efforts. Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT95-8-T, Transcript, 5773 (Oct. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Sikirica, Transcript] (on file with
author).
553 Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at paras.
25, 31, 37. In
548
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sentences between ten and seventeen years' imprisonment for Sikirica,
between five and seven years' imprisonment for Dogen, and between
three and five years' imprisonment for Kolundj a. 4 Further, each of
the Sikirica defendants, like Todorovic, made statements at the sentencing hearing expressing his remorse. While the Keraterm statements
were not identical, they were quite similar both to each other and to
Todorovi 's.
They all emphasized that they had not worked at
Keraterm voluntarily; that they were sorry that they had not done more
to prevent the atrocities; and that, when they returned to Prejidor, they
would speak out against ethnic divisions and try to promote reconciliation and harmonyi9 One significant difference between Sikirica and
Todorovi6, however, is that the Sikirica defendants did not promise to
cooperate with the prosecution.
The Trial Chamber also followed Todorovi6 in its treatment of several sentencing issues. First, the Trial Chamber sentenced the defendants to terms of imprisonment within the ranges set forth in the plea
agreements; specifically, it sentenced Sikirica, Dogen, and Kolund~ija 5to
6
prison terms of fifteen years, five years, and three years, respectively.
Second, over the prosecution's objection, the Trial Chamber concluded
that the defendants' statements of remorse were sincere and treated
them as mitigating factors. 57 Finally, and most importantly, the Sikirica
Trial Chamber reiterated Todorovi6's endorsement of guilty pleas and
indeed expanded upon it. Todorovid had pled guilty before his trial
began, and after noting the savings that thus had accrued to the Tribunal, the Todorovi6 Trial Chamber went on to note that:
[A] plea of guilt will only contribute to the above-described public advantage if it is pleaded before the commencement of the trial against the
accused . . . . [I]f pleaded at a later stage of the proceedings, or even

after the conclusion of the trial, a voluntary admission of guilt will not

Sikirica's plea agreement, the prosecution also agreed not to appeal the Trial Chamber's decision that Sikirica had no case to answer with respect to the genocide counts.
Sikirica, Plea Agreement, supra note 548, at para. 5(b).

554Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at paras. 25, 31, 37. Also,
like
Todorovi6, the prosecution in Sikirica recommended the maximum sentence for each
defendant. Sikirica, Transcript, supra note 552, at 5687; Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at para. 42.
555Sikirica, Transcript, supra note 552, at 5718-20, 5736-37, 5741-43.
556

Sikirica, SentencingJudgement, supranote 355, at para. 245.

557 Id.

at paras. 152, 194, 230. The prosecution had maintained that neither Sikirica
nor Dogen had shown any remorse. Id. at paras. 141, 174; see also Sikirica, Prosecution's
Sentencing Brief, supra note 552, at para. 56.
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save the International
Tribunal the time and effort of a lengthy investi5 58
gation and trial.

Sikirica involved just such "late" guilty pleas and required the Trial
Chamber to determine what, if any, mitigating value should attach to
them. The SikiricaTrial Chamber reiterated Todorovi6's conclusion that
a guilty plea assists the Tribunal not only by saving it time and resources
when it is timely made, but also, no matter when it is made, by contributing "directly to one of the fundamental objectives of the International
Tribunal: namely, its truth-finding function."' 9 The Trial Chamber
thus held that a defendant who enters a late plea will not get full creditas does a defendant who pleads guilty before trial-but he still stands to
receive some credit. 60 Indeed, with respect to Sikirica, the Trial Chamber stated that even though his plea was very late, "he would have received a much longer sentence" had he not pled guilty."'
On December 28, 2001, the ICTY added Rule 62ter, entitled "Plea
Agreement Procedure" to its RPE. Rule 62ter(A) provides that if a defendant pleads guilty to one or more counts of the indictment, the
Prosecutor may apply to amend the indictment accordingly, submit that
a specific sentencing range is appropriate, and/or not oppose a request
by the defendant for a particular sentence or sentencing range.

Sub-

section (B) states, however, that "[t]he Trial Chamber shall not be
bound by any agreement specified in paragraph (A) .'' 62 Rule 62ter
does not provide for anything new; it merely identifies the practices
that had been taking place and reiterates the Trial Chambers' ultimate sentencing discretion. The appearance of the rule, however,
serves to publicize and legitimize the practices.

Todorovi6, SentencingJudgement, supra note 336, at para. 81.
SentencingJudgement, supra note 355, at para. 149.
560Id. at para. 150. The Trial Chamber gave Kolund~ija "close to the full credit for

558

55i9 Sikirica,

his guilty plea" because he pled guilty before the commencement of his case in defense.
Id. at ara. 228.
Id. at para. 234. Sikirica's plea agreement states that the prosecution would not
have accepted a plea along the lines set forth in the agreement before trial, noting,
among other things, that the second amended indictment included genocide charges
which the Trial Chamber subsequently dismissed. Sikirica, Plea Agreement, supra note
548, at para. 5(e). The Trial Chamber did not mention this point, but it may have influenced its decision to grant Sikirica a substantial sentencing discount, since it indicates that Sikirica's guilty plea was as timely as it could have been.
5 2 ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62ter.
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2. The ICTR's Guilty Plea Cases
a. Background
The years leading up to the 1994 Rwandan genocide saw other
smaller-scale massacres of the Tutsi and the exile of thousands of Tutsi
563
Rwanda became an authoritarian state in
to neighboring countries.
the 1970s; it was ruled by Hutu President Habyarimana and had a single

political party, the Republican Movement for Democracy. 16

During

these years, the exiled Tutsi formed an army, the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) and engaged in several clashes with the Rwandan govern-

ment.565 After the Rwandan government and the RPF fought to a standstill in the early 1990s, they entered into the Arusha Accords, which
provided, among other things, for a new transitional government with a
prime minister acceptable to both sides and for multi-party general
566

However, President
elections with the full participation of the RPF.
Habyarimana began to undermine the Accords as soon as he adhered
to them and, in particular, attempted to shore up support among his

fellow Hutu by relying on "the unifying specter of a common enemy"the Tutsi.' 67 Habyarimana's government established a training camp for

563

See BALL, supra note 288, at 159-60; MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 47, 50;

William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-GenocideRwanda: Searching
for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523, 523-524 (1996).
564 PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA:

RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS,

AND THE U.N. CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 14 (2000) (noting Habyarimana's overthrow of Kayibanda, Rwanda's previously elected president); MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at

50 (discussing Habyarimana's government); Carroll, supra note 372, at 167-68 (describing Rwanda's government as a "one-party system").
565 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 50; Carroll, supra note 372, at 168.
566 BALL, supra note 288, at 162; MAGNARELLA, supra note 564, at 16-17; MORRIS &
SCHARF, supra note 253, at 50-51.
567MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 51; see also Drumbl, supra note 374, at
558-

59 (detailing the tactics used by the Habyarimana government to ensure Hutu support). Drumbl states:
The Habyarimana government used the failed [RPF] invasion as an excuse to
arrest tens of thousands and massacre hundreds of Tutsi. Fear of the RPF was
falsely whipped up among the Hutu population by a staged attack on Kigali, in
which Habyarimana soldiers fired into the air to create the illusion of an attack. During this time period, the Hutu government began to develop a
propaganda machine calculated to instill within the Hutu citizenry a fear of
the Tutsi. It was frequently emphasized in rural villages that Tutsi "devils"
lurked in the bushes and were about to attack .... Peasants were told by officials that their umuganda (a day of unpaid labor, usually once a month, for
public service projects, akin to the coruve in European medieval society) would
be satisfied if they spent the day killing Tutsi under official supervision.
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Hutu militia to indoctrinate them in ethnic hatred and instruct them
on methods of mass murder. The trainees later became members of
the militia known as the Interahamwe. The government also distributed
millions of dollars worth of firearms and machetes throughout the
568
country.
Immediately after President Habyarimana's plane was shot down on
April 6, 1994,569 Hutu soldiers, the Presidential Guard, and the Interahamwe militia began to hunt down and kill Tutsi and moderate Hutu.
These armed forces conducted house-to-house searches, killing all the
Tutsi they could find and murdering Tutsi who had taken refuge in
churches, hospitals, schools, and Red Cross buildings. 5' Two days after
Habyarimana's death, an interim government was established in
Rwanda without a single Tutsi minister.57 ' After hundreds of thousands
of Tutsi and moderate Hutu had been massacred, the genocide came to
an end approximately one hundred days after it had begun when the
RPF conquered the Rwandan army.5"
b. Kambanda
Jean Kambanda was prime minister of the interim government of
Rwanda, established after President Habyarimana's death. " ' Kambanda
was arrested in Kenya along with several other former members of the

568

MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 52. As William Schabas described it:

Extremist elements refused to accept the Arusha compromise. Habyarimana's
personal commitment to Arusha also seems questionable, and in any case,
members of his entourage took direct steps to sabotage the agreement. They
set up a private radio station, Radio-Television Libre Mille-Collines, which battered Rwanda with hate propaganda over the following months. Secretly, they
imported arms from abroad and organized militias, notably the Interahamwe,
for the coming holocaust. Lists were prepared designating Tutsi houses so as
to expedite the killings once the order was given.
Schabas, supra note 563, at 524.
569See Pauline Jelinek, Rwanda, Burundi Leaders Are Killed in
Crash-A Rocket Was
Firedat Plane, Diplomats Report, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1994, at 2 (reporting the downing of the plane).
570See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 253, at 53-54 (describing
the violence that
ensued after Hutu extremists accused the RPF of assassinating Habyarimana); Jos6 E.
Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessonsfrom Rwanda, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 365, 390
(1999) (detailing the events that immediately followed Habyarimana's death). For a
detailed and grisly description of the massacres, see BALL, supra note 288, at 164-70.
.7 Beresford, supra note 279, at 103; Former Rwandan
Prime Minister to Appear in
War Crimes Court for Pre-Sentencing Session, INTERNEWS (Aug. 21, 1998), at http://
www.internews.org/activities/ICTR-reports/ICTRNewsAug98.html.
572 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note 253, at 58.
573See id. at
55.

2002]

PLEA BARGAINING OFINTERNATIONAL CRIMES

129

interim government, 574 and he was charged with six counts of genocide
and crimes against humanity.5 5 Immediately upon his arrest, Kambanda expressed his intention to plead guilty and began cooperating
with the prosecution. Kambanda provided the OTP with nearly ninety
hours of recorded testimony to be used in subsequent trials of senior
political and military leaders.57 6 The prosecution described Kambanda's
cooperation as "invaluable. 577 However, by thus cooperating with the
prosecution, Kambanda placed his family at risk of retaliation, so the
including the relocation
prosecution arranged for protective measures,
8
of Kambanda's family to a different country.
57

At his initial appearance before the Trial Chamber in May 1998,
SpecifiKambanda pled guilty to all the counts in the indictment.5
in
agreement
a
plea
into
entered
cally, Kambanda and the prosecution
574Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 1; Press Release,

ICTR, Rwanda: Top Figures of Former Regime Arrested (July 18, 1997), at http://
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1997/061 .htm.
575 Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 3. Specifically,
Kambanda was charged with genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, murder as a crime against
humanity, and extermination as a crime against humanity. Id. Kambanda was not indicted until approximately three months after he was arrested. Press Release, ICTR,
Former Prime Minister Kambanda and Nsabimana Indicted (Oct. 17, 1997), at http://
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1997/085.htm.
576 Kambanda, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief, supra note 3, at 23.
577Id. at 22-23; see also Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-I, Transcript,
12 (Sept. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Kambanda, Transcript] (informing the court of Kambanda's cooperation with the prosecution) (on file with author). The prosecution described Kambanda's cooperation thus:
The accused has assisted the Prosecutor in interpreting the horrific events
that occured [sic] in Rwanda between 7 April and 7July 1994, as well as direct
evidence involving other accused and suspects. Without disclosing the substance of his audio recorded statement, his testimony has enabled the Prosecutor to have first hand information, and evidence of such key facts as the
meeting between the Council of Ministers and Prefets held on 11 April 1994,
where the topic of massacres committed against the civilian population was
raised; the contents of deliberations and decisions agreed upon by consensus
in the numerous closed sessions of the Cabinet; the involvement of Ministers,
senior Military officers and Prefets in the commission of offences within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
Kambanda, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief, supra note 3, at 23.
578 Kambanda, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief, supra note 3, at 21,
23. The
prosecution noted in addition that defendants collaborating in a substantial way with
the prosecution "may be the target of intimidation, physical threats and even assassination." Id. at 21; see also Interview with M (Oct. 31, 2001) (noting that Kambanda's cooperation placed him and his family at risk).
Press Release, ICTR, Ex-Rwandan Prime MinisterJean Kambanda Pleads Guilty
to Genocide (May 1, 1998), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/
1998/118.htm.
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which Kambanda admitted, among other things, that in 1994 a widespread and systematic attack took place against the civilian population
of Tutsi, the purpose of which was to exterminate them.
Kambanda
acknowledged his de jure and de facto authority over members of the
government, the civil service, and the military. 5 Kambanda further
admitted to participating in the planning and execution of the massacres by, among other things, distributing arms and ammunition to various groups, setting up roadblocks to facilitate the massacres, and using
media broadcasts to incite and encourage the massacres. 82 Kambanda
5813
also agreed to testify for the prosecution in subsequent cases.
Kambanda's plea agreement stated that the parties had made "no
agreements, understandings or promises" with respect to Kambanda's
sentence, 584 and when it came time for sentencing, the prosecution had
a difficult line to walk. It wanted to recognize the substantial assistance
that Kambanda had provided, and it wanted to encourage other defendants to do likewise, but it could not ignore the "heinous and intolerable" nature of the crimes for which Kambanda was convicted.185 So,

Kambanda, Plea Agreement, supra note 4, at para. 18.
Id. at paras. 21-22.
582 Id. at paras. 23-40; Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para.
580
581

39. In addition to admitting the facts specifically relevant to the charges against him,
Kambanda also attested to facts potentially relevant to other cases. For instance, Kambanda "acknowledge [d] the use of the media as part of the plan to mobilize and incite
the population to commit massacres of the civilian Tutsi population[,]" and specifically
identified the Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) as "a radio station whose
broadcasts incited killing, the commission of serious bodily or mental harm to, and persecution of[,] Tutsi and moderate Hutu." Id. at paras. 39(vi)-(vii). These "admissions"
are relevant to the prosecution's case against Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean Bosco
Barayagwiza, founding members of the RTLM. Further, Kambanda's Plea Agreement
implicates Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, former Minister of Family and Women Affairs and a
defendant in another ICTR case, in the massacres. Kambanda, Plea Agreement, supra
note 4, at para. 36; Press Release, ICTR, Ex-Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda
Pleads Guilty to Genocide, supra note 579.
583 Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para.
47; Lawyer for the
Former Rwandan Prime Minister Argues for Light Sentence, INTERNEWS (Sept. 4, 1998) at
http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTR-reports/ICTRNewsSep98.html.
' 84 Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 48.
Indeed, according to the former ICTR Chief of Prosecutions, Mohamed Othman, Kambanda's
defense counsel was aware that the prosecution was going to recommend a life sentence. Interview with Mohamed Othman, supra note 7.
'585 Kambanda, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief, supra
note 3, at 2; Kambanda,
Transcript, supra note 577, at 6-11. At the pre-sentencing hearing, the prosecution began by stating that it had to "think very seriously" before making its sentencing recommendations. Id. at 6. After emphasizing the gravity of the crime of genocide and
the need to draw the attention of those who in the future may consider the commission of genocide, the prosecution also stated its belief that justice and reconciliation
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the prosecution tried to have it both ways. The prosecution sought a
sentence of life imprisonment for Kambanda, arguing that "the maximum penalty envisaged by the Tribunal's sentencing regime[] is the
only appropriate sentence for the grave offences to which the accused
has pled guilty. ''586 At the same time, the prosecution asked that any fu-

ture application for pardon or commutation of sentence "be considered favorably on the basis of past, current and future significant cooperation extended to the prosecution. 58 7
As for Kambanda's guilty plea, both the prosecution and defense
urged the Trial Chamber to interpret the plea as a sign of Kambanda's
"remorse, repentance and acceptance of responsibility, 5 8 but the Trial
Chamber did not seem convinced. Since his sentencing hearing was
held approximately two years before Todorovi6 and Sikirica were decided, Kambanda did not yet know that a statement of remorse, however implausible, would constitute a mitigating factor, and he consequently chose not to make a statement at his sentencing hearing.
Referring to Kambanda's silence, the Trial Chamber noted that, despite
his guilty plea, "Kambanda has offered no explanation for his voluntary
participation in the genocide; nor has he expressed contrition, regret
or sympathy for the victims in Rwanda, even when given the opportunity to do so by the Chamber.""9 The Trial Chamber further noted that
"remorse is not the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from a
guilty plea."5 90 At the same time, the Trial Chamber did acknowledge
that most jurisdictions consider an admission of guilt to be a mitigating
factor and that Kambanda's guilty plea is likely to encourage other individuals to acknowledge their own guilt.59
Consequently, the Trial
Chamber recognized Kambanda's guilty plea as a mitigating factor, but

would be better served "when people come forward voluntarily and openly before
[the] court to help [it] to understand... because there cannot be reconciliation when
the truth is not known." Id. at 8.
586 Kambanda, Prosecutor's Pre-Sentencing Brief, supra note
3, at 2.
587Id. The prosecution also argued that Kambanda's cooperation
had already been
compensated for, as it were, by the protective measures given to his family. Id. at 23;
Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para. 49.
588 Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note
1, at para. 52.
589 Id. at para. 51. Almost three years later, the ICTR Registrar,
responding to a
report critical of the Tribunal, had more generous words for Kambanda's guilty plea.
He stated: "The confession, conviction and sentencing of the former Prime Minister
of their country for genocide was a cathartic moment in the post-genocide healing + in
Rwanda." Press Release, ICTR, Statement by the Registrar, Mr. Adama Dieng, on the
Report of the International Crisis Group, supra note 374.
590 Kambanda,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1, at para.
52.
591 Id. at paras. 52,
61.
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it nonetheless concluded that "the aggravating circumstances surrounding the crimes committed by Jean Kambanda negate the mitigating cir9
cumstances,"' ' and it sentenced Kambanda to life imprisonment591
Outraged, Kambanda appealed and immediately ceased cooperating with the prosecution. 94 He further sought to revoke his guilty plea
and to proceed to trial, 9 asserting on appeal that he had been "forced"
to sign a "fabricated" plea agreement. 96 Appealing his sentence also,
Kambanda maintained that the Trial Chamber had failed to apply the
general principle of law that a guilty plea "as a mitigating factor carries
with it a discount in sentence." 97 The Appeals Chamber rejected Kambanda's arguments. It affirmed his conviction, holding that his guilty
plea was voluntary, informed, unequivocal, and supported by a factual
basis..5 8 As for his sentence, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial

Id. at para. 62.
Id. at Verdict.
.94 Letter from Carla Del Ponte to Agwu Okali,
ICTR Registrar, supra note 7; Interview with Mohamed Othman, supra note 7.
595 Kambanda, Appeal, supra
note 8, at para. 3.
56 Prosecution v. Kambanda, Case No. 97-23-A, Provisional Appellant's
Brief and
Motion for Extension of Time-Limits and for Admission of New Evidence on Appeal
Pursuant to Rules 115 and 116 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, paras. 10, 12
(Mar. 29, 2000) (on file with author); see also Kambanda "Forced" to Sign Guilty Plea,
IRINNEWS.ORG Uune 27, 2000), at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=241
8&SelectREgion=GreatLakes&SelectCountry=RWANDA. Kambanda also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. One week after he was sentenced, Kambanda sent a bitter, five-page letter to the Tribunal registry accusing his lawyer of working against him.
FormerRwandan PrimeMinister Who Pleaded Guilty to Genocide Insists upon the Lawyer of His
Choice, INTERNEWS (Oct. 14, 1998),
at http://www.internews.org/activities/
ICTR.reports/ICTRNewsOct98.html. In submissions to the Appeals Chamber, Kambanda claimed, among other things, that his guilty plea was not informed because he
was not adequately advised by his counsel. Specifically, he stated that his counsel:
[D]id not take affirmative action on his client's behalf, that in the space of two
years counsel and accused "had only one hour's consultation", and that counsel "did not study the case completely nor did he investigat[e] in order to
evaluate the file and to inform Kambanda properly. In doing so, Kambanda
did not plea guilty informed [sic], since he himself did not know the ins and
outs of the charges brought against him, nor did he know the ins and outs of
the guilty plea.
Kambanda, Appeal, supra note 8, at para. 67. The ironic feature of Kambanda's complaints about his trial counsel before the Appeals Chamber is that they were made by
appellate counsel who, themselves, seemed barely competent. See, e.g., id. at para. 79
(noting that the relevance of the passage counsel cites "is unclear"); id. at para. 96
(noting that with respect to five grounds for appeal "[the Appellant puts forward no
arguments in support of these grounds, in either the Appellant's Brief or the Appellant's Reply").
597 Id. at para.
10.
5I Id. at paras. 64, 78, 87, 95.
592
f,9
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Chamber clearly considered Kambanda's guilty plea, along with several
59
other factors, as mitigating circumstances.
The Appeals Chamber further held that the weight to be attached to mitigating circumstances is a
matter for the discretion of the Trial Chamber, and because the crimes
for which Kambanda was convicted were of the most serious nature, the
Trial Chamber could not be held to have abused its discretion in sentencing Kambanda to life imprisonment. 00
c. Serushago
The next ICTR defendant to plead guilty, Omar Serushago, voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities in the Ivory Coast in June
1998, when he had not yet been indicted or included on the list of suspects wanted by Rwandan authorities. 60 ' He had been cooperating with
the prosecution even before he surrendered 6°' and played a vital role in
an operation, code-named NAKI, which led to the arrests of several
high-level ICTR defendants, including Kambanda and Georges Ruggiu, 6 3 whose case will be discussed next. Following Serushago's surrender, the prosecution drew up a five-count indictment, and during his
initial appearance before the Trial Chamber, Serushago pled guilty to
four of the five counts. Specifically, Serushago pled guilty to genocide;
and to murder, torture, and extermination, as crimes against humanity;
and the prosecution dropped the fifth count, of rape, °4 which accused
Serushago of not preventing his subordinates from raping.0o In a plea
599Id. at paras. 120-22.
600Id. at paras. 124-26.
601

Serushago, Sentence, supranote 336, at paras. 1, 34.

602Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39, Transcript, 14-15
(jan. 29,

1999) [hereinafter Serushago, Transcript] (on file with author).
603See Militia Leader Who Confessed to Genocide Gets Fifteen Years
in Prison, INTERNEWS
(Feb. 5, 1998) (reporting the arrest of Kambanda), at http://www.internews.org/
activities/ICTR-reports/ICTRNewsFeb99.htm; Press Release, ICTR, Rwanda: First
Non-Rwandese Suspect Arrested (July 23, 1997) (reporting the arrest of Georges Ruggio), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1997/062.htm; Press
Release, ICTR, Rwanda: Top Figures of Former Regime Arrested (July 18, 1997) (reporting Kambanda's arrest as a result of the NAKI operation), at http://www.ictr.org/
wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1997/061 .htm.
604 Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 2-4. A press release announcing
Serushago's guilty plea and his plea agreement announced, somewhat implausibly,
that the plea "agreement is not a plea bargain." Press Release, ICTR, Former Militia
Leader, Omar Serushago Pleads "Guilty" to Genocide and Other Crimes but "Not
Guilty" to Rape (Dec. 14, 1998), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/
PRESSREL/1998/155.htm.
605 See Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-1, Indictment,
paras. 5.105.11 (Sept. 18, 1998) (on file with author).
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agreement, Serushago admitted to having been a de facto leader of the
Interahamwe in the Gisenyi prefecture and to having commanded five
Interahamwe militiamen.0 6 Serushago supervised a roadblock, at which
he searched for Tutsi and ordered his subordinates to execute them.6°7
Specifically, Serushago killed four Tutsi personally and his subordinates
killed thirty-three.9" Serushago further admitted that, on the order of
his superiors, he and his militiamen abducted numerous Tutsi and
transported them to an execution site where they were killed. 6°9 Serushago also acknowledged that he participated in several meetings,
held by civil and military authorities, during which the progress and
smooth operation of the massacres were discussed and encouraged] °
Indeed, in the context of these and other "admissions" in his plea
agreement, Serushago implicated no less than twenty-nine named individuals, and he attested to numerous facts that are seemingly relevant
only to future prosecutions of other defendants.""1
Serushago acknowledged in the plea agreement that "sentencing is
at the entire discretion of the Trial Chamber,' 612 and the prosecution

606 Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 25(viii), 29; see also Serushago,
Appeal, supra note 337, at para. 16.
607 Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 25 (vii).
608

Militia Leader Who Confessed to Genocide Gets Fifteen Years in Prison,supra note 603.

Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at paras. 25 (ix)-(xii).
Id. at paras. 25(xv)-(xvii); see also Serushago, Appeal, supra note 337, at para. 18
(admitting attendance at secret Hutu meetings).
611 Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-37, Plea Agreement Between Omar
609
610

Serushago and the Office of the Prosecutor, paras. 18-23, 25, 28-28, 31-33 (Dec. 4,
1998) [hereinafter Seurshago, Plea Agreement] (on file with author). Serushago, like
Kambanda, acknowledged the occurrence of a "widespread and systematic attack" on civilian Tutsi and moderate Hutu "on political, ethnic or racial grounds," which resulted in
the deaths of hundreds of thousands and was carried out in order to exterminate the
Tutsi. Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 25(i); see also id. at para. 25(xxii)
(admitting most victims were killed because they were Tutsi). Serushago went on to
describe various meetings, and he named the high-level political leaders and local
authorities who conducted those meetings and the orders that they gave, id. at para.
25(iii); see also id. at paras. 25(vii), (xv)-(xvi) (describing a meeting that Serushago attended and naming other attendees), even though Serushago himself does not appear
to have attended all of the meetings that he described. Id. at para. 25(v) (Serushago
stating he was informed by Thomas Mugirareza and Jumapiri Nyaribogi of the orders
given during the meeting); see also id. at para. 25(xvii) (describing a meeting in Gisenyi
and subsequent orders to execute certain Tutsi and Hutu). Serushago also identified
the leaders of the militiamen most involved in the massacres in the Gisenyi prefecture.
Id. at para. 25(vi). Serushago concluded by declaring that "[m]ilitary officers, members
of the Interim Government, militia leaders and Civilian authorities, planned, prepared,
instigated, ordered, aided and abetted their subordinates and others in carrying out the
massacres of the Tutsi population and their 'accomplices."' Id. at para. 25 (xxiv).
612 Serushago, Plea Agreement, supra note 611, at para. 40.

2002]

PLEA BARGAINING OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES

135

made no promises as to its sentencing recommendations. Like Kambanda,. . however,
Serushago placed himself and his family at risk of re611
taliation,
so the OTP "undert[ook] to ensure the protection and
safety" of Serushago's wife and children.
The prosecution also noted
the "valuable information" that Serushago had provided "in some of its
most important investigations," and stated its expectation that Serushago would continue to cooperate. 615 Like Kambanda, Serushago
agreed to testify on behalf of the prosecution in future trials616 but, unlike Kambanda, Serushago is holding up his end of the bargain. He has
been described as a "key witness" in the so-called media trial and in the
military trial1 7 and has already given his testimony in the former.
At
his pre-sentencing hearing, Serushago tearfully begged for the forgiveness of his country and of the Tutsi. 6'9
The
fi620 prosecution recommended a sentence of not less than twentyfive years, but the Trial Chamber sentenced Serushago to only fifteen
years' imprisonment 62 ' and thus rendered Serushago the first ICTR defendant to receive a sentence of less than life imprisonment. 622 In its
613

See Serushago, Transcript, supra note 602, at 25 (informing the court of the in-

herent risks of cooperating with the prosecution, including risks to Serushago's family).
614 Serushago, Plea Agreement, supra note
611, at para. 45. Serushago reportedly
was quite aware of the danger in which his cooperation and guilty plea placed him and
repeatedly asked for security to be provided when he appeared in court. See Mary Kimani, FormerRwandan Militia LeaderAsks for the Forgiveness of Rwanda, INTERNEWS (Jan.
29, 1998), at http://internews.org/activities/ICTR-reports/ICTRnewsJAN99.html.
615 Serushago, Plea Agreement, supra note 611,
at paras. 43-44.
616 Id. at para.
41.
617 Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-A, Order for the Continued Detention of Omar Serushago in the ICTR Detention Facility in Arusha (Apr. 3, 2001);
Mary Kimani, 'Media Trial': Key Prosecution Witness Fails to Testify, INTERNEWS (Nov. 14,
2001) (reporting that Serushago did not testify as scheduled because of illness but was
planning to testify the following day), at http://www.internews.org/activities/
ICTRReports/ICTRNewsNovOl.html.
618 See Mary Kimani, Media Trial: Genocide Suspect Was Member
of 'DeathSquad,' Witness Alleges, INTERNEWS (Nov. 15, 2001) (reporting Serushago's testimony against defendants in the "Media Trial"), at http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTRReports/
ICTRNewsNov01.html. In addition to implicating defendants Barayagwiza and Ngeze
in the genocide, Serushago also claimed that Ngeze had written to him in August 2001,
urging him not to testify for the prosecution. See Mary Kimani, Media rial: 'Hassan
Ngeze Did Not Want Me to Testify, 'Genocide Convict Claims, INTERNEWS (Nov. 15, 2001), at
http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTR Reports/ICTRNewsNov0 .html.
619 Serushago, Transcript, supra note 602, at 38-44; Militia
Leader Who Confessed to
Genocide Gets Fifteen Years in Prison, supra note 603.
620 Serushago, Transcript, supra note 602,
at 14.
621 Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at
Verdict.
622 Of the eight convicted ICTR defendants, five have received
sentences of life
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sentencing judgment, the Trial Chamber had little to say about Serushago's guilty plea, although it duly noted the plea as a mitigating factor.13 The Trial Chamber seemed more impressed with Serushago's
substantial and ongoing cooperation with the prosecution14 and his
"[p]ublic expression of remorse and contrition.
Despite the comparative leniency of the sentence, Serushago appealed, contending that
the Trial Chamber had failed to give due weight to the mitigating factors in his case and arguing that his sentence was manifestly excessive in
light of the sentencing practices of the Rwandan courts. ' ' 6 The Appeals
Chamber rejected Serushago's contentions
with little discussion and af627
firmed the fifteen-year sentence.
d. Ruggiu
The third and most recent ICTR defendant to plead guilty is Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian. Ruggiu developed an interest in Rwanda and its
politics in the early 1990s when he met Rwandan students, who were his
neighbors in Belgium.62s He subsequently became one of the key players in the Rwandan community in Belgium, participating in major political debates and meeting with President Habyarimana several times. 26
Ruggiu became radically opposed to the RPF, and in late 1993, he

imprisonment. Since Serushago, two other ICTR convicts have received terms less
than life imprisonment, one of whom-Georges Ruggiu-also pled guilty. See supra
note 356 (listing prison terms for all defendants convicted by the Trial Chambers).
623 Serushago, Sentence, supra note 336, at para. 35.
The Trial Chamber's discussion of Serushago's guilty plea as pertaining to his sentence consisted of the following:
It is important to recall that the accused pleaded guilty to four counts, namely
genocide and three counts of crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, torture). As the Chamber established, his guilty plea was made voluntarily and was unequivocal. Omar Serushago clearly understood the nature of
the charges against him and their consequences.
Id.
624

Id. at para. 31.

625

Id. at para. 40.

(12

Serushago, Appeal, supra note 337, at para. 6.

627 Id. at

paras. 21-34.

(28 Ruggiu, Judgement

and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 38. At Ruggiu's pre-

sentencing hearing, Ruggiu's lawyer maintained that Ruggiu "had come to know
Rwanda through highly partisan friends who gave him a biased idea of the political
situation in the country." How Belgian Journalist Became Involved in Hate Media,
INTERNEWS (May 15, 2000), at http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTR-Reports/

ICTRNewsMay0O.html; see also Prosecution v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32, Transcript,
109-12 (May 15, 2000) [hereinafter Ruggiu, Transcript] (tracing Ruggiu's introduction
to Rwandan politics) (on file with author).
629 RuggiuJudgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 41.
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moved to Rwanda and began work as a journalist and broadcaster for
the Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) 63 the government radio station whose broadcasts had for years incited ethnic tension and ethno-political murders.63' Ruggiu used his broadcasts to encourage the killing of Tutsi and to accuse Belgium of various subversive
actions, including assassinating President Habyarimana and supporting
the RPF.
Ruggiu was arrested in July 1997 in Kenya as part of the NAKI operation 63 and was indicted on one count of public incitement to commit genocide and one count of persecution as a crime against humanity. 634 Ruggiu initially pled not guilty to the charges, 6 5 but he began
cooperating with the prosecution in July 1999 and was conspicuously
absent from the list of media defendants scheduled to have a joint
trial. 636 In May 2000, Ruggiu changed his plea to guilty and entered
into a plea agreement with the prosecution in which he admitted to
making various broadcasts, which encouraged the killing of Tutsi.63 7
Ruggiu also attested in his plea agreement to a series of facts relevant to
future prosecutions and, in particular, relevant to the prosecution of
RTLM officials Nahimana and Barayagwiza."" Ruggiu agreed to con-

630

Id. at para. 41.

Id. at paras. 41-42; see also Alvarez, supra note 570, at 392 (describing RTLM's
role in the killings).
632 Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at paras. 44(iv)-(v),
50.
633 Press Release, ICTR, Rwanda: First Non-Rwandese Suspect Arrested
(July 23,
1997), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1997/062.htm.
634 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Amended Indictment, 12-15
631

(Dec. 18, 1998) (on file with author). Ruggiu was also indicted on counts of conspiracy to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, murder as a crime against humanity,
and extermination as a crime against humanity. Id.
635 Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para.
4.
636 Mary Kimani, Hate Media Journalist Scheduled to Plead
Guilt, to Genocide Charges,
INTERNEWS (May 9, 2000), at http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTRReports/
ICTRNewsMay0O.html.
637 Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at paras. 7,
44.
638 For instance, Ruggiu not only acknowledged the statements that
he broadcast
over RTLM, but also "admit[ted] that all [RTLM] broadcasts were directed towards rallying the population against the 'enemy,' the RPF and those who were considered to be
allies of the RPF." Id. at para. 44(i). Ruggiu further acknowledged "that RTLM broadcasts reflected the political ideology and plans of extremist Hutu.... [and] that RTLM
broadcasts incited young Rwandans, Interahamwe militiamen and soldiers to engage in
armed conflict against the 'enemy' and its accomplices and to kill and inflict serious bodily and mental harm on Tutsis and moderate Hutu." Id. at para. 44(xi). Finally, Ruggiu
"admit[ted] that RTLM broadcasters, managerial and editorial staff bear full responsibility for the 1994 massacre of Tutsis and Hutu opposition party members." Id. at para.
44(xiii).
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tinue cooperating with the prosecution,'" and, like Serushago, he has
done so.'
As in Serushago and Kambanda, the prosecution made Ruggiu no promises about his sentence,"' but it did promise to contact Belgian authorities
to seek their cooperation in ensuring the safety of Rug64
giu's family.
The Trial Chamber issued its sentencing judgment in June 2000,
and, as in the ICTY, the Chamber's view of guilty pleas seems to have
evolved. Kambanda, the ICTR's first defendant to plead guilty, was sentenced to life imprisonment and thus appeared to obtain no benefit for
having pled guilty. Serushago, the ICTR's next defendant to plead
guilty, did receive a relatively lenient sentence following his guilty plea,
but the Trial Chamber did not discuss in any detail the role played by
the guilty plea. By the time Ruggiu was decided, the ICTR, like the
ICTY in Todorovi6 and Sikirica, was expressly willing to recognize the
benefits that guilty pleas afford the Tribunals. It noted, for instance,
that guilty pleas "facilitate [] the administration of justice by expediting
proceedings and saving resources" and that Ruggiu's guilty plea "has
spared the Tribunal a lengthy investigation and trial, thus economising
time, effort and resources. '64
Accordingly, like the Todorovi and
Sikirica Trial Chambers, the Ruggiu Trial Chamber announced that
guilty pleas will be compensated by sentencing discounts; the Trial
Chamber held that it "considers that it is good policy in criminal matters that some form of consideration be shown towards those who have
confessed their guilt, in order to encourage other suspects and perpetrators of crimes to come forward. 641 As for Ruggiu's case in particular,
the Trial Chamber opined that his guilty plea "reflects his genuine
awareness of his guilt, especially since he changed his plea after much
reflection."6 5 According to the Trial Chamber, Ruggiu's "acknowledgement of his mistakes and crimes is a healthy application of reason

639

Kimani, supra note 636.
with E (Nov. 26, 2001).
See Ruggiu, Transcript, supra note 628, at 65, 69-70 (recording Ruggiu's admis-

640 Interview
641

sion that he received no promises in exchange for his plea); Prosecution v. Ruggiu,
Case No. ICTR-97-32-DP, Plea Agreement Between Georges Ruggiu and the Office of
the Prosecutor, paras. 220-30 (May 12, 2000) [hereinafter Ruggiu, Plea Agreement]
(on file with author).
642Ruggiu, Plea Agreement, supra note 641, at para.
226.
643Ruggiu,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 53.
644 Id. at para. 55. The Trial Chamber went on to say that "[i]t is important
to encourage all those involved in crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994 to confess and admit their guilt." Id.
645Id. at para. 54.
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and sentiment, which illustrates the beginning of repentance. 6 4' Like
Serushago, Ruggiu had begged for forgiveness from survivors and victims' families during his pre-sentencing hearing,647 and the Trial Chamber considered these expressions of remorse a mitigating factor.14' The
Trial Chamber also noted Ruggiu's "substantial cooperation" with the
prosecution as a mitigating factor. 9 The prosecution recommended
concurrent twenty-year sentences for each count,61° but the Trial
Chamber instead sentenced Ruggiu to twelve years' imprisonment.
Ruggiu did not appeal, becoming the first ICTR defendant to fail to
take advantage of that right.
C. The Evolution of Plea Bargainingin InternationalCriminalProsecutions
The cases described above show an evolution in the way the Tribunals conceive of and practice plea bargaining. When the Tribunals
were first established, plea bargaining was looked upon with some suspicion. The Tribunals' civil lawyers and judges were unfamiliar, and
hence uncomfortable, with the practice, and the vital task with which
the Tribunals had been entrusted-to bring justice to war-torn lands
through the prosecution of those responsible for mass atrocitiesseemed too noble to be sullied by bargaining. Consequently, when the
United States proposed including a provision in the Tribunals' RPE
authorizing the prosecution to grant defendants full or limited testimonial immunity in exchange for their cooperation, that proposal was
rejected. As then-ICTY President Cassese put it: "The persons appearing before us will be charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution and other inhuman acts. After
due reflection, we have decided that no one should be immune from
prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how useful their testimony may otherwise be. 651 That view likewise prevailed with respect to
sentencing concessions for guilty pleas. Although prosecutors schooled
in common law systems understood well that defendants were unlikely
to plead guilty unless they were promised a sentence reduction, the
general feeling at the Tribunals' inception was that the crimes within
646

Id. at para. 55.

647Mary Kimani, Prosecution Asks for a Twenty Year Sentencefor Hate MediaJournalist,

INTERNEWS (May 15, 2000), at http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTR-Reports/
ICTRNewsMay00.html.
648 Ruggiu,Judgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at paras. 69-72.
649 Id. at paras. 56-58.
650

Id. at para. 81.

651

ScHARF, supranote 251, at 67.
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the Tribunals'jurisdiction were too grave to be bargained over. If every
case went to trial, so be it.
The manifest difficulties delineated above of bringing even some of
the cases to trial, however, have caused an evolution in the perception
of plea bargaining at the Tribunals. The Tribunals have had little
choice but to recognize the utility of guilty pleas as well as the necessity
of plea bargaining to secure those pleas. The practice of plea bargaining has developed in a slightly different fashion in each Tribunal. Both
utilize implicit plea bargaining; that is, both Tribunals' Trial Chambers
have made clear that defendants will receive a sentence reduction if
they plead guilty. In the ICTY, in addition, the prosecution and defense
engage in explicit bargaining over the prosecution's sentencing recommendations, and the Trial Chambers have thus far sentenced within
the range upon which the parties agreed. ICTR prosecutors have made
no similar promises to that Tribunal's defendants. Finally, neither Tribunal has engaged in charge bargaining. Although Tribunal prosecutors have withdrawn charges following a guilty plea, the withdrawal of
those charges cannot be considered instances of charge bargaining. In
Jelisi6 and Kolund~ija, charges were withdrawn because they lacked evidentiary support; in Serushago, the withdrawal of the one charge should
have had no effect on the sentence; G'5 and in the remaining cases, the
defendants pled guilty to crimes that substantially encompassed the
conduct alleged in the withdrawn counts.
A summary recapitulation of the cases reveals the course of plea
bargaining's evolution. At the ICTY, plea bargaining did not appear to
play an obvious role until Todorovi6. The ICTY's first guilty plea in Erdemovi6 was secured without plea bargaining because Erdemovid was
that very unusual defendant whose guilty plea was not motivated by a
desire to secure sentencing concessions.65 ' Erdemovid essentially volunteered himself to the ICTY when the Tribunal had never heard of him
or the executions in which he participated and immediately began co-

See ICTR Bulletin No. 2, Musema's Genocide Conviction Upheld 2 (Dec. 2001)
(noting that although the Appeals Chamber quashed Musema's conviction for rape, it upheld his conviction for genocide and extermination and held that "the quashing of his
conviction for rape could not affect the exceptional gravity of the crimes for which he
had been convicted" and thus refused to lower his sentence), at http://
www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/bulletin/dec/decO .pdf.
653 Erdemovid, Transcript, supra note 434, at 38 (recording
that an OTP investigator who conducted numerous interviews with Erdemovid opined that Erdemovi's "motivation is not to please the Office of the Prosecutor to get some weakening of his possible punishment, he was very clear on that point since the beginning").
652
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654
operating with the prosecution in every way possible..
According to
the prosecution, Erdemovid "never tried to bargain anything,... never
asked if his collaboration would be of help for him in judicial terms."655
Rather, he wanted "the truth to be known about these events and he
want[ed] the people who are responsible for these events to face justice."65 Plea bargaining was still something of a confusing concept to
the Tribunals' civil lawyers at the time of Erdemovid, a fact reflected in
Judge Cassese's comments about the practice in that case. After stating
that a defendant who pleads guilty can expect "that the court will be
more lenient,"657 Cassese went on to say that the drafters of the statute
and rules deliberately omitted any endorsement of out-of-court plea
bargaining so as to "avert[] those distortions of the free will of the accused which may be linked to plea bargaining." 65 81 Cassese does not explain just what "distortions of the free will" would be produced by outof-court plea bargaining that would not equally be produced by the implicit plea bargaining that Cassese himself endorses. Any distortion of
the defendant's free will results from the fact that the defendant receives a reduction in sentence if he pleads guilty. Whether that reduction follows out-of-court bargaining with the prosecutor or an in-court
dispensation is irrelevant.
The ICTY's second guilty plea, in Jelisi6, also did not involve plea
bargaining, but for a very different reason: the prosecution refused to
bargain because Jelisi6 had nothing to offer. Jelisi 's guilty plea to the
war-crimes and crimes-against-humanity charges did not save the prosecution any time and expense becauseJelisid insisted on going to trial on
the genocide charge, and the facts supporting that charge overlapped
almost entirely with the facts supporting the charges to which Jelisi6
pled guilty. Further, the prosecution had photographs of Jelisi6 committing many of the crimes, and it believed that his conviction on the
counts to which he pled guilty was virtually assured. Thus, the prosecution had no interest in offeringJelisid concessions to self-convict.

654 Id.

at 35-38, 43-47 (describing Erdemovid's cooperation); Erdemovi6, Brief on
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 432, § C & n.24 (noting that "Erdemovid had expressed a strong desire to surrender to the authorities here in The Hague"
even though doing so "would most likely result in criminal liability").
655 Erdemovid, Transcript, supra
note 434, at 46.
656 Id. at 38.
657 Erdemovid, Cassese Dissent, supra note
143, at para. 8.
658Id. at para.
10.
659 See Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, Case No. IT-95-10-T,
Transcript, 2615-17 (Nov. 10,
1999), at http://www.un.org/icty/transe10/991110ed.htm.
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In Todorovi and Sikirica, by contrast, the defendants did have benefits to offer the prosecution, and they did expect something in return
for them; consequently, the cases were plea bargained. In Todorovi6,
the prosecution saved the time and expense of a trial and stood to save
the time and expense of an appeal; it obtained Todorovid's cooperation
and future testimony; and it silenced Todorovi's embarrassing inquiries into his arrest. In return, the prosecution promised to withdraw
twenty-six counts and to recommend a sentence of not longer than
twelve-years' imprisonment.G"° The obviousness of the quid pro quo was
highlighted by the plea agreement's provision that if Todorovi6 failed
to fulfil his obligations under the plea agreement, the prosecution
could reinstate the entire indictment and proceed to trial.66 ' The
661
prosecution had clearly learned a lesson from Kambanda.
As noted above, the primary benefit Todorovi6 received from the
plea agreement was the prosecution's lenient sentencing recommendation, but because the Trial Chamber was in no way bound by the prosecution's recommendation, Todorovi6 took a risk. The fact that a Trial

Chamber had never before imposed a sentence longer than that sought
by the prosecution must have provided Todorovid some comfort. But
because in Todorovik the prosecution, at least in theory, was recommending a sentence shorter than what would otherwise have been appropriate for the crimes in question, the Trial Chambers' past treatment of prosecutorial recommendations was not necessarily relevant.
What was relevant, however, was that the Tribunal's Trial Chambers,
like the judicial branches of many domestic jurisdictions, stood to gain
almost as much from the plea bargain as the prosecution. The Tribunals are overworked. They spend vast sums of money to conduct very
few trials and are roundly criticized for that fact."3 The judges themselves spend considerable time debating proposals to improve efficiency, and they spend more time still responding to the suggestions

and criticisms of others.664 Improvements have been made: procedural
M6O
Prosecutor v. Todorovid, Case

No. lT-95-9/1, Transcript, 801-03 (Jan. 19, 2001),

at http://www.un.org/icty/transe9/010119iaed.htm.
6 ,1 Id. at 810-11.
Ri

However, this remedy also has its problems.

During Todorovid's presentencing hearing, Judge Hunt repeatedly raised his concern that Todorovi6's testimony in subsequent cases will be deprived of considerable credibility because he
stands to have his plea agreement dissolved if he does not "fulfil his obligations." Id. at
805-06, 812-14.
663 See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
664 SeeJorda Report, supra note 367 (suggesting reforms
and responding to the
proposals of a U.N.-appointed expert group which reviewed the ICTYs efficiency);
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reforms have been undertaken, ad litem trial judges have been appointed, and the Appeals Chamber has been enlarged by the addition
of two judges. But none of these reforms, however efficacious, can
compare to the dispatch with which a guilty plea disposes of a case, and
in Todorovi6, the prosecution sweetened the deal with the promise not
to appeal any sentence falling within the agreed-upon range, a promise
that must have seemed especially attractive to judges accustomed to appellate reversal.
With these advantages in mind, the Todorovik Trial Chamber not
only sentenced Todorovi6 within the agreed-upon range, but it gave notice to all future defendants that guilty pleas would be rewarded with
sentencing concessions. And it was scarcely more than a month after
the Todorovi6 Trial Chamber made this announcement that the Sikirica
defendants pled guilty and agreed to terms similar to those appearing
in Todorovi. Despite the TodoroviW Trial Chamber's favorable stance on
plea bargaining, the Sikirica defendants still had some reason to fear
that they would not receive sentence reductions. The Todorovik Trial
Chamber had promised leniency only to defendants who made "timely"
guilty pleas.""5 Sikirica's and Dogen's guilty pleas came after their
cases had been fully tried; only Kolundlija's guilty plea saved the Tribunal any time at all. Further, Todorovi6 had extended substantial
cooperation to the prosecution. The Sikirica defendants did not, and
the last defendant to enter a guilty plea without cooperating with the
prosecution-Goran Jelisid-received a forty-year sentence. But the
Trial Chamber did not let the Sikiricadefendants down. Because their
tardy guilty pleas did not generate all the benefits of timely guilty
pleas, the Trial Chamber held that the defendants were not entitled to
"full credit;" 666 it made clear, however, that a guilty plea, whenever
made, justifies some credit. Future defendants can plead guilty with
the expectation that they will receive some sentencing concessions

Press Release, ICTR, Statement by the Registrar, Mr. Adama Dieng, on the Report of
the International Crisis Group, supra note 374 (responding to the International Crisis
Group's critical report, which stated, among other things, that the ICTR's record of
nine verdicts in seven years is "lamentable"). The U.N.'s Inspector General has produced two reports detailing waste and managerial problems at the ICTR. McNerney,
supra note 374, at 189; see also Report of the Secretaiy-General on the Activities of the Office of
Internal Oversight Services, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex, Agenda Items 139 and 141, at
2-4, U.N. Doc. A/51/789 (1997) (criticizing the ICTR's administration and management, and finding, among other things, that not a single administrative area of the
ICTR registry "functioned effectively"); Beresford, supra note 279, at 130-31 (summarizin the Office of Internal Oversight Services report).
Todorovid, SentencingJudgement, supra note 336, at para.
114.
Sikirica, SentencingJudgement, supra note 355, at
para. 150.
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even if they wait until the last possible moment to plead and fail to
cooperate with the prosecution.
The ICTR's evolution towards accepting plea bargaining followed a
similar path. The first ICTR defendant to plead guilty-Jean Kambanda-thought that he and the prosecution were plea bargaining.
Kambanda pled guilty at his first appearance; he immediately began
providing the prosecution with invaluable information, and he promised future cooperation and testimony. Kambanda, not surprisingly,
expected leniency in return,"6 7 but no true bargaining took place because the prosecution never promised Kambanda anything.6681 Indeed,
under the circumstances, the prosecution really could not promise
Kambanda anything. Kambanda was the highest-ranking political
authority in Rwanda during the genocide. Given his high-level status
and substantial involvement in the planning and execution of the
genocide, if anyone deserved a life sentence, it was Kambanda.
No
matter how much assistance Kambanda offered, the prosecution simply
could not request a more lenient sentence without generating horrendous publicity. For these same reasons, the Trial Chamber could not
engage in implicit plea bargaining and impose a more lenient sentence.
The prosecution and the Trial Chamber avoided a public relations
disaster by requesting and imposing a life sentence on Kambanda, but
Kambanda's subsequent disavowal of his guilty plea and his refusal to
continue cooperating caused no small amount of trouble. Fortunately
for the ICTR, the next defendant to plead guilty-Omar Serushago-was
of sufficiently minor status that the prosecution could request a twentyfive-year sentence, and, more importantly, the Trial Chamber could
impose a mere fifteen-year sentence. The Serushago Trial Chamber said
little about the value it placed on Serushago's guilty plea, but by the
time the same Trial Chamber sentenced Ruggiu, plea bargaining had
become sufficiently well-accepted that the Trial Chamber could publicly

At the pre-sentencing hearing, Kambanda's lawyer asked for a sentence of no
longer than two years' imprisonment. Kambanda, Transcript, supra note 577, at 33;
Lawyer for the FormerRwandan Prime Minister Argues for Light Sentence, INTERNEWS (Sept.
4, 1998), at http://www.internews.org/activities/ICTRReports/ICTRNewsSep98
.html.
668 The prosecution did implement protective measures
for Kambanda's family,
but those measures only became necessary as a result of the cooperation Kambanda
agreed to provide. Thus, they cannot be seen as compensation for Kambanda's cooperation or his guilty plea.
6
Jean Paul Akayesu, the first person the ICTR convicted of genocide, received
a
life sentence, and he was just a relatively lowly mayor of the Taba commune. Akayesu,
Judgement, supranote 279, at para. 54.
667
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announce that guilty pleas were to be encouraged by granting "some
form of consideration" to those who make them.6'7 0
Thus, both Tribunals came to endorse plea bargaining. Flush with
the success of obtaining custody over more and more important defendants, the Tribunals now must also succeed in managing their dockets
effectively. With that need in mind, they have turned to plea bargaining. In this way, the Tribunals' functional need for expeditious alternatives to necessarily lengthy trials trumped the structural and ideological
features that seemed to militate against plea bargaining. That it did
should come as little surprise. Even on the Continent, caseload pressures and the introduction of certain adversarial procedures have increased the use of bargaining analogues, thus showing that criminal justice systems, whatever their structure or ideological underpinnings,
must find some way of adapting to work pressures.
While adapt they must, structure and ideology play a significant role
in determining the way in which a criminal justice system adapts. Specifically, the way in which the Tribunals conceive of and practice plea
bargaining reflects their unique amalgam of adversarial and nonadversarial procedures and the purposes for which the Tribunals were
established. As noted above, Tribunal proceedings are more partydominated than Continental proceedings but more judge-dominated
than American proceedings. In keeping with this balance of power,
then, Tribunal parties can bargain about sentence recommendations,
but Tribunal judges retain firm control over the ultimate sentence.
Whereas many American judges happily admit to following the prosecution's recommendations in every case671 and American federal judges,
among others, must accept an agreed-upon sentence or allow the defendant to withdraw his plea,67 ' Tribunal judges jealously guard the sentencing function, repeating over and over that they are not bound by
673
any agreements reached by the parties.
The Tribunals' greater orientation toward establishing truth is also
reflected in the forms of plea bargaining that have emerged, and particularly in the fact that neither Tribunal has practiced charge bargaining. 74 The Tribunals consider that one of their primary purposes is to

670
671

RuggiuJudgement and Sentence, supra note 339, at para. 55.
See Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History, supra note 13, at 1063-65 & n.21

(providing statistics as to how many recommendations are followed by various judges).
672 LAFAVE ETAL., supra note 12, at 1003.
673 Of course, by sentencing within the range agreed upon by the prosecution,
the

Chambers implicitly legitimize the Prosecutor's recommendations.
674 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (defining charge bargaining).
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create a historical record. Because charge bargaining virtually always
distorts the factual basis upon which a conviction rests, its use would severely undermine that purpose. American prosecutors routinely charge
crimes that they cannot prove and accept pleas to lesser crimes that the
defendant clearly did not commit, practices consistent with a disputeresolution orientation but hardly likely to "establish[] the truth behind
the evils perpetrated" in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. ('" Indeed,
for charge bargaining to be a viable form of plea bargaining at the Tribunals, the factual distortion would have to be especially great because
Tribunal prosecutors have little power to manipulate sentences through
their charging decisions. That is, the Trial Chambers have such broad
sentencing discretion, and the crimes within the Tribunals' jurisdiction
are so grave, that a prosecutorial promise to withdraw a few charges
here and there will not provide a defendant adequate certainty that he
is getting something for his plea. So long as the remaining charges are
sufficiently serious, a Trial Chamber may well sentence a defendant to
the same term of imprisonment. In other words, while an American defendant can plead guilty to manslaughter instead of first-degree murder
and be assured of a sentence reduction, a Tribunal defendant who admits to killing five people and beating twenty in satisfaction of charges
that he killed eight people and beat thirty can be assured of nothing.
Thus, in order to provide the defendant with anything close to certain
value for his plea, the prosecution would have to withdraw charges in
such a way as to fundamentally alter the criminal conduct at issue. That
is something Tribunal prosecutors have not been willing to do.
The Tribunals' treatment of guilty pleas, once made, also reflects
their orientation toward establishing truth and the substantial involvement of Tribunal judges. Before accepting a guilty plea, the
Trial Chamber must satisfy itself not only that the plea is voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, but also that there is a factual basis for the
plea.Y While some American jurisdictions now also require judges to
make a determination as to the accuracy of the plea,6" Tribunal
judges appear less inclined to rely blindly on the agreement reached
by the parties. In Ruggiu, for instance, the Trial Chamber actively
questioned the prosecution as to various details of the crimes and
challenged its interpretation of certain facts.Y Further, Tribunal plea

675

Erdemovid, Second SentencingJudgement, supra note 343, at para. 21.

676

ICTY RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62bis; ICTR RPE, supra note 264, at R. 62(B).
supra note 12, at 1000.
Ruggiu, Transcript, supra note 628, at 76-101.

677 LAFAVE ETAL.,
678
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agreements typically contain a detailed recitation of the facts,"" and
these are often published, almost in their entirety, in the Trial Chambers' judgments along with background facts to provide the context in
which to understand the defendants' admissions. While these judgments are shorter than those following a full-scale trial, they nonetheless provide substantial information about the crimes and thereby
contribute to the creation of a historical record.
The Tribunals' practice of plea bargaining has also avoided thus
far many of the abuses associated with American plea bargaining. For
instance, because the Tribunals' work is so widely publicized, the Tribunals are less inclined to issue excessively lenient sentences to encourage guilty pleas since such sentences generate bad press. Prosecutors are also less likely to base their sentencing concessions on the
strength of the evidence because making vastly different sentence recommendations for defendants indicted for similar wrongdoing is difficult to justify publicly. In addition, the Tribunals' broad disclosure
obligations prevent prosecutors from using an information differential to mislead defendants. 68° Finally, plea bargaining has proven especially valuable to the Tribunals because, unlike most American plea
bargaining in which the only benefit to the prosecution is the guilty
plea itself,681 in virtually every case of Tribunal plea bargaining, the
prosecution has also benefited from the defendant's substantial cooperation. The inclusion of substantial cooperation makes Tribunal
plea bargaining less objectionable as a theoretical matter because, by
exchanging sentencing concessions for information leading to the
conviction of more serious offenders, the government trades commensurate things: "It agrees to a sacrifice of its legitimate penological
objectives in one case in exchange for an opportunity to further similar but more important penological purposes in others. 6 82 As a practical matter, obtaining substantial cooperation is vitally important to

See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Jelisid, Case No. IT-95-10-PT, Factual Basis for the
Charges to Which Goran Jelisik Intends to Plead Guilty (Sept. 29, 1998) (supporting
specific counts to which the defendant pled guilty with witness statements) (on file
with author); Ruggiu, Plea Agreement, supra note 641 (containing twenty-two pages
and 181 paragraphs of facts supporting the plea).
680 Cf Mann, supra note 193, at 286 (noting that because Israeli prosecutors
know
that defendants will receive all relevant information through disclosure mechanisms,
the prosecutor's "representation of the case to the defendant's attorney must be tightly
rooted in the evidence [thus]. .. [t]here is little room for puffing in this procedural
679

setting").
Gifford, supra note 13, at 44.
ChangingPlea BargainingDebate,supra note 13, at 671.

682 Alschuler,
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the Tribunals. Unlike the Nuremberg prosecutors who had the benefit
of a voluminous paper trail, ICTY and ICTR prosecutors must obtain
information from human sources, 6813 and the best human sources as to,
say, a particular command structure or the orders given within that
structure, are likely to be the subordinates who received those orders.
In sum, the Tribunals have reconciled their conflicting tendencies.
They have begun practicing plea bargaining to expedite proceedings,
but they have been practicing it in a way that is largely compatible with
their unique procedural amalgam and institutional goals. The Tribunals themselves have justified their practice of plea bargaining on several grounds, and this Section ends with an assessment of those justifications. The Trial Chambers have candidly acknowledged the financial
and administrative benefits of guilty pleas, but they have gone on to
maintain that guilty pleas indicate certain desirable character traits in
defendants who make them and advance the Tribunals' truth-telling
function.
Turning to the first justification, the Trial Chambers have considered a guilty plea as evidence of honest 4 and of an "acknowledgement of [the defendant's] mistakes and crimes," which "is a healthy
application of reason and sentiment. '6 These statements, reminiscent
of similarly naive-sounding platitudes appearing in decades-old American cases and scholarly literature, have no factual basis. Indeed, emSee Alvarez, supra note 272, at 2066 ("In the Tadi case, the vast bulk
of the evidence to convict came not in the form of ... written records of atrocities, as at
Nuremburg-but through the oral testimony of... live eyewitnesses .... ");Meltzer,
supra note 412, at 908 ("Nor does the ICTY have Nuremberg's paper trail.... Hence,
the ICTY must rely heavily on oral testimony from witnesses ... ").
684 Ruggiu, Judgement and Sentence, supra note
339, at para. 55; Erdemovid, Second SentencingJudgement, supra note 343, at para. 16(ii).
685 Ruggiu,Judgement and Sentence, supra
note 339, at para. 55.
686 For instance, in 1968, the American Bar
Association Project on Standards for
Criminal Justice offered six possible justifications for granting sentencing concessions
to defendants who plead guilty, including that by pleading guilty, the defendant "has
acknowledged his guilt and shown a willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct." ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.8(a) (ii); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970)
(indicating that a defendant who pleads guilty "demonstrates by his plea that he is
ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of
mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than
might otherwise be necessary"); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 270 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (noting the argument that "the defendant's choice of plea shows whether he
recognizes and repents his crime"); Commonwealth v. Bethea, 379 A.2d 102, 105 n.8
(Pa. 1977) (noting that "it is argued that a guilty plea indicates a first step toward rehabilitation and, conversely, that a refusal to plead guilty indicates a lack of remorse
and repentance"). But see Alschuler, ChangingPlea BargainingDebate, supra note 13, at
683
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pirical studies indicate that the primary difference between defendants
who plead guilty and those who do not involves the ability to calculate
risk. Defendants who plead guilty make a rational calculation and opt
for the course of least punishment. Most similarly situated defendants
who insist on a trial do so because of an overly optimistic assessment of
the likelihood of acquittal. That is, good judgment and self-interest in687
spire most guilty pleas, not honesty, responsibility, or any other virtue.
One can assume that by attributing positive character traits to defendants who plead guilty, the Trial Chambers are attempting to differentiate the sentences they impose on defendants who plead guilty from
the harsher sentences they impose on defendants who do not, on
grounds more penologically relevant than the guilty plea itself. While
the Trial Chambers' desire to blur the harsh realities of plea bargaining
is understandable, they do not advance their cause by making indefensible statements.
As for the truth-telling justification, at first glance, it is not particularly compelling. In most of the Tribunal cases involving guilty pleas,
the defendants have not admitted to anything more than that which the
prosecution was intending to prove at trial. Such guilty pleas, then, arguably would not advance truth-telling unless the defendants would
otherwise have been acquitted. In other words, one could argue that
when the factual basis of the conviction would be the same for a conviction following a trial as a conviction following a guilty plea, the guilty
plea advances truth-telling only to the extent that it renders the conviction a certainty.
Although that analysis may be persuasive with respect to domestic
crime, it does not adequately capture the complex role of truth-telling
in the international tribunals. Truth-telling is not valuable as an end in
itself but as a means of promoting healing and reconciliation, and
whether or not it advances those ends has a great deal to do with how
the truth is told. Specifically, there is a profound difference between
facts found by ajudge and facts admitted by a perpetrator in how those
facts are received and in their potential to promote reconciliation. For
every Damir Dogen and Omar Serushago, there are thousands who behaved similarly and will not be prosecuted, and many others who benefited from their violent acts-Serbs who appropriated the homes of Muslims after their rightful inhabitants were expelled and Hutu who
stepped into powerful positions, even if only briefly. While any convic661-62 (refuting the argument that guilty pleas are evidence of remorse and repentance); Nemerson, supra note 25, at 723 (same).
687 See Alschuler, ChangingPleaBargainingDebate,
supra note 13, at 661-69.
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tion can lead to deterrence, self-conviction has the additional potential
to encourage those similarly situated to reflect on and face up to their
roles in the horror. And, as importantly, it has considerable potential
to bring closure to victims and enable them to forgive. The defiant
Slobodan Milogevi6, 6 who disdains even the attempt to hold him accountable, is far more likely to fuel further ethnic hatred and revenge
than the seemingly repentant Kambanda, who, in his lawyer's words,
"felt that he had a duty to himself, to his own country to tell the truth
about Rwanda and the genocide."8 9
Whether that potential for enhancing reconciliation is realized
depends largely on the circumstances of the self-conviction, and in
particular on the defendant's perceived motivation for pleading
guilty. To put it bluntly, guilty pleas that seem to be motivated by sincere remorse and a genuine acknowledgement of wrongdoing are
much more likely to encourage dialogue and forgiveness than guilty
pleas that appear motivated solely by sentencing concessions. Kambanda himself provides a perfect example. Before being sentenced,
Kambanda "declare[d] that his prime motivation for pleading guilty
[was his] profound desire to tell the truth... [and] his desire to contribute to the process of national reconciliation." 690 Building on this
theme at the pre-sentencing hearing, Kambanda's lawyer read a letter
Kambanda had received from a woman whose husband and three
children had been killed in the genocide. After recounting her loss,
she stated:

M8 On Milogevid's first appearance before the ICTY, he announced: "I consider
this Tribunal a false Tribunal and the indictment a false indictment." Prosecutor v.
Milogevid, Case No. IT-99-37, Transcript, 2 (July 3, 2001) [hereinafter Milogevid, July 3
Transcript], at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/010703IA.htm. The Trial Chamber
eventually turned off Milogevi's microphone when he continued in the same fashion.
See id. at 5 ("The Interpreter: I'm sorry, the microphone is not on."); Prosecutor v.
Milogevid, Case No. IT-99-37-I, Transcript, 19-20 (Aug. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Milogevid,
Aug. 30 Transcript] ("The Accussed:... [C]an I speak or are you going to turn off my
microphone like the first time?"), at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/010830SC.htm.
Milogevid refused to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty, Milogevid,July 3 Transcript, supra,
at 4, and he refused to inform himself as to the crimes charged against him in the indictment. Milogevid, Aug. 30 Transcript, supra, at 8-10; see also Miloevie Brings Air of Scorn
to Tribunal N.Y. TIMEs, July 4, 2001, at A7 (reporting Milogevid's refusal to hear the indictments against him). In subsequent court appearances, Milogevid has continued to
show nothing but contempt for the Tribunal that he refuses to recognize. Milogevie Again
Defies Tibuna INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 30, 2001, at 7 ("After four months in prison,
former President Slobodan Milolevid remained combative Monday, denouncing new war
crimes charges by U.N. prosecutors and scorning three lawyers assigned to his defense.").
M9 Kambanda, Transcript, supra
note 577, at 25.
690

Kambanda, Plea Agreement, supra note 4, at paras. 4-5.

2002]

PLEA BARGAINING OFINTERNA TIONAL CRIMES

151

[N]aturally, I would always have reasons to hate you until the end of my

days. I have every reason to become an extremist. However, your [guilty
plea] rekindles hope in me particularly because the perpetrators of the
genocide if they recognize their guilt [sic], reconciliation among Rwandans would become inevitable.69'

However much Kambanda's guilty plea might initially have advanced
reconciliation and forgiveness, those goals were dealt a severe blow
when Kambanda, not receiving the sentence reduction he expected,
stopped cooperating with the prosecution, disavowed his guilty plea,
and attempted to litigate his guilt.
The Tribunals, thus, attempt to use the guilty plea's potential to
promote reconciliation as ajustification for rewarding it with sentencing concessions, but rewarding it with sentencing concessions undermines its potential to promote reconciliation. Indeed, the only way to
be sure that a defendant has the "right" motivation for pleading guilty
is to eliminate any other motivation-that is, to eliminate sentencing
concessions. However, that is not a viable option because doing so
would substantially reduce the number of guilty pleas. Perhaps with
these realities in mind, the Trial Chambers continue to reward guilty
pleas with sentencing concessions but at the same time encourage defendants to couch them in the right language by treating statements
of remorse as mitigating factors, and by commenting negatively when
such statements are not forthcoming.9
Indeed, the Trial Chambers
seem so keen to encourage statements of remorse that they have
treated as mitigating factors statements that do not even sound especially remorseful. For instance, Todorovi6 spent more time describing
the horror of war in his town and the difficulties that Todorovid himself
suffered than he did expressing remorse for his part in creating much
of that horror. Todorovid further sought to diminish his responsibility
by claiming that he never wanted to be police chief but that "destiny or
a set of unfortunate circumstances put [him] in that position, and at
the worst possible time, the time of war."'6 9 Finally, although Todorovi6

691
692

Kambanda, Transcript, supra note 577, at 28.
See., e.g., Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, Judgement, para. 513

(Mar. 15, 2002) at http://www.un.org/icty/krnojelac/trialc2/udgement/krntj020315e.pdf;Jelisid,Judgement, supra note 312, at para. 127 (stating that the accused
showed no remorse in trial, and that the remorse he expressed to the expert psychia-

trist was of questionable sincerity); Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 1,
at para. 51 (commenting that Kambanda has not "expressed contrition, regret or sympathy for the victims in Rwanda").
69. Prosecutor v. Todorovid, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript,
59 (May 4, 2001) (on
file with author).
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pled guilty to beating one man to death, severely beating numerous
others, and sexually assaulting others still, he said nothing of those acts
in his statement but rather noted only that "he lacked the courage to
prevent the illegal and inhuman activities that were going on.''694 The
Sikirica defendants appear to have modeled their statements on
Todorovi 's, so they are not much better. Yet the Chambers, eager to
promote reconciliation, excerpt the best parts of the statements for the

judgment, pronounce the statements "sincere,'' '5 and treat them as
mitigating factors. Although the Trial Chambers' efforts are not especially adept, their motivations are understandable.
CONCLUSION

States have traditionally been rather chauvinistic about their own

criminaljustice systems and suspicious of foreign systems. Indeed, prior
to the mid-1960s, criminal procedure was of relatively little interest to
comparaivists. ' 9'1 About that time and following, however, American
scholars, dissatisfied with certain inefficiencies of the American criminal
justice system, and in particular with the widespread use of plea bargaining needed to counteract those inefficiencies, looked with longing
to the simple, efficient Continental criminal proceedings that could be
provided to virtually all criminal defendants. But, while many reforms
were discussed, few were undertaken.!)
In more recent years, Continental countries, now imposing their criminal sanctions on more ethnically diverse populations, have adopted certain adversarial procedures
that better reflect the distrust with which minority populations often
view governmental officials. The systems have therefore converged to
some degree, but they still retain their essential features. In particular,
the United States has retained most of its adversarial trial procedures
and thus continues to maintain its heavy reliance on plea bargaining

694

Id. at 59-60. Todorovid also stated that he "didn't have sufficient courage or de-

termination to prevent volunteers and local criminals from committing evil and plundering the non-Serb population." Id. at 59.
695 Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 355, at paras. 152, 194, 230; see also
Todorovi6, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 336, at para. 92 (pronouncing Todorovid's expressions of remorse "genuine").
696 See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 177, at i; see alsoJoachim Herrmann, Criminal
Justice Policy and Comparativism: A Eurapean Perspective, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS, supra note 52, at 130-37 (finding that comparativists considered
criminal justice "an exclusively domestic matter" until the need for reform arose in
post-Socialism Eastern Europe).
697 SeeJ6rg et al., supra note 112, at 48-49, 54 (noting calls for reform, but lamenting that fundamental changes have not occurred).
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while Continental countries still provide comparatively simple and inexpensive trials and continue to provide them to virtually all defendants
charged with serious crimes.
The judges of the ICTY and ICTR had the opportunity to blend the
best of both systems when they drafted the Tribunals' procedural rules,
and although their initial amalgam was predominantly adversarial in
character, the judges did not provide for the mainstay of adversarial
procedures, the plea bargain. With few, if any, defendants in the dock
and consequently few trials on the horizon, there was little reason to
provide for expedient alternatives to trial. Further, Tribunal judges
from civil law countries were unfamiliar with plea bargaining, and the
whole idea of it appeared unseemly and inconsistent with the noble
mission that the Tribunals had undertaken. Noble as it may be, however, the Tribunals' mission has been a difficult one to fulfil. Tribunal
crimes are complex and usually cannot be proved without the testimony
of dozens of witnesses and the admission of boxes of exhibits. Witnesses and evidence are far away, difficult to locate, and costly to transport to the Tribunals. Witnesses must be protected and evidence must
be translated. Tribunal proceedings consequently take forever and cost
the moon.
During its eight-year existence, the ICTY has amended its RPE
twenty-two times, with many, if not most, of those amendments seeking
to make Tribunal proceedings quicker and more efficient. 98 The Tribunals have thus adopted many Continental procedures, and in doing
so, have significantly altered the nature of Tribunal proceedings. The
introduction of these more efficient procedures helps, but many of
the reasons that Tribunal trials are so long and complex are not amenable to remedy by procedural rule. Pre-trial judges can review wit698 Most other amendments can be classified as gap-filling;
the early versions of the
RPE were understandably brief and general, see Michi~le Buteau & Gabriel Oosthuizen,
When the Statute and Rules Are Silent: The Inherent Powers of the Tribunal, in ESSAYS ON

ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note

27, at 65-66 (noting that the Rules of Evidence and Procedure are "fairly basic"); Jon
Cina & David Tolbert, The Office of the President: A Third Voice, in ESSAYS ON ICTY
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 27,

at 86 ("The initial version of the Rules was necessarily limited in scope."); Developments
in the Law, supra note 388, at 1985 ("Although the rulemakers codified the procedures

to a greater extent than had their predecessors at Nuremberg and Tokyo, they also intentionally left the Rules vague, expecting many of the details to be worked out
through amendments and case-by-case adjudication."), and many of the amendments
provided necessary detail as the Tribunals resolved unforeseen difficulties, see Askin,
supranote 251, at 19 ("During the course of [the Tadi6] trial, many Rules were added or
amended to reflect evolving needs and unforeseen circumstances affecting the defendant
and the victims and witnesses.").
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ness lists, for instance, but they cannot make those witnesses easier to
find or less expensive to transport and protect. Relieving much of the
burden of Tribunal trials requires eliminating some of those trials altogether. So, while the Tribunals adopt more and more nonadversarial procedures, they have at the same time begun practicing
that hallmark of the adversary system-plea bargaining.
Plea bargaining practices vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
and the Tribunals have developed forms of plea bargaining that reflect their unique procedural amalgam, institutional structure, and
wide-ranging goals. Plea bargaining practices at the Tribunals are
more circumscribed than they are in the United States, and despite
bargaining between ICTY prosecutors and defendants over sentence
recommendations, Tribunal judges continue to exercise considerable
control over the sentencing function. Further, plea bargaining at the
Tribunals is thus far practiced at the margins. Occasional Tribunal
defendants plead guilty, in contrast to the United States, where only
occasional defendants have trials. Plea bargaining does not occur in
every Tribunal case or even in most every case. Indeed, more than
one Tribunal prosecutor told me that they do not initiate plea discussions; although they are happy to respond to any offers made by defense counsel, they do not feel comfortable beginning the negotiations. Although this reticence might fade as more plea bargaining
takes place, it highlights the fact that plea bargaining is not currently
considered the primary method of case disposition, as it is in the
United States, but a useful expedient in the occasional case.
Even occasional instances of plea bargaining are distasteful to purists, but the "culture of impunity" 699 that provides context to the Tribunals' establishment and current operations cautions against seeking
ideal international criminal prosecutions. Atrocities that we would
now label genocide or crimes against humanity have taken place
throughout human history, 7°° yet they have virtually never been pun,99Louise Arbour, The Prosecution of International Crimes: Prospects
and Pitfalls, I
WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 13, 23 (1999) (describing the "'culture of impunity,' where enforcement of humanitarian law is the rare exception and not the rule" (footnote omitted)).
700 Howard Ball states:
Whether it was the poisoning of springs and wells to kill the enemy, showing
no quarter to a defeated enemy in the field, mistreating prisoners of war, laying siege to undefended towns populated by civilians, or intentionally killing
groups of people, young and old alike, because of race, color, religion, or
ethnicity, the world has for centuries experienced war, war crimes, and acts of
brutality that violated the customs and conventions of war and the "conscience" of humanity.
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ished by criminal sanctions.'O The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were
supposed to usher in an era of accountability for international
crimes,7 2 but a violent and bloody fifty years passed 7°3 before the international community mustered the political will to establish the

BALL, supra note 288, at 11; see alsoJean Graven, Les crimes contre l'humaniti,76 RECUEIL
DES COuRS 427, 433 (1950) (noting that crimes against humanity are as old as humanity
itself); Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Genocide: A Crime Against Mankind, in SUBSTANTIVE
AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 21, at 117-18
(noting that "[t]he history of the human race abounds with episodes of genocide" and
chronicling some of them).
701 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 570-71 (2d rev. ed. 1999) (listing mass atrocities that were not prosecuted); CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 3 (1996) ("Silence and impunity have been the norm rather than the exception .... ); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The
Future of InternationalCriminalJustice, 11 PACE INT'L L. REV. 309, 312 (1999) (describing
the twentieth century as one in which approximately 250 conflicts around the world led
to an estimated 70 to 170 million deaths through genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes, with virtually none of the perpetrators brought to justice).
702 SCHARF, supranote 251, at xiii ("There was hope that the legacy
of Nuremberg
would be the institutionalization of a judicial response to atrocities committed by anyone, anywhere around the globe.").
703 See id. (noting Stalin's purges, China's Cultural Revolution, Cambodia's killing
fields, and Argentina's Dirty War, among other massacres); Akhavan, supra note 269, at
815 ("Idi Amin, Mengistu, Pol Pot, Sadaam Hussein, and a litany of other mass murderers living without fear of punishment underscore [s] the tragic culture of impunity
that has prevailed in the international arena for so long."); Makau Mutua, Never Again:
Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 167, 169
(1997) ("The horrors in Cambodia under Pol Pot, Uganda under Idi Amin, Guatemala
under the military, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, among many others, did little to
push states to national or international prosecution of heinous crimes against civilian
populations.").
Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention, and other
treaties require states parties to prosecute offenders in domestic courts, such courts
have been severely underutilized for the prosecution of international crimes. SeeJohn
Dugard, Bridging the Gap Between Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw: The Punishment of
Offenders, 324 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 445, 453 (1998) (noting that "[n]ational courts have
a poor record when it comes to the prosecution of war crimes and other international
crimes
arising
out of armed
conflicts"),
http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/
5cacfdf48ca698b641256242003b3295/ldaee6e828886alf412566c70051c269?OpenDocu
ment; Axel Marschik, The Politics ofProsecution: European NationalApproaches to War Crimes,
in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 65, 87 (Timothy L.H. McCormack & GerryJ. Simpson eds., 1997) (noting that there have been no war
crimes trials in the United Kingdom since the 1950s); see also Douglass Cassel, The ICC's
New Legal Landscape: The Need to Expand U.S. DomesticJurisdictionto Prosecute Genocide, War
Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 378, 381-87 (1999) (discussing the inability of United States courts to prosecute many instances of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes for lack of appropriate domestic jurisdiction and substantive legislation).
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ICTY and ICTR.
And once the Tribunals were established, the international community provided them only inconstant support, funding them inadequately at their outsets0 0 and failing to assist themparticularly the ICTY-in obtaining custody over defendants. v°6 In
The proposal to create an international criminal tribunal to prosecute
those
responsible for the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia met with considerable opposition. See, e.g., Alfred P. Rubin, An InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Former Yugoslavia?,
6 PACE INT'L L. REv. 7, 17 (1994) (describing the ICTY as "a model of the legal order
under which the laws of war are administered by an 'impartial' agent of organized humanity," and criticizing it for its "fundamental incompatibility" with the Westphalian
model, "under which the laws of war are administered by each body corporate of the
international legal order within its own competence"). Some argued that the Tribunal
would obstruct peace negotiations. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 250, at
202-03; MERON, supra note 281, at 282 (suggesting that the Tribunal may "obstruct
peace negotiations" because "those who make decisions at the negotiating table . . .
[would not] agree to provisions that might endanger their leadership and bring them
to justice"); Akhavan, supra note 269, at 738 (noting that "commentators of a realist
persuasion suggested that the ICTY was.., an impediment, and not a contribution, to
reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia"); Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in
Bosnia, 88 AM.J. INT'L L. 500, 500-02 (1994) (arguing that it is not realistic to expect
Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian political and military leaders who are potential targets
of the Tribunal "to agree to a peace settlement in Bosnia if, directly following the
agreement, they may find themselves in the dock"). Others objected to the Tribunal's
establishment by means of a Security Council resolution. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI &
MANIKAS, supra note 250, at 203 ("Some [Security Council] members ... felt that such a
judicial organ should be established by the [General Assembly] or by a multilateral
treaty."); Simonovic, supra note 272, at 444-45 (noting that "Brazil and China expressed
concern that the interpretation of Security Council powers had been overstretched"
and that "Mexico presented an official report, challenging the Security Council's
authority to act as it did"). Scharf thus considered it "[a]gainst great odds" that the
ICTY was in fact created. SCHARF, supra note 251, at xv; see also Christian Tomuschat,
InternationalCriminalProsecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg Confirmed, 5 CRIM. L.F. 237,
237 (1994) ("One may call it truly amazing that the international community, acting
through the Security Council, has been able to set up two international criminal jurisdictions in the recent past.").
705See LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 382, at
VI(B) (describing the
ICTR's funding as "inadequate and unpredictable since its inception"); MERON, supra
note 281, at 280 (mentioning the ICTYs "budgetary difficulties"); RATNER & ABRAMS,
supra note 259, at 188 (noting both Tribunals' "resource problems"); SCHARF, supra
note 251, at 79-84 (detailing the ICTY's funding difficulties); Catherine Ciss6, The International Tribunalsfor the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 115 (1997) (stating that the ICTR's "inadequate budget" led to inefficient work); Meltzer, supra note 412, at 908 (noting the
IC'TYs "serious underfunding and understaffing"); Sara Darehshori, Inching Toward
Justice in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1998, at A25 (reporting that when co-counsel in
Akayesu arrived in Arusha, she and her approximately twelve office-mates "created
makeshift desks by removing doors from their hinges and placing them on crates...
fought over garbage cans, which [they] used as chairs [and that] ....
[t]he one telephone line was erratic").
706See supra text accompanying notes 281-86. As one commentator
noted in 1999,
"[a]lthough the political will existed to establish a criminal tribunal for the purposes of
704
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other words, the international community's commitment to ending
impunity for mass atrocities is, at best, a fragile one.
Whether the establishment of international criminal tribunals, ad
hoc or permanent, is the most appropriate response to large-scale violence is a controversial question that cannot be addressed here. 7 But
assuming that international prosecutions are a desirable response in
at least some circumstances, those prosecutions must be conducted at
a cost and length palatable to the international community. Since
they were created, the ICTY has spent nine years and nearly $500 million to dispose of fourteen cases, 70' and the ICTR has spent eight years
and more than $400 million to dispose of nine cases, 7°9 statistics that
can do the cause of international criminal justice little good. Plea
bargaining, though problematic for a host of reasons, will enhance
the Tribunals' productivity, and will probably enhance the likelihood
that future international criminal prosecutions are undertaken. Given
the short and troubled history of international criminal justice, that
benefit may be worth the costs.

trying individuals accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the political will
apparently does not exist to arrest and detain such individuals to enable the Tribunals
to function as designed." Penrose, supra note 281, at 361.
707 For assessments of various responses to mass violence,
see MARTHA MINOW,
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS
VIOLENCE 48-51 (1998); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 259, at 131-200; ALFRED P.
RUBIN, ETHICS AND AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 170-85 (1997); Payam Akha-

van, Beyond Impunity: Can InternationalCriminalJusticePrevent FutureAtrocities?, 95 AM. J.
INT'L

L. 7, 7-31 (2001); Alvarez, supra note 272, at 2108-12; Kenneth Anderson, Nuren-

bergSensibility: Telford Taylor's Memoir of the NurembergTrials, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 281, 292-

94 (1994) (book review).
708 ICTY Key Figures, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm
(last updatedJuly 24, 2002).
See Coalition for International Justice, Frequently Asked Questions-ICTR (provid-

ing budgetary figures from 1996-2000), at http://www.cij.org/index.cfm?fuse
action=faqs&tribunallD=2 (last visited Aug. 6, 2002); Financing of the International
Criminal Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsiblefor Genocide and Other Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsiblefor Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
NeighbouringStates Between 1 January and 31 December 1994, U.N. GAOR 5th Comm.,

55th Sess., Agenda Item 128, at para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/55/692 (2000) (appropriating
more than $93 million for 2001); Financingof the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
HumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible
for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1January and 31 December 1994, U.N. GAOR 5th Comm., 56th Sess., Agenda Item

132, at para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/248 (2001) (appropriating over $192 million for
the biennium 2002-2003).
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